Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

The Trustee in bankruptcy of ESA appealed from the affirmance by the district court of the award of summary judgment by the bankruptcy court to Hanover. The bankruptcy court concluded that ESA's transfer of $1.375 million to Hanover within 90 days of ESA's filing a petition for bankruptcy was not an avoidable preference under 11 U.S.C. 547(b). The court held that, although the bankruptcy court erred in finding that the earmarking defense applied in this case, the court found no error in its determination that Hanover was entitled to the new value defense under section 547(c) to the Trustee's claim of a preferential transfer. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court awarding summary judgment to Hanover. View "ESA Environmental Specialists, Inc. v. The Hanover Ins. Co." on Justia Law

DWS Properties (DWS) owned rental property. The sole member of DWS was Dustin Shore. After a pipe burst at the property causing substantial damage, Shore executed contracts with Performance Adjusting Public Insurance Adjusters (Performance) and Multi-State Restoration (Multi-State), in which Performance agreed to provide public adjusting service relative to the loss, and Multi-State agreed to perform emergency clean-up work at the property. Performance and Multi-State (Plaintiffs) were never paid for the services they provided, and after Shore filed for personal bankruptcy, Shore's debts to Plaintiffs were discharged. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against DWS, seeking damages for book account, breach of contract, quasi-contract, and unjust enrichment. DWS filed a motion to dismiss, which the hearing justice converted into a motion for summary judgment and granted, reasoning that Shore had signed the contracts in an individual capacity without making any reference to DWS. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded, holding (1) summary judgment was inappropriate on Plaintiffs' contract claims; and (2) the fact that DWS was not explicitly named on the contracts did not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' equitable claims. View "Multi-State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was a former employee and sole stockholder of RSI Holdings. RSI Holdings was the sole stockholder of the debtor. This appeal involved a dispute over a life insurance policy where defendant's estate was listed as the beneficiary. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed the bankruptcy court's summary judgment determination that the bankruptcy estate was entitled to the cash value proceeds of the life insurance policy debtor had obtained for defendant during her employment. View "Kaler v. Bala" on Justia Law

Debtors filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13. At issue was whether debtors could exclude an annuity debtor received under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA), 45 U.S.C. 451m(a), when calculating their "projected disposable income," which determined the amount they must repay creditors to qualify for Chapter 13 relief. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's decision was reviewable. Applying a trust law understanding of the statute pursuant to Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, the court held that the RRA's anti-anticipation clause, which provided that the payment of an annuity shall not be "anticipated," referred to premature receipt of payment, and thus did not preclude the inclusion of the RRA annuity payments in Chapter 13 debtors' projected disposable income. View "In re: Robert Scholz & Carolyn Scholz" on Justia Law

Joseph Terry, who received long-term disability benefits, filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Terry later sued the bankruptcy trustee, seeking a declaration that his disability insurance provider, Standard Insurance Company, should not have reduced his benefits by the amount of certain "voidable" payments. The bankruptcy court ruled that Standard was precluded from recouping the payments. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) reversed, holding that recoupment was subject to a a "balancing of the equities." On remand, the bankruptcy court found that the equities prevented Standard from recouping the payments. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BAP (1) erred by introducing a balancing of the equities test into the doctrine of recoupment and by invoking these equitable principles to deny Standard a right of recoupment; and (2) abused its discretion in how it weighed the equities. View "Terry v. Standard Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Sandra Emas owned a life insurance policy issued by ReliaStar. The policy named her estate as the beneficiary. When Emas died intestate, she left her son, Jaysen McCleary, as her only heir. McCleary was appointed the administrator of his mother's estate. McCleary later filed for personal bankruptcy. McCleary, as the administrator of the estate, subsequently filed suit against ReliaStar, alleging that ReliaStar had wrongfully refused to pay the estate benefits under Emas's insurance policy. ReliaStar moved for summary judgment, arguing that Emas's interest in any cause of action against ReliaStar passed immediately to McCleary upon her death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ReliaStar. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the estate was functionally closed, and McCleary could not bring a suit on behalf of a closed estate; and (2) there was not an issue of fact as to whether McCleary sold the estate's interest in his bankruptcy proceedings, as McCleary had the authority to sell the estate's interest in its claims against ReliaStar. View "McCleary v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The company and its affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought to resolve asbestos-related liability through the creation of a personal-injury trust under 11 U.S.C. 524(g). As part of its reorganization plan, it sought to transfer rights under insurance liability policies to the trust. The Insurers had provided liability policies to the debtors prior to bankruptcy and objected that the transfer violated the policies' anti-assignment provisions. The bankruptcy and district courts held that 11 U.S.C. 1123(a)(5)(B) preempts those provisions. The Third Circuit affirmed. Section 524 trusts are the only national statutory scheme available to resolve asbestos litigation through a quasi-administrative process. The plain language of 11 U.S.C. 1123(a) evinces clear intent for a preemptive scope that includes transfer of property to a 524 trust; that preemption reaches private contracts enforced by state common law.

This case required the court to address the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over suits against non-debtor third parties, as well as the scope of a stay issued pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 524(g)(4). Pfizer and Quigley appealed from a judgment in the district court reversing the Clarifying Order of the bankruptcy court and holding that the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos (Angelos) could bring suit against Pfizer for claims based on "apparent manufacturer" liability under Pennsylvania law. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue the Clarifying Order; and that the Clarifying Order did not bar Angelos from bringing the suits in question against Pfizer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Debtor appealed an order of the bankruptcy court sustaining the objection of the Chapter 7 trustee to her claimed exemption of her interest in an annuity. The court concluded that res judicata applied to the debtor's claim of an exemption; and even if res judicata did not apply the bankruptcy court properly disallowed the debtor's claimed exemption. The court also affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision on the bases that: (1) it properly determined that the record did not show that the Company was "authorized to do business" as a "stipulated premium" or "assessment plan" insurance company, as required for Mo. Rev. Stat. 377.330 and 377.090 to apply to the annuity; and (2) the annuity was not insurance, as required for any of the three statutes at issue.

Robert A. Sears appealed from a bankruptcy court order finding that the bankruptcy estate of AFY was contractually and equitably entitled to receive the cash value of a life insurance policy, owned by Sears and paid for by AFY, to reimburse AFY for policy premiums paid. The court held that the bankruptcy court possessed the jurisdiction and constitutional authority to enter final judgment and AFY was not contractually or equitably entitled to the cash value of the policy. Accordingly, the decision of the bankruptcy court was reversed.