Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Selective in an action brought by Selective, seeking a declaration that a subcontractor's policy did not require it to defend or indemnify CSC General. CSC entered into a subcontract that required it to be an "additional insured" on Glosson's general liability policy, and Glosson's policy was with Selective.In this case, Glosson damaged the parking lot through its handling of the cement (adding too much water) before it hardened. Thus, the damage was caused, at least in part, by handling of the cement, not handling of real property. Therefore, the court concluded that CSC is an additional insured for the property damage Glosson caused. The court also concluded that the district court erred in looking beyond the denial letter in focusing at length on five coverage issues not stated in Selective's coverage denial. The court explained that the district court did not properly apply North Dakota's estoppel law on insurance coverage. Finally, the court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate on the bad faith claim. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Selective Way Insurance Co. v. CSC General Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying Federal's special motion to strike a civil complaint for fraud as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, as well as the trial court's order overruling its evidentiary objections. In the underlying action, plaintiffs filed lawsuits against Moldex, alleging Moldex manufactured defective air respirators and masks that failed to protect them. This litigation ensued between Truck, Federal, and First State over coverage and the extent to which Truck was obligated to reimburse Federal and First State for payments made for Moldex's defense and indemnity, plus interest. Federal argued that Truck's complaint for fraud is based on Federal's "acts in furtherance of its right to petition" and are thus protected speech pursuant to section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on Federal's evidentiary objections and concluded that the first amended complaint is not relevant to the court's review of the anti-SLAPP motion. The court also affirmed Federal's special motion to strike Truck's complaint for fraud, concluding that Federal met its burden of showing that Truck's complaint for fraud arises from Federal's protected activity, and that the trial court correctly found that Truck met its burden to establish a probability of success on the merits of its fraud cause of action.In this case, a factfinder considering all the circumstances could reasonably conclude that when Truck signed the July 2013 settlement agreeing to pay nearly $5 million to Federal and to dismiss its pending appeal of the February 2013 judgment, it did so in reasonable reliance on Federal's course of conduct and Federal's stated position that it had a duty to defend Moldex pursuant to its policy. Furthermore, Truck agreed to file a request for dismissal of its pending appeal, with prejudice, when it entered the settlement agreement, which further supports a finding of extrinsic fraud by Federal. Finally, Federal is mistaken in its belief that Truck "released the claim for which it now seeks damages" by signing the July 2013 settlement agreement. View "Truck Insurance Exchange v. Federal Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Mesa sent faxes promoting its services. Some recipients had not consented to receive such faxes, and the faxed materials did not include an opt‐out notice as required by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C). Orrington filed a class‐action lawsuit under the TCPA and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and alleged that Mesa’s conduct constituted common‐law conversion, nuisance, and trespass to chattels for Mesa’s appropriation of the recipients’ fax equipment, paper, ink, and toner. Mesa notified its insurer, Federal, of the Orrington action. Federal declined to provide a defense. After Mesa and Orrington reached a settlement, Mesa sued Federal, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and improper delay and denial of claims under Colorado statutes.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Federal. The policy’s “Information Laws Exclusion” provides that the policy “does not apply to any damages, loss, cost or expense arising out of any actual or alleged or threatened violation of “ TCPA “or any similar regulatory or statutory law in any other jurisdiction.” The exclusion barred all of the claims because the common-law claims arose out of the same conduct underlying the statutory claims. View "Mesa Laboratories, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co." on Justia Law

MAO-MSO acquired rights to collect conditional payments that Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs) made if a primary insurer (such as automobile insurance carriers) has not promptly paid medical expenses. MAO-MSO sued those primary payers. The district court proof of required actual injury. Specifically, MAO-MSO needed to identify an “illustrative beneficiary”— a concrete example of a conditional payment that State Farm, the relevant primary payer, failed to reimburse to the pertinent MAO. MAO-MSO alleged that “O.D.” suffered injuries in a car accident and that State Farm “failed to adequately pay or reimburse” the appropriate MAO. The district court determined that these allegations sufficed for pleading purposes to establish standing.As limited discovery progressed, MAO-MSO struggled to identify evidence supporting the complaint. One dispute centered on whether O.D.’s MAO made payments related to medical care stemming from a car accident before State Farm reached its limit under O.D.’s auto policy so that State Farm should have reimbursed the MAO. The payment in question was to a physical therapist. State Farm argued that the physical therapy services had no connection to O.D.’s car accident and related only to her prior knee surgery.The district court determined no reasonable jury could find that the payment related to O.D.’s car accident, meaning that MAO-MSO lacked standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Medicare Act may authorize the lawsuit but MAO-MSO fail to establish subject matter jurisdiction by establishing an injury in fact. View "MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified to three questions of law to the Georgia Supreme Court relating to a lawsuit brought in federal district court by Fife Whiteside, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Bonnie Winslett. Whiteside sued GEICO to recover the value of Winslett’s failure-to-settle tort claim against GEICO so that the bankruptcy estate could pay creditor Terry Guthrie, who was injured in an accident caused by Winslett. The certified questions certified asked the Supreme Court to analyze how Georgia law applied to an unusual set of circumstances that implicated both Winslett’s duty to give GEICO notice of suit and GEICO’s duty to settle the claim brought against Winslett. The Supreme Court was unable to give unqualified “yes” or “no” answers to two of the certified questions as they were posed; rather, the Court answered the questions only in the context of the circumstances of this particular case. "Winslett remains liable to Guthrie, even if her bankruptcy trustee succeeds on the failure-to-settle claim against GEICO; therefore, if the bankruptcy estate does not recover enough from GEICO to satisfy Guthrie’s judgment, the estate would not be fully compensated for Winslett’s damages, and GEICO would escape responsibility for breaching its settlement duty to Winslett. Such an outcome would deny Winslett the full measure of compensatory damages allowed under Georgia law." View "GEICO Indemnity Co. v. Whiteside" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the district court's determination that the insurance policy at issue covered all of the claimed property damage and that a Miller-Shugart settlement agreement was reasonable and unenforceable against Insurer, holding that the policy did not cover all of the claimed property damage.The court of appeals concluded that the settlement agreement was "unreasonable as a matter of law and unenforceable" against the insurer because the agreement failed to allocate between covered and uncovered claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the policies in this case covered some, but not all, of the property damage claimed by the insured; and (2) determining the reasonableness of an unallocated Miller-Shugart settlement agreement involves a two-step inquiry set forth in this opinion. View "King's Cove Marina, LLC v. Lambert Commercial Construction LLC" on Justia Law

An Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (State) employee with preexisting medical conditions was involved in a work-related motor vehicle accident in January 2017. The employee consulted with Dr. Teresa Bormann two days after the accident; Dr. Bormann referred the employee to chiropractic treatment. After several month of treatment, Dr. Bormann referred the employee to physical therapy at United Physical Therapy (UPT) for chronic neck pain and headache. After an evaluation UPT recommended eight weeks of twice weekly physical therapy. Dr. Bormann endorsed the treatment plan, and the employee’s symptoms improved enough that she reduced her physical therapy visits to once a week beginning in mid-January. She saw UPT three times in February 2018. Payment for these February visits became the main dispute before the Board. The State arranged an employer’s medical evaluation (EME) with a neurologist and an orthopedist. The EME doctors diagnosed the employee with a cervical strain caused by the accident as well as several conditions they considered preexisting or unrelated to the work injury. After the State filed a retroactive controversion of medical treatment, the employee’s healthcare provider filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking payment for services it provided before the controversion was filed. The State disputed its liability for payment, and after several prehearing conferences, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board set a hearing on the merits of the provider’s claim. The Board ordered the State to pay the provider approximately $510.00 for the services. The State appealed, disputing several procedural aspects of the decision, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. View "Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services v. Thomas et al." on Justia Law

American Modern Home filed suit against defendants for insurance fraud after a fire destroyed their home, and the jury found in favor of defendants.The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court did not err by refusing to admit evidence of one of the defendant's three prior convictions for sex offenses because they were highly probative on credibility. Furthermore, the danger of unfair prejudice, undue delay, and confusion did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. In view of the uncertainty in Missouri law, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its instruction about the meaning of "material" in cases regarding misrepresentations about the fire's cause or a proof of loss. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a supplemental instruction on vexatious refusal to pay in response to a jury question, and the district court did not err in excluding expert testimony on the grounds it was untimely disclosed and cumulative. Accordingly, the court remanded for a new trial. View "American Modern Home Insurance Co. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying a political subdivision's motion for summary judgment in this subrogation action, holding that summary judgment was improper.Great Northern Insurance Company filed this subrogation action seeking compensation from Transit Authority of the City of Omaha, d/b/a Metro Area Transit, under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-901 et seq., for funds paid on an insurance claim on behalf of its insured. Metro filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion, finding that Metro had failed to demonstrate that there was no genuine issue concerning Great Northern's affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was not proper under the facts of this case. View "Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Transit Authority of Omaha" on Justia Law

Bennie Stapleton sued GEICO for abusing the judicial process after GEICO obtained a default judgment against him that was later set aside. An interlocutory appeal arose from the circuit court's denial of GEICO’s motion to dismiss Stapleton’s complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds. The Mississippi Supreme Court took the opportunity presented by this case to overrule the recent judicial expansion of Mississippi Code Section 15-1-35 (Rev. 2019) because earlier Supreme Court decisions "strayed too far from the statute’s clear text." The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GEICO Casualty Company, et al. v. Stapleton" on Justia Law