Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

In 2021, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act ("the Act"), which prohibited an abortion after around six weeks gestation. This was before many women—excluding those who were trying to become pregnant and were therefore closely monitoring their menstrual cycles—even know they were pregnant. The Supreme Court held that the decision to terminate a pregnancy rested upon the "utmost personal and private considerations imaginable," and implicates a woman's right to privacy. "While this right is not absolute, and must be balanced against the State's interest in protecting unborn life, this Act, which severely limits—and in many instances completely forecloses—abortion, is an unreasonable restriction upon a woman's right to privacy and is therefore unconstitutional." View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, et al. v. South Carolina, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting a directed verdict on a bad faith claim, holding that Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky. 1993), established the applicable legal standard for both common law and statutory bad-faith claims.Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC) brought a declaratory judgment action disputing coverage under a commercial general liability policy insuring K-2 Catering, LLC for claims Haley Belt made stemming from an accident that occurred during an event hosted by K-2's member-managers at their residence. Ultimately, judgment was entered declaring coverage under the policy. While the action was pending, Belt brought a separate action against K-2 and CIC, alleging bad faith and negligence in the settlement of her claims under K-2's policy. The negligence claims were settled and, after a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict against CIC. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred when it failed to grant CIC a directed verdict on the bad faith claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to apply the Wittmer standard and grant a directed verdict for CIC. View "Belt v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Fox and Puchlak filed purported class actions, alleging that Michigan counties seized property to satisfy property-tax delinquencies, sold the properties, and kept the difference between the sales proceeds and the tax debts.. The suits assert that the counties committed takings without just compensation or imposed excessive fines in violation of the Michigan and federal constitutions. Genesee County’s insurance, through Safety, precludes coverage for claims “[a]rising out of . . . [t]ax collection, or the improper administration of taxes or loss that reflects any tax obligation” and claims “[a]rising out of eminent domain, condemnation, inverse condemnation, temporary or permanent taking, adverse possession, or dedication by adverse use.”Safety sought a ruling that it owed no duty to defend or to indemnify. The district court entered summary judgment, finding no Article III case or controversy between Safety and Fox and Puchlak. The court also held that Safety owes Genesee County no duty to defend. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Safety lacks standing to sue Fox and Puchlak over its duty to defend and its claim for the duty to indemnify lacks ripeness. Safety owes no duty to defend; the alleged tax-collection process directly caused the injuries underlying each of Fox’s and Puchlak’s claims. View "Safety Specialty Insurance Co. v. Genesee County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court concluding that Petitioners did not establish that the recently amended Insurance Regulation 187, 11 N.Y.C.R.R. part 224, which provides protections to consumers engaging in life insurance and annuity transactions, was invalid, holding that there was no basis to invalidate the regulation.Petitioners commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding alleging that the amended regulation was unconstitutionally vague because certain terms did not satisfy the test for constitutional vagueness and that the Department of Financial Services (DFS) exceeded its authority in promulgating the amendment. Supreme Court held that the amendment was a proper exercise of the powers granted to DFS. The appellate division reversed, ruling that the amended regulation was unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that DFS appropriately exercised its authority "to create a carefully considered and clear regulation." View "Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of N.Y., Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Financial Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff National Rifle Association of America (the "NRA") claims that Defendant, the former Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), violated its rights to free speech and equal protection when she investigated three insurance companies that had partnered with it to provide coverage for losses resulting from gun use and encouraged banks and insurance companies to consider discontinuing their relationships with gun promotion organizations. The NRA contends that Defendant used her regulatory power to threaten NRA business partners and coerce them into disassociating with the NRA, in violation of its rights.   The district court dismissed the equal protection claim on the basis that Defendant was protected by absolute immunity, but it declined to dismiss the free speech claims, concluding that the NRA plausibly alleged its claims and issues of fact existed as to whether she was protected by qualified immunity.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that here, the various cases addressing the issue did not provide clear and particularized guidance but involved very different circumstances and much stronger conduct. The cases do not clearly establish that Defendant’s statements, in this case, were unconstitutionally threatening or coercive. Qualified immunity balances the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise their power irresponsibly with the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties responsibly. Here, the Complaint's factual allegations show that, far from acting irresponsibly, Defendant was doing her job in good faith. View "National Rifle Association of America v. Maria T. Vullo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Crystal Point Condominium Association, Inc. obtained default judgments against two entities for construction defect claims. Kinsale Insurance Company was alleged to have insured those entities, under the Direct Action Statute, N.J.S.A. 17:28-2. The relevant policies both contained an arbitration agreement providing in part that “[a]ll disputes over coverage or any rights afforded under this Policy . . . shall be submitted to binding Arbitration.” Crystal Point filed a declaratory judgment action against Kinsale, alleging that it was entitled to recover the amounts owed by the entities under the insurance policies issued by Kinsale. Kinsale asserted that Crystal Point’s claims were subject to binding arbitration in accordance with the insurance policies. Kinsale argued that the Direct Action Statute did not apply because Crystal Point had not demonstrated that neither entity was insolvent or bankrupt. In the alternative, Kinsale contended that even if the statute were to apply, it would not preclude enforcement of the arbitration provisions in the policies. The trial court granted Kinsale’s motion to compel arbitration, viewing the Direct Action Statute to be inapplicable because there was no evidence in the record that either insured was insolvent or bankrupt. An appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, finding the evidence that the writs of execution were unsatisfied met the Direct Action Statute’s requirement that the claimant present proof of the insured’s insolvency or bankruptcy and determining that the Direct Action Statute authorized Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale. The appellate court concluded the arbitration clause in Kinsale’s insurance policies did not warrant the arbitration of Crystal Point’s claims, so it reinstated the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined Crystal Point could assert direct claims against Kinsale pursuant to the Direct Action Statute in the setting of this case. Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:28-2, however, Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale were derivative claims, and were thus subject to the terms of the insurance policies at issue, including the provision in each policy mandating binding arbitration of disputes between Kinsale and its insureds. Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale were therefore subject to arbitration. View "Crystal Point Condominium Association, Inc. v. Kinsale Insurance Company " on Justia Law

The Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA), Tex. Lab. Code 401.007–419.007, regulates the prices that insurers must pay to providers for various medical services utilized by their beneficiaries, including air transport services. However, those price restrictions conflict with the federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), which makes clear that the states "may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision . . . related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart." 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1).The Fifth Circuit joined its sister circuits, which have unanimously held that the ADA preempts state price caps on air ambulance reimbursements, and that those state price caps are not saved by the McCarran–Ferguson Act. The court disagreed with the Texas Supreme Court, which has reached contrary conclusions by a divided vote. Therefore, in this case, the court affirmed the judgment and held that the TWCA regulations concerning the reimbursement of air ambulance providers like Air Evac are preempted by the ADA, and are not saved by the McCarran–Ferguson Act. View "Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Because the Louisiana Supreme Court found in its original opinion that plaintiffs had a right of action under La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2, their constitutional challenge was pretermitted and “that part of the district court judgment declaring [these code articles and La. C.C. art. 199 to be] unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption” was vacated. Having found on rehearing that the codal analysis of La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2 and 199 foreclosed a right of action to the plaintiff children, who were given in adoption, for the death of their biological parent and half-siblings, the Supreme Court was called on to address the propriety of the district court’s declaration that La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2, and 199 are “unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption.” The Court found a rational basis existed for limiting the categories of eligible claimants in La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2 to those who “are likely to be most affected by the death of the deceased.” Children given in adoption “have moved into a new parental relationship, becoming children ‘by adoption,’ who are eligible claimants in the unfortunate occurrence of the tortious death of their adoptive parents. Likewise, the transfer of children into a new parental unit as children ‘by adoption’ terminates, for purposes of wrongful death and survival actions, any connection between the ‘children given in adoption’ and any biological siblings who were not ‘given in adoption.’” For these reasons, the district court legally erred in finding that the fact that Daniel Goins and David Watts were adopted did not prevent them from bringing survival and wrongful death claims for the deaths of their biological father and biological half-siblings and in overruling the defendant’s exception raising the objection of no right of action. The Supreme Court's original decree was vacated and the district court's judgment was reversed. Judgment was entered sustaining the defendant insurance company's peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action, and dismissing the claims that were the subject of this exception. View "Rismiller et al. v. Gemini Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual), Hill Brothers Construction Company (Hill Brothers) and the Mississippi Transportation Commission (the Commission) regarding a fuel-adjustment clause (the FAC) in a highway-construction contract. In 2019, the Commission successfully moved to alter or amend the circuit court's judgment. The circuit court vacated its prior entry of partial summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual on the issue of liability, effectively denying Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Liberty Mutual's petition for interlocutory appeal. The company argued the 2019 order was entered in violation of the Supreme Court's mandate in Hill Brothers I. The Supreme Court determined the circuit court erred in denying Liberty Mutual's motion on liability. The circuit court's judgement was thus reversed and summary judgment reinstated in favor of the insurance company on the issue of liability. View "Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Mississippi Transportation Commission" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified to three questions of law to the Georgia Supreme Court relating to a lawsuit brought in federal district court by Fife Whiteside, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Bonnie Winslett. Whiteside sued GEICO to recover the value of Winslett’s failure-to-settle tort claim against GEICO so that the bankruptcy estate could pay creditor Terry Guthrie, who was injured in an accident caused by Winslett. The certified questions certified asked the Supreme Court to analyze how Georgia law applied to an unusual set of circumstances that implicated both Winslett’s duty to give GEICO notice of suit and GEICO’s duty to settle the claim brought against Winslett. The Supreme Court was unable to give unqualified “yes” or “no” answers to two of the certified questions as they were posed; rather, the Court answered the questions only in the context of the circumstances of this particular case. "Winslett remains liable to Guthrie, even if her bankruptcy trustee succeeds on the failure-to-settle claim against GEICO; therefore, if the bankruptcy estate does not recover enough from GEICO to satisfy Guthrie’s judgment, the estate would not be fully compensated for Winslett’s damages, and GEICO would escape responsibility for breaching its settlement duty to Winslett. Such an outcome would deny Winslett the full measure of compensatory damages allowed under Georgia law." View "GEICO Indemnity Co. v. Whiteside" on Justia Law