Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries
Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tipton
After defendants Frayba and William Tipton pled guilty to committing insurance fraud, they were ordered to pay victim restitution to Nationwide Insurance Company of America (Nationwide). Later, Nationwide petitioned the trial court to convert the criminal restitution orders to civil judgments against both defendants. Defendants opposed. Relying on Penal Code1 section 1214, the trial court granted Nationwide’s petition and entered civil judgments against the defendants. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred because (1) Nationwide “failed to provide citation to any . . . authority supporting” conversion of the victim restitution orders to civil judgment; and (2) Nationwide’s petition lacked supporting evidence. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tipton" on Justia Law
North Shore Medical Center, Inc., et al v. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company
Eight South Florida hospitals dutifully provided out-of-network emergency treatment to numerous Cigna customers. When Cigna reimbursed the hospitals just 15% of what they had charged, the hospitals sued, accusing Cigna of paying less than the “community” rate. As proof, the hospitals showed that they normally receive five times as much for the care they provided here. In response, Cigna asserted that the hospitals’ data proved nothing because, it insisted, the relevant “community” necessarily includes more than just the eight plaintiff hospitals. The district court agreed and granted Cigna summary judgment.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that even if the relevant “community” here extends beyond the eight plaintiff hospitals, their receipts alone are enough to create a genuine factual dispute about what the “community” rates are. The court reasoned that to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff needn’t present evidence that compels a single, airtight inference—just evidence that allows a reasonable one. The court explained that the way to rebut an inference allegedly skewed by limited data is to add data. And Cigna can do just that—at trial. If it can show there that most other providers in the “community” charge less than the plaintiff hospitals do, then it may well debunk the hospitals’ estimate. But unless and until that happens, it remains the case that a reasonable jury could conclude that the eight plaintiff hospitals’ rates reflect the prevailing community rate—and thus that Cigna shortchanged them. View "North Shore Medical Center, Inc., et al v. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Gold Coast v. Crum & Forster Spclt
Gold Coast Commodities, Inc. makes animal feed using saponified poultry and plant fats at its Rankin County, Mississippi facility. Because its production process involves, among other things, old restaurant grease and sulfuric acid, Gold Coast is left with about 6,000 gallons of oily, “highly acidic,” and “extremely hot” wastewater each week. The City of Brandon, Mississippi, told a state agency that it believed Gold Coast was “discharging” that “oily, low-pH wastewater” into the public sewers. As a result, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality launched an investigation. Two months before the Department’s investigation, Gold Coast purchased a pollution liability policy from Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company. After the City filed suit, Gold Coast—seeking coverage under the provisions of its Policy—notified the insurer of its potential liability. But Crum & Forster refused to defend Gold Coast. The insurer insisted that because the Policy only covers accidents. The district court agreed with Crum & Forster—that the City wasn’t alleging an accident.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that here, the Policy is governed by Mississippi law. In Mississippi, whether an insurer has a duty to defend against a third-party lawsuit “depends upon the policy's language.” The district court found that the “overarching” theme of the City’s complaint, regardless of the accompanying “legal labels,” is that Gold Coast deliberately dumped wastewater into the public sewers. The court agreed with the district court and held that Gold Coast isn’t entitled to a defense from Crum & Forster. View "Gold Coast v. Crum & Forster Spclt" on Justia Law
The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Equitas Insurance
Defendant, a reinsurer, appealed from a district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to Plaintiff, its reinsured. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erroneously held that its reinsurance obligations to Plaintiff are co-extensive with Appellee’s separate insurance obligations to a third party and that it presented no triable issue of fact on its late-notice defense.
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the district court correctly determined that English law, which governs the relevant reinsurance policy, would interpret that policy to provide coverage that is coextensive with Plaintiff’s separate insurance obligations. The district court also correctly rejected Defendant’s late-notice defense because Defendant has not shown the extreme facts necessary under English law to support recognition of that defense where, as here, timely notice is not a condition precedent to coverage. View "The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Equitas Insurance" on Justia Law
Bonner v. Triple-S Vida, Inc.
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Triple-S Management Corporation and Triple-S Vida, Inc. (collectively, Triple-S) and dismissing this case brought by Dora Bonner, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bonner's discovery-related motions and did not err in considering the evidence at the summary judgment stage.Bonner brought several claims alleging that Triple-S denied her millions of dollars of proceeds from certain certificates and devised a scheme to defraud her. After denying Bonner's motion to compel discovery and extend the discovery deadline, the district court concluded that Triple-S had established as a matter of law that the persons behind the fraudulent scheme were not related to Triple-S. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel and motion for consideration; and (2) properly granted summary judgment for Triple-S. View "Bonner v. Triple-S Vida, Inc." on Justia Law
Green Enterprises, LLC v. Hiscox Syndicates Limited at Lloyd’s of London
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a motion to compel arbitration in this insurance dispute, holding that the district court correctly granted the motion to compel arbitration brought by the underwriters of Green Enterprises, LLC's insurance policy, all syndicates at Lloyd's of London (Underwriters).After a fire destroyed one of its plants, Green, a Puerto Rican recycling company, filed an insurance claim. Underwriters denied the claim, after which Green brought this lawsuit. Underwriters filed a motion to compel arbitration under an arbitration clause in the parties' contract. The district court granted the motion and dismissed Green's claims without prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted the motion to compel. View "Green Enterprises, LLC v. Hiscox Syndicates Limited at Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law
Laake v. Western & Southern Financial Group Flexible Benefits Plan
The Plan is an employee welfare benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). W&S denied Laake’s claim for extended long-term disability (LTD) benefits, indicating that Plan limited LTD benefit to 24 months if the disabling condition is due to any mental, nervous, psychiatric condition or chronic pain.” The Plan refers to “chronic pain syndrome.” No medical doctor had ever diagnosed Laake with “Chronic Pain Syndrome.” Although the Plan fails to define “Chronic Pain Syndrome,” Schedule C—which lists conditions that are excluded from extended LTD benefits—explicitly incorporates the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which does not specifically include “Chronic Pain Syndrome,” but does detail the symptoms and features of “Pain Disorder.” W&S did not ask Laake’s physicians in its questionnaires about the Mental Illness exclusion or “Chronic Pain Syndrome.” None of her physicians indicated that there was any psychological basis for her pain.The district court determined that Laake was entitled to benefits, imposed penalties against W&S, and awarded Laake attorney’s fees and costs, 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In denying benefits without any explanation or supporting evidence, W&S acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Because W&S provided notice that implied one basis for its denial of benefits, but in its final decision included an entirely new basis, it failed to substantially comply with ERISA’s notice requirements. The court noted a finding that W&S engaged in particularly “egregious conduct throughout the course of this litigation.” View "Laake v. Western & Southern Financial Group Flexible Benefits Plan" on Justia Law
Henley, Lotterhos & Henley, PLLC v. Bryant
Amanda Bryant filed suit against State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) and its attorneys, Henley, Lotterhos & Henley, PLLC (HLH), claiming negligence, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on HLH’s actions in a prior subrogation claim. HLH argued in a Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment that it was not a proper party to this lawsuit because it was the legal representative of the adverse party in the prior subrogation matter. For this reason, HLH argued it did not owe a duty to Bryant that could give rise to tort liability. The trial court disagreed with HLH and denied its motion. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted HLH’s petition for interlocutory appeal. Based on caselaw, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order and rendered judgment in favor of HLH. Because State Farm was still party to the action, the case was remanded to the trial court for continuation of the proceedings. View "Henley, Lotterhos & Henley, PLLC v. Bryant" on Justia Law
Tranbarger v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of New York
After gallbladder surgery, Tranbarger began suffering from multiple medical conditions, including physical pain and chronic fatigue. At work, Tranbarger continued as an accounts receivable manager, a primarily sedentary position. Her supervisor modified some of her responsibilities to accommodate her reduced capacity. Tranbarger resigned in July 2016, citing pain and fatigue.Through her employer, Tranbarger was enrolled in Lincoln's disability insurance plan. About 14 months after resigning, Tranbarger filed a claim for long-term disability benefits. Tranbarger was entitled to benefits if she could show “total disability” such that she was “unable to perform each of the [m]ain [d]uties” of an accounts receivable manager during a six-month “Elimination Period” following her resignation. Tranbarger presented a Social Security ruling in her favor, doctors’ notes, and statements from individuals otherwise familiar with her condition. Lincoln denied Tranbarger’s claim. She sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of Lincoln. Tranbarger did not demonstrate a continuous inability to perform the main duties of an accounts receivable manager during the six months following her resignation. Although she provided diagnoses from the Mayo Clinic and established that she suffered pain and fatigue, there was little evidence about whether Tranbarger could perform her job functions. View "Tranbarger v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of New York" on Justia Law
Brown Goldstein Levy LLP v. Federal Insurance Company
The law firm of Brown Goldstein Levy LLP (“BGL”) and one of its partners (collectively, “Appellants”) filed suit against their insurer, Federal Insurance Company (“Appellee”), when it refused to provide coverage for costs Appellants incurred after the Government investigated the partner, executed a search warrant at BGL’s office, and notified the partner that his representation of certain clients may present a conflict of interest. The district court dismissed Appellants’ complaint, holding that there was no “Claim,” as that term is defined in the insurance policy, and alternatively that any costs Appellants incurred were excluded from the policy’s definition of “loss.”
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that there is no “Claim.” Neither the search warrant application nor the resulting search warrant is “written demand[s] or written request[s] for . . . nonmonetary relief . . . against an Insured” as required by the Policy. Therefore, the Search Warrant Claim fails because Appellants cannot state a claim for relief. The Target Conflict Letter makes no demand or request for relief against an Insured. The Government’s request to be notified promptly as to how the partner intends to proceed is not a request for “the redress or benefit, esp. equitable in nature (such as an injunction or specific performance), that a party asks of a court.” The Conflict Letters are not “Claims.” The court explained that despite Appellants’ attempts to characterize them as “demands,” they are not. Therefore, Appellants cannot state a claim as to the Partner Claim. View "Brown Goldstein Levy LLP v. Federal Insurance Company" on Justia Law