Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves Bryar Johnson, who was seriously injured in a traffic accident while riding his motorcycle. After the other drivers' insurance policies paid out their liability limits, Johnson sought additional uninsured motorist (UM) coverage from his parents' automobile policy with Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (MetLife). MetLife denied Johnson's claim under an exclusion in his parents' policy that denies coverage to resident-relative insureds injured while operating their own motor vehicle that is not insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy. Johnson had liability insurance on his motorcycle but had declined to purchase the offered UM coverage.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma ruled in favor of MetLife. The court found that although Johnson was a resident relative and insured under his parents' policy, he had the opportunity to purchase his own UM coverage but declined it. The court interpreted Oklahoma law as requiring Johnson to either obtain liability insurance and UM coverage on his motorcycle policy or forego UM coverage under his parents' policy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that MetLife's exclusion does not defeat UM coverage for Johnson. Because Johnson carried liability insurance on his motorcycle, the court held that his motorcycle was "insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy." The court found that MetLife's exclusion did not require that resident-relative insureds carry UM coverage on their own motor vehicles to be eligible for UM benefits on other applicable policies. Therefore, MetLife owes Johnson UM coverage from his parents' policy. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a car accident that occurred on February 6, 2016, involving Melissa A. Keller and her daughter, Caroline Keller, who were insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The Kellers were hit by Xavier Blanchard, who ran a red light. Xavier's vehicle was owned by his father, Harvey Blanchard, and was also insured by State Farm. The Kellers filed a complaint against the Blanchards on January 8, 2018, alleging negligence and wantonness. However, the complaint did not state any claim against State Farm. On January 26, 2023, the Kellers settled their claims with the Blanchards and subsequently filed an "Amended Complaint for Underinsured Motorist Coverage" against State Farm on January 27, 2023.State Farm moved to dismiss the new complaint, arguing that it was filed outside the six-year statute-of-limitations period applicable to contract-based claims. The insurer contended that the claim did not relate back to the original complaint as Keller knew or should have known that State Farm was her insurer. Keller, on the other hand, argued that her claim for underinsured-motorist coverage did not accrue until the date she settled with the Blanchards. The trial court denied State Farm's motion to dismiss on June 12, 2023, without making specific findings of fact or law.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted State Farm's petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to dismiss Keller's underinsured-motorist claim against it. The court held that the accrual date for a direct uninsured/underinsured-motorist claim against an insurer is the date of the accident. Since Keller did not assert her direct claim for underinsured-motorist benefits against State Farm until more than six years after the date of the accident, that claim was time-barred. View "Ex parte State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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The case involves Century Aluminum Company and its subsidiaries (Century), and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London (Lloyd's). Century uses river barges to transport alumina ore and other materials for its aluminum smelting operations. In 2017, the Army Corps of Engineers closed key locks on the Ohio River, causing Century to seek alternative transportation. Century filed a claim with Lloyd's, its maritime cargo insurance policy provider, for the unanticipated shipping expenses. While Lloyd's paid $1 million under the policy's Extra Expense Clause, it denied coverage for the rest of the claim.The case was first heard by the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Century sought a declaration that its denied claims were covered by the insurance policy and requested damages for Lloyd's alleged breach of contract among other violations of Kentucky insurance law. Lloyd's sought summary judgment, arguing that the policy did not cover the claims. The district court sided with Lloyd's.The appeal was heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Century argued that the policy's All Risks Clause, Risks Covered Clause, Shipping Expenses Clause, and Sue and Labour Clause required Lloyd's to cover the additional shipping expenses. The court rejected these arguments, affirming the district court's ruling. The court held that under the All Risks Clause and Risks Covered Clause, Century's alumina did not suffer any physical loss or damage. As for the Shipping Expenses Clause, it covered the risk of a failed delivery, not an untimely one. Lastly, under the Sue and Labour Clause, Century was required to mitigate Lloyd's exposure under the policy, but it did not obligate Lloyd's to pay anything for reducing losses that fall outside the policy. View "Century Aluminum Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London" on Justia Law

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The case involves Indemnity Insurance Company of North America ("Indemnity") and Unitrans International Corporation ("Unitrans"). Indemnity, as the insurer of Amgen, a pharmaceutical company, paid for the loss of a pallet of pharmaceutical drugs that was damaged while being unloaded from a truck at an airport. The pallet was being transported from Amgen's facility in Dublin, Ireland to Philadelphia, and Unitrans, a logistics company, had been engaged to arrange the transportation. Indemnity, as Amgen's subrogee, sued Unitrans for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of bailment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted Unitrans's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Unitrans qualified as a contracting carrier under the Montreal Convention, and therefore, Indemnity's action was time-barred by the Convention's statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that contracting carriers are subject to the Montreal Convention, but found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Unitrans was a contracting carrier. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that a contracting carrier, as defined by Article 39 of the Montreal Convention, is a person that, as a principal, makes a contract of carriage governed by the Montreal Convention with a consignor, and an actual carrier performs the whole or part of the carriage by virtue of authority from the contracting carrier. The court found that there was enough evidence cutting both ways to create a genuine question as to whether Unitrans qualifies as a contracting carrier. View "Indemnity Inssurance Co. of North America v. Unitrans International Corp." on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiffs, Carl and Mary Ellen Schnell, filed an insurance claim with their home insurer, State Farm Lloyds, after a hailstorm damaged their home's roof. State Farm accepted coverage for some claims but denied others, including the claim that the City of Fort Worth required the Schnells to replace their entire roof, rather than just the damaged tiles. The Schnells sued, and the district court ruled in favor of State Farm. The Schnells appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that there were genuine issues of material fact that prevented the case from being resolved through summary judgment. The court found conflicting evidence regarding whether a building code administrator had flatly denied the Schnells' request for spot repairs or had conditioned his decision on the Schnells confirming that the old and new tiles on their roof did not interlock. The court also found a genuine dispute of fact about whether the Schnells' roof tiles were damaged by a covered risk like wind or hail, which would have triggered their insurance coverage.Thus, the court vacated the district court's summary judgment in favor of State Farm on the Schnells' breach of contract and Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act claims. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Schnell v. State Farm Lloyds" on Justia Law

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This case involved Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco) appealing against the trial court's dismissal of its third-party spoliation and negligence claims against the Michaelis Corporation. The dispute originated from a fire in a home insured by Safeco, which resulted in over $500,000 worth of damage. Safeco hired Michaelis to restore the property, and during this process, the kitchen, identified as the origin of the fire, was demolished and the dehydrator believed to have caused the fire was discarded. Safeco subsequently sued Michaelis for negligence and spoliation of evidence, arguing this impeded its ability to bring a successful claim against the dehydrator manufacturer.The trial court dismissed both claims, sparking Safeco's appeal. The Indiana Supreme Court held that under the given facts, Indiana common law did not recognize the tort of third-party spoliation and therefore upheld the trial court’s ruling. The court established that a special relationship did not exist between Safeco and Michaelis that would impose a duty on Michaelis to preserve the evidence. Furthermore, the court ruled it was not reasonably foreseeable that Safeco would be harmed by the loss of the dehydrator. Public policy considerations also weighed against recognizing third-party spoliation absent a special relationship.In addition, the court ruled that Safeco's negligence claim was essentially a third-party spoliation claim and failed for the same reasons. The court also dismissed Safeco's argument that Michaelis assumed a duty of care to preserve the evidence, as this was not alleged in the amended complaint and was raised for the first time on appeal. View "Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana v. Blue Sky Innovation Group, Inc" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho upheld a decision by the Idaho Industrial Commission that required an employer and its insurance company to pay the full amount of a medical invoice for an employee's workers' compensation claim, even though the employee's medical expenses were fully covered by Medicaid. The employee, Nickole Thompson, worked at Burley Inn, whose workers' compensation insurer was Milford Casualty Insurance Company. After Thompson suffered a work-related injury, Burley Inn and Milford denied her workers' compensation claim for a hip replacement surgery. Thompson underwent the surgery anyway, with Medicaid covering the cost.Thompson later filed a claim with the Industrial Commission, which found the hip replacement surgery was connected to her work injury and awarded her medical benefits based on the full invoice amount for the surgery. Burley Inn and Milford appealed the decision, arguing that the "full invoice" rule should not apply when Medicaid has already covered the medical expenses.The state Supreme Court, however, upheld the Commission's decision, asserting that excluding Medicaid recipients from the full invoice rule could encourage employers to deny workers' compensation claims of workers they suspect of being Medicaid recipients. The court also noted that the full invoice rule was consistent with Idaho's workers' compensation law and was intended to prevent employers from denying legitimate claims. The Court also concluded that the employer and insurer had standing to bring the appeal and that Thompson was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Thompson v. Burley Inn, Inc." on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute between Zhen Feng Lin, a food delivery driver who was severely injured in a car accident, and his employer's insurance company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. After the accident, Lin received a settlement from the at-fault driver's insurance company, and workers' compensation benefits from his employer's insurance carrier, Hartford Fire Insurance Company. Lin later sought additional recovery under his employer's underinsured motorist policy with Hartford Accident.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Lin and Hartford Accident had not entered into a "settlement agreement" as defined by the insurance policy. As a result, the court ruled that the policy limits should be reduced by the amount Lin received in workers' compensation benefits. The court also agreed with the district court that Lin should be credited for the amount he paid to settle the workers' compensation lien.Additionally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lin's counterclaims for bad faith and breach of contract. The court found no plausible claim supporting the argument that Hartford Accident unreasonably delayed settling Lin's claim. Lin's request for statutory penalties for Hartford Accident's purported delay in handling his claim was also denied.Finally, the court denied both parties' motions for sanctions. Lin's appeal was deemed frivolous in part, but the court exercised its discretion not to impose sanctions. View "Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Lin" on Justia Law

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The case centers on an insurance dispute between Cardinal Building Materials, Inc. and Amerisure Insurance Company following damage to Cardinal's facility by a tornado. Cardinal initially received a payout from Amerisure but later claimed additional coverage under its policy. Amerisure requested further documentation to support these additional losses, which Cardinal provided, albeit in an unorganized and delayed manner. Amerisure also requested Cardinal to provide a representative for an examination under oath, which Cardinal complied with. Subsequently, Amerisure argued that Cardinal had failed to cooperate as outlined in the insurance policy due to its delayed and disorganized submission of documents, and changes to the claim amount. The district court granted summary judgment in Amerisure's favor, holding that Cardinal had materially breached the insurance policy's cooperation clause.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court noted that while Cardinal's document submission and response times were not ideal, the policy did not specify a particular format or schedule for document submission. The court also pointed out that Amerisure did not provide evidence that it had requested a "signed, sworn proof of loss" from Cardinal, a requirement in the policy. As such, the court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Cardinal's actions constituted a material breach of the cooperation clause, making summary judgment inappropriate.The court did not address Amerisure’s alternative arguments that Cardinal failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding damages or present evidence from which a jury could rationally estimate Cardinal’s damages. The court deemed these arguments to be fact-intensive and best left to the district court to decide in the first instance. The court therefore vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cardinal Building Materials, Inc. v. Amerisure Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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In this case, an automobile repair technician, Donijah Virgo, was injured when his stalled vehicle was hit by a car driven by Heather Michelle Roberts while he was attempting to push it across a road. Virgo sued Roberts for negligence, but the Mobile Circuit Court granted Roberts a partial summary judgment, dismissing Virgo's counterclaim. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision.In October 2020, Virgo was diagnosing a mechanical problem in a Crown Victoria automobile. The car stalled on a road, and he moved it into a median left-turn lane. After waiting for about 10 minutes for traffic to clear, Virgo attempted to push the car across the road, during which Roberts's vehicle collided with it, resulting in major damage and serious injuries to Virgo.Roberts sued Virgo for negligence and wantonness and sought uninsured motorist benefits from GEICO Casualty Company. Virgo filed a counterclaim alleging negligence on Roberts's part. After settling the claim against GEICO, Roberts moved for a summary judgment on Virgo's counterclaim, which the circuit court granted.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court concluded that Virgo failed to present substantial evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his counterclaim, and thus, the circuit court did not err in granting a summary judgment in favor of Roberts. View "Virgo v. Roberts" on Justia Law