Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Following an automobile crash for which United Tool Rental (UTR) and DeLyle Paulsen admitted negligence, UTR and Paulsen sought contribution from the state DOT and several construction entities (construction parties), alleging their negligent design, construction, and maintenance of the highway contributed to the crash. After a jury trial, the district court determined UTR and Paulsen were entirely at fault for the crash and rejected their contribution claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence the DOT erected a "no left turn" sign after the crash and a post-crash memorandum prepared by the highway patrol; (2) the district court did not deprive UTR and Paulsen a fair trial by allowing the construction parties' counsel to inquire what caused Paulsen to drive inattentively; and (3) the jury's verdict was not defective.

Stephen and Dawn Steadele contracted with Montana Component Housing Corporation (MCHC) to construct a home. MCHC did not complete the home by the deadline and eventually abandoned the project without completing the home. The Steadeles filed suit against MCHC. The district court entered a default judgment against MCHC when it failed to respond to the suit. The Steadeles then requested payment from Colony Insurance Company, MCHC's insurer. Colony denied coverage and refused to pay because MCHC never notified it of the Steadeles' claim. The Steadeles then filed this action, arguing that Colony's refusal to issue payment on the underlying judgment was a violation of Mont. Code Ann. 33-18-201, which prohibits unfair claim settlement practices. The district court granted summary judgment to Colony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Colony because MCHC's failure to notify Colony of the Steadeles' claim was a material breach of MCHC's obligations under the policy.

Appellant/Respondent Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company ("Harleysville") issued a series of standard CGL policies to the Respondent developers or their predecessors (collectively "Crossmann") for a series of condominium projects in the Myrtle Beach area of South Carolina. The exterior components of the condominium projects were negligently constructed, which resulted in water penetration and progressive damage to otherwise nondefective components of the projects. The homeowners settled their lawsuits against Respondents. Crossmann then filed this declaratory judgment action to determine coverage under Harleysville's policies. Upon review of the lower courtâs order, the Supreme Court reversed a finding of joint and several liability against the developers and its insurer, and found the scope of Harleysville's liability was limited to damages accrued during its "time on the risk." In so ruling, the Court adhered to its holding in âJoe Harden Builders, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.â: â[u]sing our âtime on riskâ framework, the allocation of the damage award against Crossmann must conform to the actual distribution of property damage across the progressive damage period. Where proof of the actual property damage distribution is not available, the allocation formula adopted herein will serve as an appropriate default method for dividing the loss among Crossmann's insurers.â The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further consideration of the "time on risk" allocation.

A contractor, renovating military housing, obtained a performance bond under the Miller Act (40 U.S.C. 3131 (b)) and abandoned the project after completing 12 percent of the work. The government had paid 40 percent of the contract price. The surety contracted for completion, but the second contractor discovered code violations and incurred penalties for late completion. Costs were reimbursed by the surety, which filed suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491. The Federal Circuit held that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction. The court previously held that the Claims Court has jurisdiction under the Act over sureties' claims based on a theory of equitable subrogation; this case does not involve equitable subrogation because the government made payments at issue before receiving notice of the contractor's default. The waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act does not extend to impairment of suretyship claims apart from the theory of equitable subrogation. The Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 601, applies to a surety's claim against the government arising from a takeover agreement between the government and surety for completion of a bonded contract following the principal obligorâs default; the surety failed to satisfy CDA jurisdictional prerequisites.

Developer refused to pay nearly $6.5 million under the prime contract ($5 million was due subcontractors) claiming deficient work. General contractor declined to pay a subcontractor, who sued on the surety bond. The surety asserted that term 6.f conditioned subcontractor's right to payment on contractor's receipt of payment. In the meantime, contractor settled with developer for $1 million--all it was able to pay--and subcontractor declined a pro rata share in return for a release of claims. The district court granted partial summary judgments in favor of subcontractor for an amount $91,790 less than the claimed $1,074,260. The Third Circuit reversed interpretation of the subcontract and rejection of surety's claim for proportional offset for legal fees incurred in the suit against developer, but affirmed denial of subcontractor's waiver claim, and remanded. The parties intended to share the risk of non-payment. Under 6f developer's payment to contractor is a condition precedent to contractor's obligation to pay subcontractor, yielding after six months to provide a mechanism that specifies when and for how much subcontractor may sue contractor. The contract created a mechanism for passing through subcontractor's remaining claims and pegging recovery to the amount that contractor received from developer for subcontractor's work.

The claim arose from an accident at a construction site. The company was insured under its own commercial general liability policy, issued by Acadia, and as an additional insured on a subcontractor's policy, issued by AIG. Both policies contained provisions that: This insurance is excess over: (1) Any of the other insurance, whether primary, excess, contingent, or on any other basis . . . (a) That is . . . coverage for "your work"; . . .(2) Any other primary insurance available to you covering liability for damages arising out of the premises or operations for which you have been added as an additional insured by attachment of an endorsement. The company and Acadia sought declaratory judgment that AIG was obligated to defend the construction company and compensation of costs incurred by Acadia that defense. The district court granted judgment in AIG's favor. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the plain language of the policy requires that the Acadia policy be treated as excess over the AIG policy. The word "you" refers solely to the listed Named Insured in the policy Declarations or "qualifying as Named Insureds" under the policy.

Plaintiff John Stuart decided to build a new house on a small farm. He contacted his insurance agent of nineteen years, Defendant Ronald Pittman for "course-of-construction" insurance to cover any problems in the course of building his house. Mr. Pittman discussed the scope of coverage that the policy would provide. Relying on Mr. Pittman's oral assurance of what the policy would cover, Plaintiff agreed to it. Construction started in 2003. Plaintiff received a premium statement, but not a written copy of the policy. An ice storm struck Plaintiff's building project. Plaintiff contacted Mr. Pittman to initiate an insurance claim. Mr. Pittman told Plaintiff that damage should be covered by the policy. In 2004, Plaintiff received a declaration page from Country Mutual Insurance Company, and found that damage to his house was not covered. Plaintiff brought an action against both Mr. Pittman and the Insurance Company alleging breach of the oral "policy" that he and Mr. Pittman agreed to at the onset of the building project. At the conclusion of the trial's evidentiary phase, Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Plaintiff failed to prove that the oral insurance binder covered his project. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury would later rule in favor of Plaintiff. The verdict was overturned on appeal. The court held that there was no evidence from which a jury could have found in favor of Plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that the appellate court misinterpreted the Oregon law that required him to prove that the oral binder superseded the "usual exclusions" of the written policy. The Supreme Court found that the written policy was, as a matter of law, deemed to include all terms of the oral binder. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants Bunn Builders, Inc. (Bunn) hired Appellees Richard Womack and Roy Turner (Womack & Turner) to paint the ground floor office of the Bunn Building in Arkadelphia. On August 19, 2004, a fire was reported at the building. The building sustained major structural damage as a result of the fire. Bunn insured the building through Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC). Within a few days, EMC hired investigators to find the cause and origin of the fire. The investigators asked Womack & Turner's liability insurance carrier Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Arkansas, Inc. (Farm Bureau) to preserve certain items for testing. In particular, they requested to test a halogen work lamp that the painters used on the Bunn job. EMC later sent a letter to Farm Bureau stating that EMC believed that the electrical components from the "electrical tools" used on the job were eliminated as a possible cause for igniting the fire. Testimony at trial by Womack & Turner revealed that EMC believed that the halogen lamp had been eliminated as a possible cause. However, EMC's investigators submitted reports identifying the lamp as the possible source of ignition. These reports were not sent to Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau wanted to do its own independent testing and asked EMC for the tools. EMC admitted that it had destroyed the items once its investigation was complete. Bunn and EMC sued Womack & Turner for negligence, alleging that the halogen lamp started the fire. In their response, Womack & Turner raised the issue of "spoliation," arguing that Bunn and EMC had a duty to preserve the evidence if they intended to sue for negligence. A trial was held, and the jury was given an instruction on "spoliation." The jury returned a verdict in favor of Womack & Turner. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Bunn and EMC argued that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to instruct the jury on spoliation. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and affirmed the decision in favor of Womack & Turner.

Duane Peterson, Mid Am Group, LLC, and Mid Am Group Realty (collectively âMid Amâ), Village Homes at Harwood Groves, LLC (Village Homes), and First International Bank and Trust (First International) all had a stake in the insurance proceeds from a 2007 hail storm that damaged their respective properties. The trial court granted summary judgment to Village Homesâ Homeownersâ Association that represented ten property owners of the Village Homes community impacted by the storm. Mid Am developed and built the insured properties, but Mid Am had only sold ten of fifty units. When the hail storm hit, Mid Am submitted a proof of loss with its insurance company for the residences it still owned. First American was in the process of foreclosing on those unsold Mid Am properties. The insurance check was sent to Mid Am, but First American sued to get possession of the proceeds, and the individual owners were permitted to intervene. The court took control of the proceeds, and held that neither Mid Am nor First International were entitled to them. The court ruled that Mid Am, as fiduciary to the ten owners, should distribute the proceeds among them. Mid Am appealed, arguing that the ownersâ association did not have standing to intervene in the suit for the proceeds. The Supreme Court concluded that the ownersâ association had standing to intervene, and that it was not an error of the trial court to allow the owners to make their claim for the proceeds. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.