In 2010, Baby Fold, which provides Illinois foster-care services, placed three-year-old Kianna in the care of Lamie, who killed Kianna in 2011 and was convicted of murder. The administrator of Kianna’s estate maintained a state court wrongful death action against Baby Fold, which settled for $4 million. Baby Fold’s insurer, Philadelphia, sought a declaratory judgment that its maximum indemnity is $1 million under a primary policy and $250,000 under an excess policy. Baby Fold and the administrator argued that the excess policy’s limit is $5 million. The district court entered judgment in favor of Philadelphia and dismissed the counterclaims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the policies were ambiguous. The primary policy comprises several “coverage parts,” each of which outlines specific types of losses. One part covers losses arising out of negligent supervision of foster parents who commit physical abuse; this part provides $1 million of coverage. The excess policy then provides additional coverage for physical-abuse claims, but the background limit of $5 million drops to $250,000 for each instance of “abusive conduct”, a term that aggregates multiple acts of abuse by multiple persons. The policies contain anti-stacking provisions to prevent an insured from benefiting from consecutive policies’ limits when injuries or losses span multiple periods. The primary policy accomplishes this by defining “abusive conduct” to aggregate multiple acts of abuse into one unit. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Chicago Trust Co." on Justia Law

In this property insurance coverage dispute, the insurer appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment and coverage award to the landlord. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding the deductible was satisfied. In this case, the district court erred in determining that the Tenants and Neighbors Provision was ambiguous and concluding that it extended coverage under this property insurance policy for the landlords' attorneys' fees amount and the post-judgment interest amount. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment -- and an order declaring that the policy did not provide coverage to the landlord -- in favor of the insurer. View "Ace American Insurance Co. v. The Wattles Company" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for American Family in an action brought by plaintiff seeking uninsured motorist coverage from American Family after he was involved in a car accident. The court held that material facts remained unresolved regarding the proximate cause of the accident. In this case, a question of fact exists regarding whether the other driver's entry into the highway, alone, caused the accident or whether the brown car's entry ahead of the other driver caused him to stop, making the accident unavoidable. View "Cottrell v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Claimant Mark Pilling filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits which insurer Travelers Insurance denied. An administrative law judge (ALJ) reversed insurer’s denial, but the Workers’ Compensation Board reversed the ALJ’s order and reinstated insurer’s denial on the ground that claimant was a nonsubject worker because he was a partner in the business for which he worked and he had not applied for coverage as a nonsubject worker. The Court of Appeals affirmed the board’s order. On claimant’s petition, the Oregon Supreme Court granted certiorari review and concluded that, even assuming claimant was a nonsubject worker, he was entitled to coverage because the business for which he worked made a specific written application for workers’ compensation coverage for him, which insurer accepted. Therefore, the Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board and remanded to the board for further proceedings. View "Pilling v. Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this equitable contribution action brought by Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (collectively, Nationwide) against Erie Insurance Exchange the Supreme Court vacated the final judgment of the circuit court granting Erie's demurrer and dismissing Nationwide's claim for equitable contribution, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law. In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 293 Va. 331 (Nationwide I), the Supreme Court resolved an insurance coverage dispute between Nationwide and Erie. Thereafter, Nationwide brought this action seeking reimbursement for Erie's share of a monetary settlement that Nationwide had paid to a tort claimant while the case was on appeal. The circuit court sustained Erie's demurrer to the claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have denied Erie's demurrer to the claim of equitable contribution based upon the coverage allocation that the Court had determined in Nationwide I. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court to enter an order awarding contribution to Nationwide consistent with the Court's allocation of coverage liability in Nationwide I and with the views expressed in this opinion. View "Nationwide Mut. Fire Insurance Co. v. Erie Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the circuit court's distribution of proceeds from Nicklaus Macke's wrongful death settlement the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court overruling Appellant's motion for a second continuance and in apportioning only a small percent of the wrongful death settlement to Appellant, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion. Nicklaus, the son of Pamela Eden and Loren Macke (Macke), suffered fatal injuries in a motor vehicle collision with Austin Patton. Macke negotiated a settlement with Patton's insurance company, which offered to pay its policy limit in satisfaction of Macke's wrongful death claim against Patton. The circuit court apportioned ninety-eight percent of the settlement to Nicklaus' father and two percent to Eden, who played little to no role in Nicklaus' childhood and upbringing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in overruling Appellant's motion for continuance; and (2) the circuit court did not erroneously apply the law in making its apportionment judgment, and the apportionment was not against the weight of the evidence. View "Macke v. Patton" on Justia Law

After Hamas fired rockets from Gaza into Israel, Universal moved the production of their televisions series out of Jerusalem at significant expense. Universal filed an insurance claim for coverage of those costs under a television production insurance policy and the insurer, Atlantic, denied coverage based on the policy's war exclusions. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Atlantic in part and held that Atlantic breached its contract when it denied coverage by defining Hamas' conduct as "war" or "warlike action by a military force." Because the district court did not address the third war exclusion regarding whether Hamas' actions constituted "insurrection, rebellion, or revolution," the panel remanded for the district court to address that question in the first instance. Consequently, the panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on Universal's bad faith claim because it turned on the district court's erroneous analysis of the first two war exclusions. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Universal Cable Productions, LLC v. Atlantic Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders requiring it to deposit $21 million in disputed insurance proceeds to maintain its federal statutory interpleader claim and dismissing Ronald Gean and the Estate of Jean Carol Gean for lack of personal jurisdiction in its declaratory judgment claims. The Geans are citizens of Michigan and were injured in an automobile accident in Illinois by a truck operated by Rex, a Missouri company. The court agreed with the district court that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because Acuity did not deposit the disputed amount into the court's registry. The court rejected Acuity's argument that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the Geans. Rather, the court held that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Geans in the remaining declaratory judgment action. View "Acuity v. Rex, LLC" on Justia Law

Matthew Dye brought an action against Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company and GEICO Indemnity Company, seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., for injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle he had recently purchased. At plaintiff’s request, plaintiff’s father had registered the vehicle in plaintiff’s name and obtained a no-fault insurance policy from Esurance. The declarations page of the policy identified only plaintiff’s father as the named insured. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was living with his wife, who owned a vehicle that was insured by GEICO. After Esurance and GEICO refused to cover plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff filed a breach-of-contract claim against both insurers along with a declaratory action, alleging that either Esurance or GEICO was obligated to pay his no-fault PIP benefits and requesting that the trial court determine the parties’ respective rights and duties. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review centered on whether an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident was excluded from receiving statutory no-fault insurance benefits under the no-fault act when someone other than an owner or registrant purchased no-fault insurance for that vehicle. The Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]t least one owner or registrant must have the insurance required by MCL 500.3101(1), and ‘when none of the owners maintains the requisite coverage, no owner may recover [personal injury protection (PIP)] benefits.’ ” The Supreme Court concluded an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle was not required to personally purchase no-fault insurance for his or her vehicle in order to avoid the statutory bar to PIP benefits. Rather, MCL 500.3101(1) only requires that the owner or registrant “maintain” no-fault insurance. The Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Dye v. Esurance Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Allstate filed suit under Insurance Code section 1871.7 on behalf of the People against defendant, her mother, and others for insurance fraud in violation of Penal Code section 550, which makes it unlawful to submit false or fraudulent claims to an insurance company. The jury found in favor of Allstate. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's ex parte application for a stay. The court also held that unlawful conduct under section 550 does not require a misstatement of fact in the insurance claim. In this case, defendant and her mother committed insurance fraud in violation of section 550 where they perpetrated a deceitful insurance scheme designed to acquire insurance proceeds illegally for personal gain. View "People ex rel. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Suh" on Justia Law