Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Farm Bureau County Mutual Insurance Company filed this declaratory judgment action against Cristil Rogers, Farm Bureau’s insured, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Rogers in an underlying tort action and requesting court costs and attorney fees. Rogers answered and prayed for recovery of her court costs and attorney fees. The trial court denied Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Farm Bureau had a duty to defend Rogers in the tort action. The order did not expressly address the parties’ claims for attorney’s fees. The court of appeals dismissed Farm Bureau’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the order denying Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment was not final and appealable because Rogers did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the fact that Rogers did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment did not preclude the trial court from entering a final judgment; but (2) in the absence of the trial court’s intent with respect to the parties’ claims for attorney’s fees, the order at issue did not dispose of all parties and claims. View "Farm Bureau County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The home of Keith Conley was insured through an insurance policy issued by Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. Conley’s son fatally murdered his girlfriend, Jessica Newsome, in Conley’s home. Gregory and Loretta Newsome brought a wrongful death action against Conley for damages arising from Jessica’s death. Kentucky Farm Bureau provided a defense to Conley for the Newsomes’ claims against him and intervened in the action seeking a declaration that the policy did not provide coverage to Conley for the claims arising from Jessica’s murder. The trial court ruled that the homeowner’s policy provided coverage for Conley’s acts. Kentucky Farm Bureau subsequently filed a Ky. R. Civ. P. 59.05 motion asking the court to alter or amend its order. The trial court denied the motion. Kentucky Farm Bureau then filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Rule 59.05 motion was deficient due to a lack of “particularity” and therefore failed to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although Kentucky Farm Bureau’s Rule 59.05 motion did not strictly adhere to the particularity requirement of Ky. R. Civ. P. 7.02, the defect was not so serious that it should have been stricken. View "Ky. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Conley" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on a dispute over insurance coverage following a private airplane crash. Garmin International, Inc., purchased an insurance policy from Appellees (the insurance companies). In 2008, while the insurance policy was in effect, Appellant Henry Bartle, an individual who had some dealings with Garmin, crashed while piloting his malfunctioning personal aircraft, injuring himself and his passengers. Bartle sought coverage under Garmin’s insurance policy for indemnification from claims brought against Bartle by his injured passengers. Appellees, the insurers, brought suit federal district court seeking a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act that Bartle did not qualify as an "Insured" under Garmin’s policy. Bartle submitted evidence to the district court to demonstrate he was indeed an "Insured," but the district court refused to consider much of the evidence because the evidence failed to conform to district court rules regarding proper citation. Without considering this evidence, the district court granted summary judgment to the insurers, finding that Bartle was not an "Insured" under the policy. Bartle appealed both the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurers and its refusal to consider the excluded evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[t]he district court concluded, and Mr. Bartle acknowledged, that the exhibits submitted could not be feasibly used by the district court without great difficulty. The district court cannot be expected to review evidence, evaluate arguments, or arrive at reasoned conclusions without usable citations. In this case the merits cannot be separated from the process, and ultimately Mr. Bartle bore the responsibility to present evidence that would allow a rational trier of fact to find in his favor." View "Certain Underwriters v. Bartle" on Justia Law

In March, 2004, Harris closed on a home with a mortgage loan from MPI. To be licensed in Missouri, MPI, as obligor and principal, bought two “Missouri Residential Mortgage Brokers Bonds” from Hartford, its surety, RSMo 443.849. The surety bonds stated that the two parties were “jointly and severally” bound for payment to any person “who may have a claim against” MPI. Harris sued MPI for violating the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, sections 407.010-.1500. Harris obtained a judgment for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Hartford had notice of the suit against MPI, but chose not to intervene. As surety, Hartford failed to pay the judgment amount due on the bonds. In 2012, Harris sued Hartford for breach of contract, vexatious refusal to pay, and equitable garnishment. The district court granted Hartford summary judgment, rejecting the 10-year statute of limitations in RSMo 516.110(1) in favor of the three-year statute in section 516.130(2). The Eighth Circuit reversed. Harris’s claim against Hartford sought the amount due on the bonds, not a penalty. View "Harris v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Lexon Insurance Company (“Lexon”) issued two performance bonds to DLM, LLC. Both bonds named Berkeley County as the obligee. DLM later defaulted under both bonds. Berkeley County filed this action against Lexon and DLM, seeking “specific performance of the Surety’s obligations according to the terms of the subject bonds” in addition to its costs and expenses. Berkeley County subsequently filed a motion for default judgment, pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1), against Lexon. The circuit court entered default judgment against Lexon for the total face value of the two bonds at issue, plus post judgment interest. The circuit court denied Lexon’s motion to set aside default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order denying Lexon’s motion to set aside default judgment, holding (1) because the damages sought in this case were not a “sum certain” as required by Rule 55(b)(1), default judgment was improperly granted under that rule; and (2) default judgment was improperly entered under the unique circumstances of this case where the parties failed to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to the extension of the time for filing an answer. View "Lexon Ins. v. County Council of Berkeley County" on Justia Law

Reverend Flesher participated in benefits plans administered by the Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Board (MMBB), a New York not‐for‐profit corporation. Flesher entered into the plans while married to Snow. Snow, also a reverend and MMBB policyholder, was listed as the primary beneficiary on both of Flesher’s plans. Snow’s father was the contingent beneficiary. When Flesher and Snow divorced in 2008 they signed a Marital Settlement Agreement; each agreed to relinquish rights to inherit from the other and was allowed to change the beneficiaries on their respective MMBB plans. Flesher, then domiciled in Colorado, died in 2011 without changing his beneficiaries. MMBB , unable to determine how to distribute the funds, and filed an interpleader suit. The district court discharged MMBB from liability, applied New York law, and held that Flesher’s estate was entitled to the funds. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question: whether a governing‐law provision that states that the contract will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of New York, in a contract not consummated pursuant to New York General Obligations Law 5‐1401, requires the application of New York Estates, Powers & Trusts Law 3‐5.1(b)(2), which may, in turn, require application of the law of another state. View "Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Augustine Badiali was injured when his motor vehicle was rear-ended by an uninsured motorist. Plaintiff filed a UM claim, which proceeded to arbitration and resulted in an award in plaintiff s favor. Plaintiff filed suit against his insurer, defendant New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Group ( NJM ), after NJM rejected the arbitration award and refused to pay its share. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award in a summary action and found NJM liable for its share of the award. In a subsequent action, plaintiff asserted that NJM litigated in bad faith by advocating that its policy language allowed for a rejection of the arbitration award at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of NJM. The court agreed that the case was ripe for summary judgment although discovery had not been completed. The court was further persuaded that NJM s position was fairly debatable based on its policy language and on the existence of an unpublished Appellate Division decision involving nearly identical facts, in which NJM was also a party. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that NJM s position was fairly debatable because it was supported by a prior, unpublished opinion of the court. Plaintiff was thereby barred from recovering counsel fees or any other consequential damages. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Badiali v. N.J. Mfg. Ins. Grp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kwabena Wadeer suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident that occurred while he was attempting to avoid an unidentified vehicle. Plaintiff filed a UM claim against New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company (NJM), his insurer. The insurance policy provided $100,000 in UM and UIM coverage. NJM made no offers to attempt to settle plaintiff's UM claim and the parties proceeded to private arbitration pursuant to the terms of the policy. The panel determined that plaintiff was 30% liable for the accident, the phantom vehicle was 70% liable, and plaintiff was entitled to a net award of $87,500. NJM rejected the $87,500 arbitration award and demanded a trial. By letter, plaintiff's attorney acknowledged NJM s rejection of the arbitration award and notified NJM that he believed it was acting in bad faith by rejecting that award. Plaintiff submitted an Offer of Judgment to NJM in the amount of $95,000 and reiterated his belief that defendant's conduct was in bad faith. NJM rejected the offer and the case proceeded to trial. The jury determined that the phantom vehicle was 100% liable for the underlying accident and awarded plaintiff $210,000 for pain and suffering and $12,175 in lost wages. Plaintiff thereafter moved to enter judgment for the full amount of the verdict, notwithstanding the $100,000 policy limit, as well as for prejudgment interest on the verdict and attorneys fees. During argument on the motion, plaintiff's counsel raised the issue of bad faith, contending that defendant was on notice of the claim. In response, NJM argued that plaintiff failed to plead bad faith in his complaint. The trial judge entered an order reducing and molding the jury verdict to conform to the insurance policy limit of $100,000 and awarding plaintiff attorneys fees and prejudgment interest. In his accompanying statement of reasons, the trial judge found that NJM s actions did not constitute bad faith because NJM had fairly debatable reasons for denying the benefits of the policy. Plaintiff and NJM filed cross-appeals. Plaintiff contended the trial court should not have molded the verdict to the policy limits because NJM acted in bad faith. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge's modified jury verdict, but reversed the award of attorneys fees and expenses. Plaintiff then filed a separate complaint alleging that NJM breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to make a settlement offer to plaintiff and by failing to settle the claim in a timely manner. NJM moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's complaint was barred by the entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and/or collateral estoppel. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that plaintiff's bad faith claim was barred in this action under the principle of res judicata because it was raised, fairly litigated, and determined by the trial court in the first litigation. View "Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC") appealed the trial court's order certifying a class in the action filed by the City of Vernon and a class of similarly situated entities that had purchased uninsured motorist/underinsured-motorist coverage ("UM/UIM coverage") from AMIC. Vernon was the original class representative; however, after AMIC filed its notice of appeal of the class-certification order, Vernon settled its claims against AMIC and withdrew as the class representative. Because there was no longer a representative to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a new class representative to be substituted for Vernon. The City of Fairfield substituted for Vernon as the class representative. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute: the Court concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Initial jurisdiction over this dispute was with the Alabama Department of Insurance and its commissioner. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's class-certification order, and remanded for dismissal. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

Daer filed a personal injury suit, alleging material and design defects in a tire manufactured by Yokohama and sold by Costco. Costco settled for $5.5 million and Yokohama for $1.1 million. National, as excess insurer of Costco, sued Yokohama and its insurers (Tokio) to recover the costs of defending plus money paid on behalf of Costco to settle that lawsuit. National, as subrogee of Costco, sought recovery based on an express indemnity provision in the supplier agreement between Costco and Yokohama, and alleged breach of Yokohama’s contractual insurance obligations. It sued Tokio for indemnity and contribution. The court ruled in limine that National’s proof of a tire defect would be limited to the opinions of Daer’s expert in the underlying case. After National made its opening statement in a proceeding to determine whether a tire defect was a cause of Daer’s accident, the court dismissed the express indemnity claim. Having determined that the tire was not defective, the court granted summary adjudication as to claims based on refusal to defend and Yokohama’s breach of insurance obligations. The court awarded Yokohama $863,706.75 in fees as the prevailing party on the indemnity claim. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that the court erred in excluding relevant, material expert evidence on a matter properly subject to expert opinion. View "Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law