Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Southeastern recovered a judgment against David Herzig in a North Carolina court. In August 1998, the North Carolina judgment was transcribed and filed in North Dakota under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, and renewed in North Carolina in 2000, and was again transcribed and filed in North Dakota for enforcement purposes. In 2004, Alphild Herzig, David Herzig's mother, was joined as a party. In 2005, Southeastern moved for an order compelling Alphild Herzig to comply with Southeastern's discovery requests and requested sanctions. In June 2006, Southeastern moved to compel discovery and requested sanctions. The court granted Southeastern's motion for sanctions against Alphild Herzig contingent on submission of a checklist of items to be produced so the court could set a daily sanction for each item not provided. The court also found Alphild Herzig was in contempt and awarded attorney fees. In August 2006, Alphild Herzig moved for release from the sanctions. The court denied her motion. In 2008, Alphild Herzig moved for an order to dismiss her as a party in the original action and vacating the 2004 order joining her as a party and all subsequent orders issued against her, including the 2006 contempt orders. Southeastern opposed Alphild Herzig's motion to dismiss. However, Alphild Herzig died before the court ruled on the motion. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the daily sanctions imposed on Alphild Herzig under 2006 contempt orders abated at her death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court had not followed its instructions on whether a portion of the daily sanctions were intended to be money damages to compensate Southeastern or whether the sanctions were a forfeiture. As such, the Court reversed and remanded the district court to make that determination. View "Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig" on Justia Law

Shenandoah Life Insurance Company brought an action to void an insurance policy it issued on the life of Lorenzo Smallwood. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Shenandoah, and narrowed the issue for trial to whether Lorenzo intended to defraud the insurance company when he did not disclose information related to his medical history on the insurance application. At trial, the court granted Shenandoah's motion for a directed verdict. Lakeisha Smallwood appealed the directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a jury could reasonably conclude that Shenandoah failed to meet its burden of proving Lorenzo made the misrepresentations with the requisite fraudulent intent. The Court reversed and remanded the case for trial. View "Shenandoah Life v. Smallwood" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this consolidated case to consider whether a plaintiff may recover delay damages on the full amount of a jury verdict in his favor, or whether delay damages are limited to the amount of the legally-recoverable molded verdict, as it was adjusted by the trial court to reflect insurance policy limits. This case stemmed from a 2002 accident in which the vehicle operated by Richard and Marleen Marlette, stopped in traffic, was hit when vehicle operated by Herman Jordan crossed the center line and sideswiped them. Mr. Marlette sustained serious physical injuries, as well as lost wages and impairment of his earning capacity. The Marlettes filed suit against Jordan, who was uninsured, and their own insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), for uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage. Liability was uncontested, and the case proceeded to trial on damages. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff may recover delay damages only on the amount of legally-recoverable damages to which he is entitled pursuant to the molded verdict. The Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for remand to the trial court for reinstatement of its original award of delay damages. View "Marlette v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, is a 'Potentially Responsible Party' ('PRP') letter from the Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA'), in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ('CERCLA') provisions, sufficient to satisfy the 'suit' requirement under a liability policy of insurance?" The plaintiff in the underlying action is Alabama Gas Corporation ("Alagasco"). Defendants St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company, and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company are all direct and indirect subsidiaries of defendant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company. Upon review of the applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Travelers Casualty and Surety Company et al. v. Alabama Gas Corporation " on Justia Law

This case involved an insurance coverage dispute arising from charges of sexual harassment brought by a former employee (Employee) against the one-time president (President) of Jasmine Company, Inc. After President filed an action against Jasmine's liability insurance provider (Insurer), seeking defense and indemnification for the harassment charges, Insurer filed a third-party complaint against Jasmine itself, requesting a declaratory judgment that it had not duty to defend or indemnify Jasmine for the harassment claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the third-party claims for Jasmine, holding that Insurer had to defend and indemnify Jasmine. At issue on appeal was whether a finder of fact must conclude that the conduct underlying the sexual harassment charges did or did not begin before Jasmine's insurance policy took effect. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that neither party was entitled to summary judgment, as the question of when the harassing conduct that gave rise to Employee's claims began was a quintessential question for a factfinder. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to determined whether Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a permits the use of motor vehicle and gas tax (MVGT) funds to pay those costs of a county's joint self-insurance pool attributable to covering the risk of liability and loss resulting from the operations of a county engineer's highway department. The Supreme Court concluded that Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a authorizes the use of MVGT funds to pay a county's cost of participating in a joint self-insurance pool attributable to covering the risk of liability and loss resulting from the operations of a county engineer's highway department. In so holding, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded. View "Stockberger v. Henry" on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arose from charges of sexual harassment brought by a one-time employee against Appellant, the former president of Jasmine Company, Inc. Appellant sought a defense to and indemnity for the harassment claims from Appellee, Jasmine's liability insurance provider. The district court ruled that Appellant was not entitled to coverage from Appellee because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, a prior arbitration between Appellant and the purchaser of his business conclusively established that Appellant's conduct fell within an exclusion to Appellee's insurance policy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration presented Appellant with the full and fair opportunity for adjudication on the issue at hand; and (2) therefore, the district court was correct to bar Appellant from disputing the applicability of the exclusion based on the doctrine of issue preclusion. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted the petition of Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company (Petitioner) in its Original Jurisdiction to assess constitutional challenges to Act No. 26 of the South Carolina Acts and Joint Resolutions, which regulates coverage provided by commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies for construction-related work. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the retroactivity clause of Act No. 261 violated the Contract Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions, and that the statute may only apply prospectively to CGL insurance contracts executed on or after its effective date of May 17, 2011. View "Harleysville Mutual v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a Workers' Compensation employer's insurance carrier should be reimbursed from the Supersedeas Fund for specific payments made to a claimant prior to the ultimate grant of supersedeas. The question turned on whether the relevant payments constituted payments of "compensation" within the meaning of Section 443 of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), 77 P.S. 999(a), or, as argued by Appellant Bureau of Workers' Compensation, whether the payments are not reimbursable because they constitute payment of legal costs associated with obtaining a claimant's third-party tort settlement under Section 319 of the WCA, 77 P.S. 671. After review, the Court found no language in either Section 443 or Section 319 that would transform the relevant payments into something other than compensation merely because the amounts of the payments were calculated to compensate the claimant for the costs of recovering the third-party settlement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. View "Bureau of Workers' Comp, Aplt v. WCAB(Excelsior Ins.)" on Justia Law

Following the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool (GIIP), Lumpkin County appealed, contending that following the insolvency of the County's regular insurer, GIIP was required to step in and cover the pending workers' compensation claims against the County. Specifically, the County argued that the trial court erred in finding that it was not entitled to coverage under the GIIP because the County's net worth exceeded $25 million. Alternatively, the County argued OCGA 33-36-3 unconstitutionally violated the County's due process rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "The County contend[ed] that this ruling was erroneous because the term 'net worth' is inapplicable to government entities, and, instead, the applicability of the twenty-five million dollar exemption under the Act should be assessed based on the County's 'net assets.' The County argue[d] that the bulk of its assets, including land, roads, bridges, and government buildings are restricted from use and are thus unavailable to meet its obligations or satisfy liabilities. Based on the County's calculation of its own net assets, it only has $5.6 million dollars with which to meet these obligations. As a result, the County maintain[ed] that it should receive coverage for its claims from the GIIP. This argument is misplaced." Therefore, the Court held that the trial court did not err in excluding the County from GIIP protection based on the net worth exemption. Furthermore, the County does not possess due process rights by which to challenge the constitutionality of the Act, and its argument premised on any such right necessarily failed. View "Lumpkin Co. v. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool" on Justia Law