Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Nucor Steel Tuscaloosa, Inc. ("Nucor"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich") and Onin Staffing, LLC ("Onin"), on claims asserted by Nucor arising from an alleged breach of an indemnification agreement. Nucor operated a steel-manufacturing facility in Tuscaloosa. Nucor had an internship program that offered part-time work to technical-school students, who, as part of the internship program, earned both academic credit and work experience relevant to their vocational training. In 2010, Nucor entered into a "Temporary Services Agency Agreement" ("the TSA Agreement") with Onin, a personnel-staffing agency, whereby Onin was to manage the employment of the technical-school students selected by Nucor for its internship program. Korey Ryan was a student at Shelton State Community College who applied for Nucor's internship program through Shelton State. In October 2014, Ryan was killed while working in the course of his duties at the Nucor facility. Ricky Edwards, a Nucor employee, directed Ryan to stand in a certain area in front of a water filter so that he would be clear of a moving crane. Edwards stated that he then turned his attention back to the load and began moving the crane. Ryan's right boot was struck by and became caught underneath the gearbox as the crane was moving. Ryan was dragged by the crane along the concrete floor through the narrow passageway between the crane and the warehouse wall, where he was crushed to death against a building support beam. Ryan's estate brought a wrongful-death action against Nucor; OSHA cited Nucor for a "serious" safety violation and fined it. Zurich issued a letter to Nucor and Onin in which it questioned whether the general-liability policy afforded coverage for the claims asserted in the wrongful-death action. Zurich noted that neither the indemnification provision in the TSA Agreement nor the additional-insured endorsement contained in the policy applied to in instances when the alleged "bodily injury" and/or "property damage" was caused by Nucor’s sole wrongful conduct. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the particular facts and circumstances underlying the wrongful- death action did not trigger the indemnification provision and the payment of an insurance benefit; rather, the facts and circumstances voided the indemnification provision altogether. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. View "Nucor Steel Tuscaloosa, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company et al." on Justia Law

Various parties petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for reconsideration of its decision in Allianz Global Risks v. ACE Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 483 P3d 1124 (2021). Petitioner on review Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company and Allianz Underwriters Insurance Company (“Allianz”), together with respondent on review Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London and Certain London Market Insurance Companies (“London”), petitioned on two grounds: (1) that the court in one place in the opinion incorrectly characterized its earlier cases regarding the duties of an insurer to defend or indemnify its insured; and (2) that the court in several places incorrectly identified a particular entity as the “indemnitor” in several agreements discussed in the opinion. Respondent on review Con-Way filed a petition for reconsideration asserting that the court erred in holding that certain “side” agreements between Con-Way and three of its insurers were to be considered separately from the insurance policies that those companies issued to Con-Way’s subsidiary, Freightliner. The Supreme Court considered the arguments in Con-Way’s petition, and denied it: "The purpose of a rehearing is not to raise new questions or rehash old arguments, but to allow the court to correct mistakes and consider misapprehensions." As to the Allianz/London petition: the Court allowed that petition to make changes as noted. View "Allianz Global Risks v. ACE Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly identified the accrual date of the legal malpractice claim in this case. The court determined that the accrual date for the malpractice action based on failure to protect an underinsured motorist (“UM”) claim was the date on which the plaintiff’s attorney first became aware that the plaintiff potentially had a UM claim with available coverage. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the accrual date was the last day counsel could protect the client’s UM claim by lawfully effecting service on the UM carrier. View "Armstrong et al. v. Cuffie et al." on Justia Law

Nicholas Jay appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of United Services Automobile Association ("USAA") on his claim against USAA seeking uninsured-motorist ("UM") benefits. Nicholas was injured in an automobile accident when riding as a passenger in Ryen Gorman's automobile. Gorman did not have automobile insurance. Nicholas received $50,000 in UM benefits through a policy he had with Nationwide Insurance Company. Thereafter, Nicholas commenced an action against USAA, seeking UM benefits pursuant to a USAA policy owned by his father-in-law, George Brewer, and under which Nicholas's wife, Michelle Jay, had automobile-insurance coverage. Because Nicholas was not a "covered person" under the USAA policy, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Jay v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law

Jean Hardin filed a claim with Farm Bureau, her homeowner’s insurance carrier, following an alleged sudden collapse in the floor of her home. After Farm Bureau denied the claim, Hardin sued Farm Bureau for specific performance, breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, damages, emotional harm and upset, depression, attorneys’ fees, costs of litigation, and punitive damages related to Farm Bureau’s denial of coverage for damage to Hardin’s home. Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Farm Bureau sought, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted, interlocutory appeal. The Court reversed, finding the trial court erred in denying Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment because Hardin demonstrated proof that the water damage to her home was caused by the failure of the Town of Leakesville to maintain the ditch beside her home. Thus, because Hardin’s damages were not covered under the policy, Farm Bureau was entitled to summary judgment. View "Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Hardin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger in a truck driven by Lorenz. The vehicles were traveling on an interstate when it began to hail and rain. A sedan ahead of the truck spun out of control and collided with the front of the truck. The passengers of the sedan required medical assistance; a third vehicle struck the back of the truck, pushing the truck into the sedan. Plaintiff was severely injured. Plaintiff filed a personal injury claim for damages, alleging the drivers of the vehicles, John Turner and Sherri Oliver, had been negligent and that the negligence of each had caused her injuries and damages. She also alleged that Turner and Oliver were underinsured and that, as a result, she was entitled to UIM benefits from her own insurance company, defendant Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance. Eventually, plaintiff settled with Turner and Oliver for a total of $175,000, and the case was dismissed as to them. This case was the second appeal in a dispute between Plaintiff and her insurance company over the limits of her Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage. Plaintiff’s policy included a limit of $500,000 for damages “resulting from any one automobile accident.” In the first trial in this case, the jury found that plaintiff’s injuries resulted in damages of $979,540. In the second trial, the jury found that plaintiff was injured, not in one, but in two, separate “accidents,” and that it could not “separate the cause” of plaintiff’s injuries between those two accidents. Consequently, the trial court awarded plaintiff the full measure of her damages, minus offsets. On appeal, the insurance company argued the trial court had erred in its instructions to the jury and should have required the jury to apportion plaintiff’s damages between the two accidents. The Court of Appeals agreed with the company and reversed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the trial correctly instructed the jury it could find, as a matter of fact, the number of accidents that occurred and whether the cause of plaintiff's injuries could be separated between them. View "Wright v. Turner" on Justia Law

A Town of Cottageville police officer shot and killed the former town Mayor Bert Reeves. A federal jury awarded Reeves' estate $97,500,000 in damages. The South Carolina Municipal Insurance and Risk Financing Fund, which insured the town, paid $10,000,000 to settle the federal lawsuit and two other lawsuits. The Settlement Agreement provided for two questions to be submitted to the state courts: (1) whether the amount of indemnity coverage available under the policy was more than $1,000,000; and (2) whether the South Carolina Tort Claims Act applied to a bad faith action against the Fund. The South Carolina Supreme Court answered the first question "yes"; it declined to answer the second. View "Reeves v. South Carolina Municipal Insurance" on Justia Law

National Western Life Insurance Company (NWL) appealed a jury verdict holding the company liable for negligence and elder abuse arising from an NWL annuity sold to Barney Williams by Victor Pantaleoni, an independent agent. In 2016, Pantaleoni sold a $100,000 NWL annuity to Williams, who had contacted Pantaleoni to revise a living trust after the death of Williams’ wife. When Williams returned the annuity to NWL during a 30-day “free look” period, Pantaleoni wrote a letter over Williams’ signature for NWL to reissue a new annuity. In 2017, when Williams cancelled the second annuity, NWL charged a $14,949.91 surrender penalty. The jury awarded Williams damages against NWL, including punitive damages, totaling almost $3 million. NWL moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied. The Court of Appeal reversed: “Assuming NWL had monitored Pantaleoni as Williams suggested, there was no evidence showing that NWL knew or should have known of Pantaleoni’s fraud. … That Williams wrote the note cancelling the first annuity and Pantaleoni apparently wrote the letter requesting that it be reissued for Williams’ signature did not suggest to NWL that the letter was forged.” View "Williams v. National Western Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Wesley Zoo Yang brought an action against Everest National Insurance Company (Everest) and Motorist Mutual Insurance Company (Motorist), seeking to recover personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under a no-fault insurance policy issued by Everest to Yang and his wife. Everest issued Yang a six-month no-fault insurance policy, the term of which ran from September 26, 2017, through March 26, 2018. On October 9, 2017, Everest mailed Yang a bill for the second monthly payment, stating that if Yang failed to pay the amount due by October 26, 2017, the policy would be canceled, effective October 27, 2017; the policy provided that the cancellation notice did not apply if Yang paid the premium on time. Yang did not pay the premium on time, and Everest sent Yang an offer to reinstate, explaining that the policy was canceled but that Yang could reinstate the policy with a lapse in coverage. On November 15, 2017, plaintiffs were struck by a car when they were walking across a street; Motorist insured the driver of the vehicle that struck plaintiffs. Two days later, on November 17, 2017, Yang sent the monthly premium payment to Everest; the policy was reinstated effective that day, and the notice informed Yang that there had been a lapse in coverage from October 27, 2017, through November 17, 2017. Plaintiffs sued when Everest refused plaintiffs’ request for PIP benefits under the policy. Everest moved for summary judgment, maintaining the policy had been canceled and was not in effect at the time of the accident, and that the policy’s cancellation provision was not inconsistent with MCL 500.3020(1)(b); Motorist disagreed with Everest’s motion and argued that it was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) because it was not the insurer responsible for the payment of PIP benefits. The trial court denied Everest’s motion and granted summary judgment in favor of Motorist, reasoning that Everest’s notice of cancellation was not valid because it was sent before the nonpayment occurred and that Everest was therefore responsible for the payment of PIP benefits; the court thus dismissed Motorist from the action. Everest appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the cancellation notice was not valid under MCL 500.3020(1)(b) because Everest sent the notice before the premium was due and that the notice did not satisfy the terms of plaintiffs’ no-fault policy itself. Finding no reversible error, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal. View "Yang v. Everest National Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal is whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over an interpleader action commenced by a liability insurance company, whose policy was exposed to conflicting and excess claims. In this case, AmGuard, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, commenced this action in the nature of an interpleader and for a declaratory judgment against its insured and the claimants to the proceeds of its policy, all of whom were South Carolina citizens.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained that, because AmGuard disputed the amount that the claimants maintained was available under AmGuard's policy, having acknowledged coverage for only a lesser amount, it was a "claimant" adverse to the other claimants to the proceeds of the policy. Therefore, the diverse citizenship between AmGuard and the South Carolina claimants provided the district court with the minimal diversity needed for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1335. Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. 1332 also provided the district court with jurisdiction to resolve AmGuard's declaratory judgment claim, yet the district court dismissed the entire action without addressing why it did not have jurisdiction under section 1332. The court concluded that this error also required reversal. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "AmGuard Insurance Co. v. SG Patel and Sons II LLC" on Justia Law