Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Class Action
Washington Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman
Several insureds filed a class action against the predecessor of Washington National Insurance Corporation concerning insurance policies that provide for reimbursement of certain home health care expenses. The district court granted summary judgment for the insureds, concluding that various provisions in the policy, including a certificate schedule, demonstrated an ambiguity concerning whether an automatic increase applied only to the daily benefit or also applied to the lifetime maximum benefit amount and the per occurrence maximum benefit amount. Because there was ambiguity in the policy, the court of appeal certified questions of law to the Florida Supreme Court, which held (1) because the policy was ambiguous, it must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage without consideration of extrinsic evidence; and (2) when so construed, the policy's automatic benefit increase applies to the daily benefit, the lifetime maximum benefit, and the per occurrence maximum benefit. View "Washington Nat'l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman" on Justia Law
Halvorson, et al. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., et al.
Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Auto-Owners, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. On appeal, Auto-Owners challenged the district court's certification of a class for those policy owners whose policies were issued in North Dakota. The court reversed, concluding that the certified class did not meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23 where the reasonableness of any claim payment may have to be individually analyzed and, therefore, the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class. View "Halvorson, et al. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Erie Indem. Co
Exchange is a reciprocal insurance exchange, under 40 PA. STAT. 961. Members purchase insurance policies and receive indemnification for losses out of Exchange’s pool of funds. A 2012 Complaint alleged that Exchange is owned by subscribers and has no independent officers or governing body; that Indemnity is a public corporation that serves as Exchange’s attorney-in-fact; that Indemnity is permitted to retain up to 25% of Exchange’s premiums; that the balance of premiums is to be used for insurance losses and operational costs and may be distributed to Exchange members as dividends at Indemnity’s discretion; that members who pay premiums in installments must pay service charges and are subject to late payment and policy reinstatement fees; that, beginning in 1997, Indemnity began to retained for itself service charges paid to Exchange, which belonged to Exchange; and that, beginning in 2008, Indemnity misappropriated fees, totaling more than $300 million. The complaint was filed for Exchange by certain members and “on behalf of” all other members. Contending that the words “on behalf of” converted the case into a class action, Indemnity removed the case to federal court. The district court remanded to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the case was brought under state rules that bear no resemblance to Rule 23 in that they allow for suits by entities, not a conglomerate of individuals, and does not meet the statutory definition of “class action.” View "Erie Ins. Exch. v. Erie Indem. Co" on Justia Law
Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded. View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Am. Int’l Grp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co
Companies underwriting workers’ compensation insurance participate in a reinsurance pool administered by the National Workers Compensation Reinsurance Association. Insurers share in the pool’s profit or loss according to the volume of business they underwrite. When the pool is profitable, it is beneficial to have a larger book of business; when the pool loses money, a smaller book means that the underwriter needs to contribute less toward the losses. The class contends that AIG underreported the size of its business in losing years, causing the pool’s other members to bear a disproportionate share of the losses and sought$3.1 billion. Some of the insurers had independent claims against AIG. AIG advanced its own claims against Liberty Mutual. The district judge approved a settlement. Liberty Mutual appealed, arguing that its share would not compensate it adequately for its stand-alone claims against AIG and that the conflicts of interest within the reinsurance pool meant that the case never should have been certified as a class. After argument, Liberty Mutual settled with AIG. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the settlement does not jeopardize the interests of the unrepresented class members. View "Am. Int'l Grp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co" on Justia Law
Conway v. Benefis Health Sys., Inc.
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment at Benefis Health System, Inc. Plaintiff had healthcare coverage as a TRICARE beneficiary and also had medical payments coverage through his insurance carrier, Kemper. Plaintiff's medical treatment costs totaled $2,073. Benefis accepted $662 from TRICARE as payment in full satisfaction of the bill pursuant to a preferred provider agreement (PPA) between Blue Cross Blue Shield and Benefis. Benefis subsequently received $1,866 from Kemper, upon which Benefis reimbursed TRICARE's payment in full. Plaintiff filed an individual and class action complaint, claiming that he was entitled to the additional $1,204 that Benefis received from Kemper over and above the TRICARE reimbursement rate. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asking the district court to find Benefis breached its contract with TRICARE and that Benefis was liable for Plaintiff's damages. The district court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to pocket the difference between the TRICARE reimbursement rate and the amount Benefis accepted from Kemper; and (2) Plaintiff failed to establish any damages that resulted from the alleged breach. View "Conway v. Benefis Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law
Dennison v. MONY Life Ret. Income Sec. Plan for Emps.
Plaintiff left his senior position in 1996, having participated in the Retirement Income Security Plan for Employees (RISPE), a tax-qualified defined benefits plan that guarantees specified retirement benefits, and in the Excess Benefit Plan, a defined unfunded benefits pension plan under which benefits are paid directly by the employer rather than by a trust funded by the employer. Both plans allowed him to choose between an annuity and an actuarial equivalent lump sum distribution. In 2009 he received his RISPE lump sum, $325,054.28 and his Excess Plan lump sum, $218,726.38. The discount rate used to calculate lump sum RISPE benefits was a “segment rate,” 26 U.S.C. 417(e)(3)(C), of 5.24 percent. The discount rate applied to the Excess Plan lump sum was 7.5 percent. The district court rejected his ERISA claim that the discount rate required by both plans was a rate computed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation on the basis of annuity premiums charged by insurance companies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. With respect to the RISPE, the accrued benefit, which cannot be reduced retroactively, is the annuity; the lump sum is not the accrued benefit and can be reduced retroactively. The court rejected a conflict-of-interest argument concerning calculation of the Excess Benefit Plan discount rate. View "Dennison v. MONY Life Ret. Income Sec. Plan for Emps." on Justia Law
Freeman Investments, L.P., et al v. Pacific Life Ins. Co.
Plaintiffs purchased variable universal life insurance policies from defendant. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a class action suit against defendant under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(1), for levying excessive cost of insurance charges. The court concluded that claims of breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing were not precluded by SLUSA, even if such claims related to the purchase or sale of a covered security. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the two contract claims, on the condition that plaintiffs amend their complaint to remove any reference to deliberate concealment or fraudulent omission. The court affirmed the dismissal of the class claim for unfair competition in violation of California law. View "Freeman Investments, L.P., et al v. Pacific Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Horn, et al v. State Farm Lloyds
Homeowners, who were represented by the Mostyn Law Firm, filed claims against State Farm in Texas state court after Hurricane Ike. State Farm removed several cases to federal court on diversity grounds. The Firm and State Farm then entered into an agreement whereby the Firm promised to abandon its clients' claims against individual adjusters and forgo suing them in the future in exchange for State Farm's promise not to remove any Hurricane Ike cases to federal court. At issue on appeal was whether the phrase "any Hurricane Ike cases," in a contract covering "all Hurricane Ike cases that either have been filed or will be filed in the future," encompassed class-action lawsuits. The court affirmed and agreed with the district court's conclusion that the negotiated contract covered all past, present, and future lawsuits filed by the Firm against State Farm on behalf of homeowners, as individuals or part of a class, whose properties were damaged during Hurricane Ike. View "Horn, et al v. State Farm Lloyds" on Justia Law
Jacks v. Meridian Resource Co., et al
This case principally involved challenges to the application, in Missouri, of the provision of the Plan administered by BCBS-KC that required a Plan enrollee who received benefits in connection with any injury in addition to compensation from a third party must reimburse BCBS-KC the amount of benefits paid. Given the state's antisubrogration laws, plaintiff contended that BCBS-KC was unable to recover its reimbursement liens in Missouri. BCBS-KC removed the action to federal district court and plaintiff then moved to remand the matter to state court. BCBS-KC subsequently appealed the district court's remand based upon the local controversy exception to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d); its determination that federal common law was not contemplated in this action; and its decision that BCBS-KC could not remove this matter under the federal officer removal statute. Because the court determined that this matter was properly in federal court under the federal officer removal statute, the court need not address plaintiff's remaining claims. That said, the court did not delve into the CAFA claim, but rather reversed the district court's judgment and remanded this matter for further consideration, directing that this action remain in federal court. View "Jacks v. Meridian Resource Co., et al" on Justia Law