Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Heath and Vail Freyer, the parents of Alicia Freyer, were all riding in their vehicle, which was insured by State Farm, when the vehicle rolled over, causing Health's death. In Freyer I, the Court held that the subject policy provided coverage for Alicia's claim for derivative damages stemming from Health's death. After remand, State Farm paid the disputed coverage amounts. The Freyers then brought claims against State Farm for the wrongful denial of coverage for Alicia's derivative claims. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that State Farm had not breached the insurance contract when it failed to indemnify Vail for Alicia's derivative claims based on State Farm's "reasonable basis in law" defense; (2) properly granted summary judgment to State Farm on the common-law bad faith and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to State Farm on the Unfair Trade Practices Act claims. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freyer" on Justia Law

Defendant, an independent insurance broker, offered its clients insurance products from multiple insurance companies. Plaintiff, the State, brought this action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's failure to disclose to its clients certain contingent commission agreements that it had entered into with the insurance companies violated the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court improperly concluded that Defendant violated CUIPA; and (2) in the absence of a CUIPA violation in this case, the CUTPA claim failed. View "State v. Acordia, Inc." on Justia Law

Leonard Landa was the sole managing member of a Montana limited liability corporation. Landa carried commercial general liability insurance through Assurance. After a former employee of Landa's filed a complaint alleging that Landa had committed various torts by inducing him to work for Landa under allegedly false pretenses, Landa tendered defense of the former employee's claim to Assurance. Assurance refused to defend Landa, stating that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy. Landa filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief establishing that Assurance had a duty to defend and indemnify Landa and alleging violations of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), negligence, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Assurance, finding that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy and that Assurance was not liable under the UTPA because the denial of coverage was grounded on a legal conclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Assurance correctly declined to provide a defense where the former employee's complaint did not allege an "occurrence" and, as a result, did not trigger a duty to defend under the policy. View "Landa v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Holline and William Parsons (Plaintiffs) were enrolled in Today's Option, a Medicare Advantage Plan sponsored by the Pyramid Life Insurance Company (Pyramid). After Plaintiffs were each disenrolled from their respective plans, they brought suit against Pyramid, asserting numerous state law claims. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part declaring that the Medicare Act did not provide the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' claims in this case. Pyramid then moved for Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification and a stay pending appeal, requesting permission to file an interlocutory appeal on the issues of whether Plaintiffs' state-law claims arose under the Medicare Act and whether their claims, to the extent they did not arise under the Act, were expressly preempted by the Act. The circuit court certified this appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the finding supporting Rule 54(b) certification was in error. View "Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Parsons" on Justia Law

State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded. View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Intel Corporation appealed a Superior Court order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. (AGLI) in a dispute over the interpretation of an excess insurance policy under California law. AGLI sought and obtained a declaration from the Superior Court that AGLI had no duty to reimburse Intel for defense costs or indemnity claims in connection with Intel's defense of various antitrust lawsuits, because the underlying insurance policy limits of $50 million were not exhausted as required by the AGLI policy. Intel read the AGLI Policy to allow Intel to exhaust the limits of its underlying policy with XL Insurance Company by adding Intel's own contributed payments for defense costs to the amount of Intel's settlement with XL. Under Intel’s interpretation, the XL Policy was exhausted and AGLI's duty to defend was triggered. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that AGLI's reading was the only reasonable reading, and accordingly, affirmed. View "Intel Corporation v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., et al." on Justia Law

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs were doctors of chiropractic who alleged they had been victimized by the discriminatory practices of Iowa's largest health insurer, Wellmark, Inc. The district court (1) granted Wellmark's motion to dismiss claims brought under Iowa's insurance regulatory statutes because no private cause of action was provided therein; (2) granted Wellmark's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' antitrust claims based on the "state action" exemption found in Iowa Code 553.6(4); (3) granted summary judgment on claims alleging Wellmark breached its obligations under a judicially approved national class action settlement in Love v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n; and (4) granted summary judgment on several specific antitrust claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' antitrust claims based on the state action exemption, as the record failed to establish the challenged conduct fell within the exemption; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded. View "Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued behalf of themselves and all other purchasers of title insurance in Ohio from March 2004 through the present. They alleged that 22 title-insurance companies and the Ohio Title Insurance Rating Bureau violated antitrust laws (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; Ohio Rev. Code 1331.01) by conspiring to set unreasonably high title-insurance rates. The title-insurance companies filed rates with the Ohio Department of Insurance through OTIRB, a properly licensed rating bureau. Plaintiffs claimed that it was impossible for the Department to review the reasonableness of the rates collectively set by defendants because those rates are based principally on undisclosed costs, which allegedly included “kickbacks, referral fees and other expenses designed to solicit business referrals.” The district court dismissed, holding that the filed-rate doctrine applied to title insurance, and foreclosed claims for monetary damages and that Ohio statutes (Title XXXIX) completely foreclosed federal and state antitrust claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that there are at least 45 similar cases, nationwide. The filed-rate doctrine, which limits antitrust remedies available to private parties, is irrelevant because the actions are barred by state law. View "Katz v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins." on Justia Law

As the primary beneficiary under an insurance policy issued by Appellee Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Appellant Roger Goff brought a cause of action under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, asserting that Penn Mutual had violated the statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing. After deciding that Goff did not meet the accepted definition of either a first- or a third-party bad faith claimant, the trial court dismissed Goff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a primary life insurance beneficiary may assert a statutory bad faith action upon the death of the insured. Remanded. View "Goff v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Title insurance purchasers, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated consumers, claimed that insurers collectively fixed title insurance rates in violation of the Sherman Act. Title insurers in Delaware are required to file their insurance rates with the state Department of Insurance, Del. Code tit. 18, 2504(a). Insurers may comply with the state’s rate filing requirements through a licensed rating organization. Defendants, title insurers, are members of and file their rates through the Delaware Title Insurance Rating Bureau, which is licensed by the DOI; the statutory scheme authorizes cooperative action. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint is barred by the filed-rate doctrine (which precludes antitrust suits based on rates currently filed with federal or state agencies), lack of standing, and federal antitrust liability exemptions. The Third Circuit affirmed.