Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Commercial Law
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Insured appealed the circuit court's grant of judgment on the pleadings to Broker on Insured's claims that Broker violated a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Insured by not disclosing that Broker received contingent commissions from Insurers for directing Insured's business to them and that Broker kept all interest earned on the premiums Insured sent it between the time Broker received them and the time they were forwarded to the Insurers. In addition, Insured argued that Broker breached a duty to find it the least costly policy possible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) brokers do not have a duty to find insureds the lowest possible cost insurance available to meet their needs; (2) Missouri law specifically authorizes a broker to receive commissions from the insurer and to deposit premiums in an account pending their payment to the insurer or refund to the insured; but (3) the trial court erred by dismissing the petition because it could not be said as a matter of law that Emerson could not recover on one or more of its claims. Remanded.

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In 2003, the Trust sought group accident and life insurance policies as a benefit for its union members. Consistent with the Trust's request, the broker's RFP specifically sought a policy where the "Trust is the owner of the policy and also [a] beneficiary." Defendant's proposal contained only a summary of proposed terms, expressly cautioned that it was not a contract, and omitted reference to the Trust’s desired beneficiary provision. The policy drafts sent to the Trust did not contain the beneficiary provision the Trust wanted and stated that payment of the required premium after delivery of the policies would constitute acceptance. The Trust's chairman signed and paid the first premium in 2003 In May, 2004, the Trust made a claim on the group life policy. Defendant responded that the terms of the policy required it to pay the full benefit to the decedent's beneficiaries. The Trust terminated the policy, stopped paying premiums, and filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and rescission of the contract. The district court dismissed the Trust's claims and entered judgment for defendant for $95,059.99 in unpaid premiums. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the parties had an enforceable contract.

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In the garnishment action below, Plaintiffs sought to collect the consent judgments they had previously obtained in settlement of their tort actions against Americold Corporation, which was insured by Northwestern Pacific Indemnity Company (NPIC). NPIC, the garnishee in the instant action, appealed the district court's adverse rulings, contending that the underlying judgments against Americold had become dormant and extinguished, thus depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with this garnishment action. Finding in favor of NPIC on that issue, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when the district court entered its judgment against NPIC in this garnishment proceeding, Plaintiffs' underlying consent judgments against Americold had been extinguished by operation of the dormancy and revivor statutes; (2) because Americold was not legally obligated to pay an unenforceable judgment, NPIC was no longer indebted to Americold under its contract to pay the judgments for which Americold was legally liable; and (3) accordingly, without an indebtedness from NPIC to Americold, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Plaintiffs judgment against NPIC in a garnishment proceeding. Remanded with directions to dismiss these garnishment proceedings.

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Plaintiff, sued by a competitor and by consumers for unfair trade practices, false and misleading advertising, and deceptive labeling, among other claims, sought indemnity and defense costs from its insurer. The insurer claimed that the suit fell within an exclusion for "antitrust violations, price fixing, price discriminations, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices and/or monopolies." The district court ruled in favor of the insurer. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the policy headings were not determinative and that the paragraph at issue clearly excluded coverage.

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An employee of Plaintiff, the town of Southbury, was injured in a car accident with Defendants, Patricia and Joseph Gonyea, during the course of employment. Employee applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from Plaintiff. Employee also made a claim against Defendants, which was settled for the Defendants' policy insurance limit. After Plaintiff perfected its statutory lien rights, Employee forwarded to Plaintiff the net proceeds he received from the settlement. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced the present action to recover past and future works' compensation benefits it had paid, or would become obligated to pay, as a result of Employee's injuries. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff had assented to the settlement between Employee and Defendants and, thus, was barred from pursuing this action. The trial court granted Defendants' motion, concluding Plaintiff had assented to the settlement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff assented to the settlement and voluntarily relinquished its rights to recover an outstanding balance through subsequent litigation.

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Anthony Smith was involved in an accident that caused extensive damage to his vehicle, which was insured by State Farm. The vehicle was taken to Lewis Auto Body for repairs, after which State Farm determined that the car was a total loss. State Farm requested that Lewis release the vehicle. In response, Lewis requested payment from State Farm amounting to $30,816 for labor and storage. Lewis then asserted a lien against the vehicle in the amount of $30,816, conducted a lien sale, and obtained title to the vehicle. Smith filed a complaint for replevin and conversion. The district court granted summary judgment to Smith, finding Lewis did not file a valid lien and did not provide proper notice of the sale. Lewis then filed a complaint for money judgment against Smith. In response, Smith filed an emergency petition to prohibit the sale or other disposition of the vehicle. The district court consolidated the actions and awarded damages to Lewis in the amount of $20,516, including $15,240 in storage fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Lewis was not entitled to accumulate storage charges after the date that a demand was made for the return of the automobile. Remanded.