Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries
USA Gymnastics v. Liberty Insurance Underwriter, Inc.
Larry Nassar, who was affiliated with USAG, sexually assaulted hundreds of female athletes. After Nassar’s conduct was revealed, USAG faced multiple lawsuits and investigations. USAG and its insurers, including Liberty, litigated questions about insurance coverage in an adversary proceeding before a bankruptcy court. In a previous appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision that Liberty had a duty to defend USAG. There were ancillary disputes over the amounts of attorneys’ fees that Liberty owed USAG. While an appeal was pending, USAG sought to enforce the order entitling it to reimbursement. Liberty resisted, asserting that large portions of the fees USAG claimed were not reasonable and necessary. The bankruptcy court recommended that the district court award USAG nearly all the requested fees. The district court adopted most of the bankruptcy court’s findings and entered judgment for USAG.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The lower courts correctly concluded that USAG was entitled to a presumption that the fees it incurred were reasonable and necessary despite Liberty’s challenges to the nature of USAG’s supervision of outside counsel and the proportion of fees paid by USAG. The particular form of supervision suggested by Liberty and the policyholder’s full payment of all the fees it incurred are not prerequisites for that presumption. Liberty failed to rebut the presumption. View "USA Gymnastics v. Liberty Insurance Underwriter, Inc." on Justia Law
ExxonMobil Oil Corporation v. TIG Insurance Company
TIG Insurance Company (“TIG”) appeals from a judgment and order of the district court. TIG asserts that Judge Ramos erred in ordering it to arbitrate a coverage dispute with ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (“Exxon”). Even if it was required to arbitrate, TIG contends that Judge Ramos erred in awarding Exxon prejudgment interest when confirming the arbitral award. After entering judgment, and after TIG had appealed, the district court clerk notified the parties that it was brought to Judge Ramos’s attention that he owned stock in Exxon when he presided over the case. Nothing in the record suggests that Judge Ramos was aware of his conflict at the time he rendered his decisions, and the parties do not suggest otherwise. TIG moved in the district court to vacate the judgment. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who denied the motion to vacate. TIG appealed from that denial as well.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to vacate and the district court’s order compelling arbitration, reversed in part its decision granting Exxon’s request for prejudgment interest, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that vacatur was not required because this case presents only questions of law, and a non-conflicted district judge reviewed the case de novo. As to the merits, the court held that the district court did not err in compelling arbitration because the parties were subject to a binding arbitration agreement, but that the district court erred in ordering TIG to pay pre-arbitral-award interest. View "ExxonMobil Oil Corporation v. TIG Insurance Company" on Justia Law
In the Matter of the Liquidation of The Home Insurance Company
The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s review was filed by appellant Zurich Insurance plc, German Branch (Zurich). Zurich sought to challenge a superior court order that granted the motion of the Insurance Commissioner of the State of New Hampshire, as Liquidator (Liquidator) of the Home Insurance Company (Home), for approval of the Claim Amendment Deadline pursuant to the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act (Act). Policyholders Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, Eli Lilly and Company, ViacomCBS Inc., and the Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis Settlement Trust (policyholders), submitted a brief in support of the Claim Amendment Deadline. The two questions presented were whether the superior court acted within its discretion: (1) “in granting the Liquidator’s motion and approving the Claim Amendment Deadline on the law, facts and circumstances presented”; and (2) in concluding that the Claim Amendment Deadline struck “a reasonable balance between the expeditious completion of the liquidation and the protection of unliquidated and undetermined claims” in accordance with RSA 402-C:46, I (2018). The Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative. View "In the Matter of the Liquidation of The Home Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Preferred Contractors Ins. Co. v. Baker & Son Constr., Inc.
The United States Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court. Cox Construction was the general contractor of a remodeling project. Cox hired Baker & Son Construction, Inc. as a subcontractor. A Baker employee allegedly caused a two-by-four to fall from a railing and strike Ronnie Cox, owner of Cox Construction, who later died from his injury. Baker allegedly called an insurance agent to alert them of the incident. The agent told Baker that no action needed to be taken because at that time, no claim existed. A few months later, Baker received a wrongful death claim from an attorney representing Cox’s widow. Baker notified its insurer, Preferred Contractors Insurance Company (PCIC) of the claim. PCIC denied coverage, but agreed to defend Baker under a reservation of rights. The certified question to the Washington Supreme Court related to the “claims-made” nature of the policy and the timing of Baker’s tender of Ms. Cox’s claim. The Supreme Court replied to the certified question that in light of RCW 18.27, a contractor’s commercial general liability insurance policy that requires the loss to occur and be reported within the same policy year, and provides neither neither prospective nor retroactive coverage violates Washington’s public policy. View "Preferred Contractors Ins. Co. v. Baker & Son Constr., Inc." on Justia Law
Macedo v. Automobile Insurance Co.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that a household exclusion in umbrella policy issued by The Travelers Indemnity Company (TIC) was valid and enforceable, holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Travelers on Count VIII of Plaintiffs' complaint.Michael Buarque de Macedo and his wife and child died in a two-vehicle collision in Montgomery County and a remaining child suffered permanent injuries. Michael and his wife were the named insureds of a primary automobile liability insurance policy issued by TIC. The policy contained a household exclusion purporting to preclude coverage for bodily injury or personal injury suffered by Michael or related individuals who resided in Michael's household. Plaintiffs (collectively, the Macedos) brought this action asserting several claims against Michael's estate and the State. Count VIII of the complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the household exclusion was void as against public policy and contrary to statute. The circuit court declared the household exclusion valid and enforceable. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that the household exclusion in TIC's umbrella policy was valid and enforceable. View "Macedo v. Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law
MSPA Claims 1, LLC. v. Tower Hill Prime Insurance Co.
MSPA Claims 1 LLC—the assignee of a now-defunct Medicare Advantage Organization—sued Tower Hill Prime Insurance Company to recover a reimbursable payment. The district court granted Tower Hill’s motion for summary judgment because it determined that MSPA Claims 1’s suit was untimely.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because it is at least “plausible” that the term “accrues” in Section 1658(a) incorporates an occurrence rule—in fact, and setting presumptions aside, the court wrote that it thinks that’s the best interpretation—that is how the court interprets it. Therefore, MSPA Claims 1’s cause of action accrued in 2012 when MSPA Claims 1’s assignor, Florida Healthcare, paid D.L.’s medical bills and became entitled to reimbursement through the Medicare Secondary Payer Act. Because that was more than four years before MSPA Claims 1 filed suit in 2018, its suit is not timely under 28 U.S.C. Section 1658(a). View "MSPA Claims 1, LLC. v. Tower Hill Prime Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Levy v. West Coast Life Insurance Co.
In 2001, Levy, a 37-year-old single mother of two, purchased a 20-year term life insurance policy from West Coast, with a $3 million benefit payable upon her death to her sons. In January 2019, Benita—in deteriorating physical and mental health—missed a payment. Approximately five months later, she died, having never paid the missed premium. West Coast declared the policy forfeited.Levy's sons filed suit, alleging breach of contract and that a late-2018 missed-payment notice failed to comply with the Illinois Insurance Code, which forbids an insurer from canceling a policy within six months of a policyholder’s failure to pay a premium by its due date (calculated to include a 31-day grace period) unless the insurer provided notice stating “that unless such premium or other sums due shall be paid to the company or its agents the policy and all payments thereon will become forfeited and void, except as to the right to a surrender value or paid-up policy as provided for by the policy.” West Coast’s 2018 notice incorporated much of the statutory language. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The Notice adequately alerted policyholders to the consequences of nonpayment; there was no need for the Notice to mention the company’s agents as alternate payees. View "Levy v. West Coast Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Carol H. Stewart v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company
Plaintiff sued to obtain two insurance benefits that she believes Hartford Insurance Company owes her: (1) long-term disability payments and (2) a waiver of life insurance premiums. Although it concedes that Plaintiff was covered by its policy, Hartford contends that she was ineligible for those benefits.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting Hartford summary judgment, concluding that Hartford’s determinations were permissible. The court explained that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability payments because Hartford’s interpretation of the disability exclusion was reasonable, and its conflict of interest didn’t lead it to make an arbitrary or capricious decision. Likewise, Plaintiff was not entitled to a waiver of life insurance premiums because she wasn’t disabled within the meaning of Hartford’s life insurance policy. View "Carol H. Stewart v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Norman International, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Company
The issue this appeal presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on an exclusionary clause in a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by Admiral Insurance Company (Admiral) to Richfield Window Coverings, LLC (Richfield). Richfield sold window coverage products, including blinds, to national retailers like Home Depot and provided retailers with machines to cut the blinds to meet the specifications of the retailers’ customers. Colleen Lorito, an employee of a Home Depot located in Nassau County, was injured while operating the blind cutting machine. She and her husband filed a civil action against Richfield, asserting claims for product liability, breach of warranty, and loss of spousal services. Admiral denied any obligation to defend or indemnify, asserting the claims were not covered under the policy based on the Designated New York Counties Exclusion of the insurance policy. Richfield filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to compel Admiral to defend it in the Lorito case and, if necessary, indemnify it against any monetary damages awarded to the plaintiffs. The Law Division granted summary judgment in favor of Admiral. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that “Richfield’s limited activities and operations have no causal relationship to the causes of action or allegations.” The Supreme Court found that the policy’s broad and unambiguous language made clear that a causal relationship was not required in order for the exclusionary clause to apply; rather, any claim “in any way connected with” the insured’s operations or activities in a county identified in the exclusionary clause was not covered under the policy. Richfield’s operations in an excluded county were alleged to be connected with the injuries for which recovery was sought, so the exclusion applied. Admiral had no duty to defend a claim that it is not contractually obligated to indemnify. View "Norman International, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Company " on Justia Law
Sullivan Mgmt v. Fireman’s Fund
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Sullivan Management, LLC operated restaurants in South Carolina and filed suit to recover for business interruption losses during COVID-19 under a commercial property insurance policy issued by Fireman's Fund and Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company (Fireman's). Specifically, the questions was whether the presence of COVID-19 in or near Sullivan's properties, and/or related governmental orders, which allegedly hinder or destroy the fitness, habitability or functionality of property, constituted "direct physical loss or damage" or did "direct physical loss or damage" require some permanent dispossession of the property or physical alteration to the property. The Supreme Court held that the presence of COVID-19 and the corresponding government orders prohibiting indoor dining did not fall within the policy’s trigger language of “direct physical loss or damage.” View "Sullivan Mgmt v. Fireman's Fund" on Justia Law