Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Berry worked for Telamon from 2005-2011, under Consulting Agreements between Telamon and Berry’s one-woman company. Berry’s responsibilities expanded beyond those described in the Agreements. She became Telamon’s senior regional manager. She oversaw Telamon’s AT&T Asset Recovery Program, to remove old telecommunications equipment from AT&T sites and sell it to salvagers. Berry removed the equipment and sold it, but kept the profits. The company discovered the scheme in 2011; it had suffered $5.2 million in losses. Berry was convicted of wire fraud and tax evasion; she was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $3,440,885 in restitution. Telamon sought compensation under its Travelers crime insurance policy and its Charter Oak general commercial insurance policy. Travelers denied coverage because Berry was not, legally, an employee; Charter denied coverage because she was, functionally, an employee. Telamon sued, alleging bad faith, then unsuccessfully sought permission to add claims based on older policies. The request came a year after the deadline for amending pleadings. Telamon filed suit in state court, raising essentially the same claims. The insurers again removed; the district court dismissed the suit as an impermissible attempt to split claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both decisions, noting that none of the four ways of establishing bad faith under Indiana law exist in this case. View "Telamon Corporation v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co" on Justia Law

Employee-appellant Tracy Meeks sued an insurer for bad faith refusal to timely comply with several orders of the Workers' Compensation Court awarding employee temporary total disability benefits after the insurer, without good cause, withheld employee's benefits on twenty-six separate occasions. Insurer moved for dismissal, asserting employee failed to obtain a certification order from the Workers' Compensation Court (a jurisdictional prerequisite for commencing a bad-faith action in district court). The District Court granted insurer's motion, but the Supreme Court reversed. Because the certification requirements were met here, employee was free to proceed in district court on his bad-faith claim against insurer for insurer's alleged bad faith refusal to provide temporary total disability benefits as ordered by the WCC. View "Meeks v. Guarantee Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Pertinent to this appeal, the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”) required insurers to offer insureds Underinsured Motorist coverage. Subsection 1731(c.1) of the MVFRL stated that any UIM coverage rejection form that does not “specifically comply” with Section 1731 of the MVFRL was void and that, if an insurer failed to produce a valid UIM coverage rejection form, then UIM coverage shall be equal to the policy’s bodily injury liability limits. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine whether an insurer’s UIM coverage rejection form “specifically compl[ied]” with Section 1731 of the MVFRL if the insurer’s form was not a verbatim reproduction of the statutory rejection form found in Subsection 1731(c) of the MVFRL but, rather, differed from the statutory form in an inconsequential manner. The Court held that a UIM coverage rejection form specifically complies with Section 1731 of the MVFRL even if the form contains de minimis deviations from the statutory form. Because the Superior Court reached the proper result in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed that court’s judgment. View "Ford v. American States Ins." on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Airport Authority sued Travelers Property Casualty over Travelers’ partial denial of a claim for coverage arising from an airport construction accident that occurred in 2007. On motions for summary judgment, the district court interpreted the insurance contract in favor of Travelers on several issues, narrowing the Authority’s case to a claim for unreimbursed inspection costs associated with the incident. Two weeks before trial was set to begin on that claim, the district court entered an evidentiary order that effectively precluded the Authority from proving that sole remaining claim by restricting the testimony of two “hybrid fact/expert” witnesses, leaving the Authority with no designated damages expert. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment order, and vacated the evidentiary order. The court upheld the district court’s construction of the General Coverage Provision and agreed that the Authority has no compensable soft cost claim because of the deductible, but stated that, if the Authority can demonstrate with competent evidence that it incurred expenses to reduce soft costs for which Travelers otherwise would have been liable, it may recover those expenses under the “expenses to reduce the amount of loss” provision, subject to policy limits. View "Indianapolis Airport Authority v. Travelers Property Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (“Philadelphia”) and Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”) insured the same school building that suffered fire damage. In a declaratory judgment action, they disputed their relative responsibilities to pay for the loss. The district court ordered Philadelphia to pay 54 percent and Lexington to pay 46 percent of the approximately $6 million loss. Lexington appealed, arguing it should have no obligation to pay. Philadelphia cross-appealed, arguing Lexington should have paid more. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's allocation between the insurers. View "Philadelphia Indemnity v. Lexington Insurance" on Justia Law

Appellants attempted to execute judgments obtained against Robert Fitte in their respective underlying lawsuits by attaching the proceeds of a commercial liability policy issued to Fitte by joined party Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Mountain West). In a separate declaratory proceeding, a federal court determined that the commercial policy covered Fitte’s actions. Thereafter, Mountain West filed a motion to deposit the proceeds of the commercial policy into an existing interpleader action. The underlying proceedings filed by Appellants were consolidated. The district court granted summary judgment to Fitte and Mountain West, concluding that Appellants were not entitled to execute judgments secured outside the pending interpleader action and attach the proceeds of the commercial policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the proceeds from the commercial policy must be distributed through the interpleader; and (2) deposit of the commercial policy proceeds was not required at the time of the interpleader proceeding to establish the interpleader court’s jurisdiction. View "Associated Dermatology & Skin Cancer Clinic of Helena, P.C. Profit Sharing & Trust Benefit of Stephen D. Behlmer, M.D. v. Fitte" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased an insurance policy from defendant that provided coverage for his house, other structures on his property, personal property, and loss of use for up to 12 months. The policy also included “extended dwelling coverage,” which provided additional coverage of 50 percent to pay for unexpected repair or rebuilding costs that exceeded the base amount of coverage for the house. A fire completely destroyed plaintiff’s house and its contents and damaged other structures on the property. Plaintiff and defendant disagreed about what was owed under the policy. In particular, the parties disagreed about whether plaintiff was entitled to the extended dwelling coverage without having to first actually replace the house. After a lengthy and complicated trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding for plaintiff on his breach of contract claim and assessing damages in the amount of the limits of the extended dwelling coverage. The jury also found for defendant on the counterclaim, however. The trial court declined to enter a judgment awarding plaintiff any damages. The court concluded that, in light of the jury’s findings on the counterclaim, the insurance policy had been voided, and as a result, it was defendant who was entitled to a judgment for all payments that it had made under the policy up to that time. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in even sending the counterclaim to the jury because there was no evidence that defendant had reasonably relied on any misrepresentations by plaintiff. Defendant petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court, which ultimately denied defendant’s petition. Plaintiff sought an award of $30,771 in attorney fees incurred before the Supreme Court, contending that, given the Court of Appeals’ decision, he was the prevailing party on appeal and was entitled to fees. The Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff’s action was “upon [a] policy of insurance” within the meaning of ORS 742.061(1), and therefore did not address whether defendant was correct about the insufficiency of plaintiff’s “alternative” theory of recovery under the statute, based on his defeat of the counterclaim. Defendant advanced no other objection to the requested award of fees. The petition for attorney fees was allowed. View "Masood v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Oregon" on Justia Law

The issue this matter presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a discovery dispute between plaintiff Stephen Rumnock and defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company. After being ordered to produce documents that Rumnock requested, American Family disclosed some and simultaneously moved for a protective order. The motion sought to preclude Rumnock from using or disclosing the documents (alleged to be trade secrets) outside of this litigation. The trial court granted in part and denied in part, ordering that the alleged trade secrets not be shared with American Family's competitors, but declining to further limit their use. American Family petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to direct the trial court to enter the protective order. The Supreme Court declined to do so, finding that American Family failed to present to the trial court evidence demonstrating the documents were trade secrets or otherwise confidential commercial information. View "In re Rumnock v. Anschutz" on Justia Law

Defendants April Steele Benton and John Benton and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bibb Circuit Court to vacate its July 18, 2016, order denying the Bentons' and State Farm's motion to transfer this action from the Bibb Circuit Court to the Shelby Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. In 2014, April Steele Benton, a resident of Bibb County, and Amir Alan Ebrahimi, a resident of Shelby County, were involved in a two-vehicle collision in Shelby County. Following the collision, Ebrahimi was transported from the scene of the accident by Regional Paramedical Services to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Medical Center ("UAB"), where he received treatment for his injuries. Ebrahimi filed a complaint in the Bibb Circuit Court against April Steele Benton; John Benton, the owner of the car April was driving; and State Farm, Ebrahimi's underinsured-motorist carrier. The Bentons filed a motion to transfer the action to Shelby County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Bentons argued in their motion that Shelby County had a stronger connection to the case because: (1) the accident occurred in Shelby County; (2) the Pelham Police Department, located in Shelby County, investigated the accident; (3) Ebrahimi resided in Calera, located in Shelby County; (4) the first responders, employees of Regional Paramedical Services, were located in Shelby County; (5) Ebrahimi was treated at UAB, which was closer to Shelby County than to Bibb County; and (6) the only connection this action has with Bibb County was the fact that the Bentons, resided there. The Supreme Court found that the trial court should have granted the Bentons' motion for a change of venue, and accordingly, issued the writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to deny the motion and transfer the action to Shelby County. View "Ex parte Benton et al." on Justia Law

Insured Kourtni Martin suffered serious injuries from an automobile collision in Oklahoma City with Nicholas Gray. At the time of the collision, Insured had UM coverage with Goodville Mutual Casualty Company. The policy was purchased by her parents while they lived in Kansas. She was, however, a listed/rated driver in the policy. Before the collision, Martin's parents notified the Kansas agent that she was moving to Oklahoma to live with her grandmother and that her vehicle would be garaged in Oklahoma. After the collision, the claim was reported to the agent in Kansas who then transmitted the claim to Insurer which was located principally in Pennsylvania. The claim was adjusted out of Pennsylvania. Martin was unable to locate Gray. Her attempts to serve Gray, or his insurer, in Oklahoma and Texas failed. Martin filed this lawsuit against Gray alleging negligence (later adding breach of contract and bad faith against her Insurer). After service by publication, Gray answered asserting a general denial. Martin sought compensation from the Insurer pursuant to her UM policy and negotiations began between Insured and Insurer regarding medical bills and projected future medical bills substantially in excess of $100,000. Insurer offered $27,000 for medical expenses under the "Kansas No Fault Benefits" and $10,000 in UM coverage. The trial court, after reviewing the policy at issue here, applied Kansas law to this case and dismissed Martin's bad faith claim against the Insurer (with prejudice). After review, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in applying Kansas law, finding that the actions by Insurer related to the bad-faith claim appear to have occurred primarily in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania: (1) any injury from the alleged bad faith occurred in Oklahoma where Insured is located; (2) the alleged conduct causing injury from bad faith occurred in Oklahoma or Pennsylvania, where the claim was handled; (3) the domicile of Insurer and Insured are Pennsylvania and Oklahoma, respectively, and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties occurred had yet to be determined. However, because the trial court did not apply the "most significant relationship test," there was no evaluation of these factors according to their relative importance. Despite the parties' voluntary settlement of this case, the Supreme Court nevertheless remanded this case for the trial court to make findings with respect to the "most significant relationship test," and then to dismiss. View "Martin v. Gray" on Justia Law