Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a Workers' Compensation employer's insurance carrier should be reimbursed from the Supersedeas Fund for specific payments made to a claimant prior to the ultimate grant of supersedeas. The question turned on whether the relevant payments constituted payments of "compensation" within the meaning of Section 443 of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), 77 P.S. 999(a), or, as argued by Appellant Bureau of Workers' Compensation, whether the payments are not reimbursable because they constitute payment of legal costs associated with obtaining a claimant's third-party tort settlement under Section 319 of the WCA, 77 P.S. 671. After review, the Court found no language in either Section 443 or Section 319 that would transform the relevant payments into something other than compensation merely because the amounts of the payments were calculated to compensate the claimant for the costs of recovering the third-party settlement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. View "Bureau of Workers' Comp, Aplt v. WCAB(Excelsior Ins.)" on Justia Law

Following the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool (GIIP), Lumpkin County appealed, contending that following the insolvency of the County's regular insurer, GIIP was required to step in and cover the pending workers' compensation claims against the County. Specifically, the County argued that the trial court erred in finding that it was not entitled to coverage under the GIIP because the County's net worth exceeded $25 million. Alternatively, the County argued OCGA 33-36-3 unconstitutionally violated the County's due process rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "The County contend[ed] that this ruling was erroneous because the term 'net worth' is inapplicable to government entities, and, instead, the applicability of the twenty-five million dollar exemption under the Act should be assessed based on the County's 'net assets.' The County argue[d] that the bulk of its assets, including land, roads, bridges, and government buildings are restricted from use and are thus unavailable to meet its obligations or satisfy liabilities. Based on the County's calculation of its own net assets, it only has $5.6 million dollars with which to meet these obligations. As a result, the County maintain[ed] that it should receive coverage for its claims from the GIIP. This argument is misplaced." Therefore, the Court held that the trial court did not err in excluding the County from GIIP protection based on the net worth exemption. Furthermore, the County does not possess due process rights by which to challenge the constitutionality of the Act, and its argument premised on any such right necessarily failed. View "Lumpkin Co. v. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an appellate court should review a non-final order denying a claim of sovereign immunity by Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), a state-created entity that provides property insurance, in a bad faith action stemming from the entity's handling of a property damage claim. The issue arose in the context of the broader question of when appellate courts should use common law writs to review non-final orders involving claims of immunity prior to the entry of a final judgment and when the Supreme Court should expand the list of non-final appealable orders. While the Court did not resolve the broader issue in this case, it determined that Citizens' claim of immunity was not reviewable by the appellate courts either through the writ of certiorari or the writ of prohibition, and the Court declined to expand the list of non-final orders reviewable on appeal to include the discrete legal issue presented in this case. View "Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to resolve an issue of first impression: whether a member of a putative class was entitled to the suspension of prescription provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 596 when an independent, individual lawsuit is filed prior to a ruling on the class certification issue. The respective district courts in each of these cases sustained exceptions of prescription, dismissing plaintiffs' individual lawsuits filed prior to a resolution of the class certification issue in class action proceedings in which the plaintiffs were putative members. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissals, finding that the filing of an individual lawsuit by a member of a putative class prior to a ruling on the class certification issue operates as an "opt out" of the class action and a forfeiture of the suspension provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 596. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, the Supreme Court found that because plaintiffs were members of a class asserted in a class action petition, they were entitled to the benefits of the suspension of prescription provided under La. C.C.P. art. 596, notwithstanding that they also filed individual actions prior to a resolution of the class certification issue. As a result, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts sustaining exceptions of prescription to the petitions of the plaintiffs and remanded these matters to the respective district courts for further proceedings. View "Duckworth v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider two separate, but related issues: (1) whether the suspension of prescription provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 596 extended to a putative class member who filed an individual claim after a ruling on the class certification issue and, if so, (2) whether La. C.C.P. art. 596 suspended prescription when the putative class action is filed in another jurisdiction. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, the Court found that the filing of an individual lawsuit after a ruling on class certification does not operate as an "opt out" of a class action proceeding and a forfeiture of the benefits of suspension provided in La. C.C.P. art. 596, but that the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 596 do not extend to suspend prescription on claims asserted in a putative class action filed in a federal court. As a result, the Court reversed the district court's judgment denying the defendant's exception of prescription, sustain the exception, and remanded this case to the district court to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to amend the petition, if they could, to allege facts to show their claims were not prescribed. View "Quinn v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

When an insured defendant believes its insurer is refusing to settle a plaintiff's claims in bad faith, the insured can negotiate an independent pretrial settlement with the plaintiff, typically involving a stipulated judgment, a covenant not to execute the judgment, and an assignment of the insurer's bad faith claim to the plaintiff (collectively, a "covenant judgment). When accepted by the trial court, the settlement amount becomes the presumptive measure of damages in the later bad faith action. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned whether article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution entitles the insurer to have the reasonableness of the covenant judgment determined by a jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it does not, and affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Bird v. Best Plumbing Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

The State of North Dakota, by and through the Department of Human Services and its Child Support Enforcement Division ("the Department"), appealed a district court order denying its application for an order to enforce an administrative subpoena. In July 2010, the Department issued an administrative subpoena to the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund ("NDIRF") directing it to provide information on all claims submitted to the Fund. NDIRF objected to the subpoena, contending that the Department was not statutorily authorized to issue an administrative subpoena to NDIRF and that the subpoena was vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome. The Department filed an application for an order enforcing the administrative subpoena in district court. The district court determined that the Department was not statutorily authorized to issue an administrative subpoena to NDIRF and denied the application. The district court did not address NDIRF's arguments that the subpoena was vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in holding the Department was not statutorily authorized to issue an administrative subpoena to NDIRF. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying the Department's application for an order enforcing the administrative subpoena. Because the district court did not address NDIRF's contentions that the subpoena was vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome, the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings to properly consider these issues under the limited four-factor review of enforcement of an administrative subpoena. View "North Dakota v. No. Dakota Ins. Reserve Fund" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether plaintiffs' dismissal with prejudice of a lawsuit filed in federal court after the defendant has made a general appearance of record was a "voluntary dismissal" for purposes of La. C.C. art. 3463, which provides "[i]nterruption [of prescription] is considered never to have occurred if the plaintiff abandons, voluntarily dismisses the action at any time either before the defendant has made any appearance of record or thereafter . . ." After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and the reinstated the trial court's dismissing plaintiffs' suit. View "Sims v. American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The State enacted an Act in 2011 pursuant to which health insurers were required to disclose, upon written request from a public school district, aggregate loss information pertaining to any group policies held by the district's employees. Maine Education Association Benefits Trust, which managed a statewide health insurance plan for a substantial segment of Maine's public school work force, subsequently filed suit in the district court, seeking to permanently enjoin the law prior to its enforcement. The Trust alleged that because its information constituted a confidential trade secret, the Act's disclosure requirement resulted in an uncompensated taking proscribed by the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied the Trust's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Trust did not have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its takings claim. View "Me. Educ. Ass'n Benefits Trust v. Cioppa" on Justia Law

ORS 742.061 authorizes an award of attorney fees to an insured who prevails in "an action * * * in any court of this state upon any policy of insurance of any kind or nature * * *." A later enacted statute, ORS 742.001, provides that ORS chapter 742 "appl[ies] to all insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery in this state * * *." The question in this case was whether ORS 742.001 precluded awarding attorney fees to an insured who prevailed in an action in an Oregon court on an insurance policy that was issued for delivery and delivered in the State of Washington. The trial court concluded that it did and entered a supplemental judgment to that effect. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Considering the text, context, and legislative history of Chapter 742, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature did not intend that ORS 742.001 would limit the scope of ORS 742.061. "For us to hold otherwise, we would have to turn an expansion of the state's authority to impose substantive regulations on insurers transacting business in Oregon into a limitation on the remedial and procedural rules that affect insurers appearing in its courts. * * * we would have to read a limitation into the text of that section that the legislature did not include. We may not do that." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Morgan v. Amex Assurance Company" on Justia Law