Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Consumer Law
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The plaintiffs, Shane and Maura Pelissier, insured their automobile through GEICO General Insurance Company. They sought underinsured motorist benefits four and a half years after a motor vehicle accident with an underinsured driver. GEICO moved for summary judgment, citing a policy provision requiring lawsuits for underinsured motorist benefits to be filed within three years of the accident. The trial court denied the motion and transferred three interlocutory appeal questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The trial court found that the contractual limitations provision was unenforceable because it could require insureds to file suit before a justiciable cause of action exists. It also found that using the date of the accident as the triggering event for the limitations period was contrary to public policy and that there was a material factual dispute regarding the plaintiffs' ability to discover the tortfeasor’s policy limits before the limitations period expired. The trial court denied GEICO’s motion for reconsideration but granted an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the contractual limitations provision violated public policy. The court held that the provision was unenforceable because it could force insureds to file suit before their cause of action for underinsured motorist benefits had accrued, thus restricting their ability to recover damages. The court noted that the provision contravened the public policy underlying New Hampshire’s uninsured motorist statute, RSA 264:15, which aims to place insured persons in the same position as if the offending motorist had adequate liability insurance. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision in part, did not address the second interlocutory question, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pelissier v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between an insurer, GEICO, and a windshield repair shop, Glassco, regarding the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act. From 2016 to 2019, Glassco performed nearly 1,800 windshield repairs for GEICO’s insureds, who assigned their insurance payment rights to Glassco. GEICO paid these claims at a discounted rate, leading to litigation. GEICO sought to recover payments and claimed that Glassco violated the Repair Act by not providing written estimates and other disclosures.The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida ruled in favor of Glassco, concluding that GEICO did not have a private right of action under the Repair Act because it was not a "customer" as defined by the statute. The court also held that Glassco’s violations did not render its invoices void. GEICO appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Florida regarding the insurer's rights under the Repair Act.The Supreme Court of Florida answered both certified questions in the negative. First, it held that Fla. Stat. § 559.921(1) does not grant an insurance company a cause of action when a repair shop fails to provide a written repair estimate. The court emphasized that the statute defines a "customer" as the person who signs the repair estimate, and GEICO conceded it did not meet this definition.Second, the court held that the Repair Act violations do not void a repair invoice for completed windshield repairs, nor do they preclude a repair shop from being paid by an insurance company. The court noted that the statute allows for penalties and damages to be adjusted if repairs were authorized and properly performed, indicating that voiding invoices was not intended as a remedy. The court also found that subsequent amendments to the Repair Act rendered previous case law, which might have supported GEICO’s position, obsolete. View "Government Employees Insurance Company v. Glassco Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2007, Dennis Collins, Suzanne Collins, David Butler, and Lucia Bott purchased long-term care insurance policies from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife). They also bought an Inflation Protection Rider, which promised automatic annual benefit increases without corresponding premium hikes, though MetLife reserved the right to adjust premiums on a class basis. In 2015, 2018, and 2019, MetLife informed the plaintiffs of significant premium increases. The plaintiffs filed a class action in 2022, alleging fraud, fraudulent concealment, violations of state consumer protection statutes, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Illinois and Missouri law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the case, ruling that the filed rate doctrine under Missouri and Illinois law barred the plaintiffs' claims. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs bringing claims under Missouri law failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the filed rate doctrine did not apply, they were not required to exhaust administrative remedies, and their complaint adequately alleged a breach of the implied covenant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that MetLife's statements about premium expectations were not materially false and that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege intentional fraud or fraudulent concealment. The court also concluded that the statutory claims under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act were barred by regulatory exemptions. Lastly, the court determined that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not breached, as MetLife's actions were expressly permitted by the policy terms. View "Collins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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A joint state and federal criminal investigation, "Operation Back Cracker," uncovered a scheme where Minnesota healthcare providers, primarily chiropractors, recruited car accident victims and fraudulently billed auto insurers for their treatment. In related civil settlements, some providers agreed not to bill certain insurance companies, including Illinois Farmers Insurance Company, for any treatment provided to their insureds. Plaintiffs, representing a class of insured individuals, sued Farmers, alleging that these no-bill agreements violated the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs' injunctive class, enjoining Farmers from entering into or enforcing the no-bill agreements. The court found that these agreements effectively provided managed care services and set preestablished limitations on medical expense benefits, both of which are prohibited under the No-Fault Act. Farmers appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the injunction. The court held that the no-bill agreements did not constitute managed care services as defined by the No-Fault Act because they excluded, rather than used, the providers under contract with Farmers. Additionally, the court found that the agreements did not place preestablished limitations on medical expense benefits since they did not limit reimbursement for reasonable expenses incurred by insureds. The court concluded that an insurer does not violate the No-Fault Act by enforcing a no-bill agreement against a provider, as long as it does not refuse to reimburse an insured who has incurred a qualifying expense. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Taqueria El Primo LLC v. IL Farmers Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Katherine Rosenberg-Wohl procured a homeowners insurance policy from State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, which covered various risks including fire. After her neighbor fell on her staircase, she discovered the stairs needed replacement and filed a claim with State Farm. The insurer denied her claim, citing policy exclusions. Rosenberg-Wohl then filed two lawsuits: one for breach of contract and another under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding State Farm’s general claims-handling practices.The San Francisco City and County Superior Court sustained State Farm’s demurrer, concluding that the one-year limitations period in the insurance policy applied to all of Rosenberg-Wohl’s claims, including her UCL claim. The court reasoned that her claims were essentially “on the policy” because they were grounded in the denial of her insurance claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, with a majority agreeing that the one-year limitations period applied, while a dissenting justice argued that the UCL’s four-year limitations period should govern.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and concluded that the one-year limitations period in section 2071 of the Insurance Code and the insurance policy did not apply to Rosenberg-Wohl’s UCL cause of action. The court determined that her lawsuit was not a “suit or action on [the] policy for the recovery of any claim” because she sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, not a financial recovery under the policy. The court emphasized that the UCL’s four-year statute of limitations governed her claim. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

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The case involves Earl John and Christine Dwyer, who sued Ameriprise Financial, Inc. for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation. In 1985, Ameriprise fraudulently and negligently induced the Dwyers to purchase a universal whole life insurance policy by misrepresenting that their quarterly premium payments would remain the same for the life of the policy. The Dwyers surrendered life insurance policies they had purchased from other companies to facilitate this purchase. In reality, if the Dwyers’ premium payment had remained the same, the policy would have lapsed for insufficient funds in 2020.The trial court found Ameriprise guilty of violating Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (CPL) and awarded the Dwyers compensatory damages. However, the court declined to award treble damages under the CPL, reasoning that they would be duplicative of the punitive damages awarded by the jury on the common-law claims. The Superior Court affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that treble damages under the CPL are a separate remedy available to the Dwyers and must be considered by the trial court without regard to a punitive damages award on related common-law claims. The court concluded that nullifying the availability of a statutory award because of a common-law award is not a permissible exercise of discretion. Therefore, the court reversed the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case for reconsideration of damages under the CPL. View "Dwyer v. Ameriprise Financial" on Justia Law

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Yasmin Varela filed a class action lawsuit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) after a car accident. Varela's insurance policy with State Farm entitled her to the "actual cash value" of her totaled car. However, she alleged that State Farm improperly adjusted the value of her car based on a "typical negotiation" deduction, which was not defined or mentioned in the policy. Varela claimed this deduction was arbitrary, did not reflect market realities, and was not authorized by Minnesota law. She sued State Farm for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (MCFA).State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Varela's claims were subject to mandatory, binding arbitration under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (No-Fault Act). The district court granted State Farm's motion in part, agreeing that Varela's claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment fell within the No-Fault Act's mandatory arbitration provision. However, the court found that Varela's MCFA claim did not seek the type of relief addressed by the No-Fault Act and was neither time-barred nor improperly pleaded, and thus denied State Farm's motion to dismiss this claim.State Farm appealed, arguing that Varela's MCFA claim was subject to mandatory arbitration and should have been dismissed. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that State Farm did not invoke the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in its motion to dismiss and did not file a motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the district court's order turned entirely on a question of state law, and the policy contained no arbitration provision for the district court to "compel." Therefore, State Farm failed to establish the court's jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. View "Varela v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between Dr. Stan Schiff and Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies. Dr. Schiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated providers, claimed that Liberty Mutual's practice of reducing provider bills to an 80th percentile cap based on a computer-generated calculation violated Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Liberty Mutual argued that the statutory requirement to conduct a reasonable investigation into medical expenses is satisfied by determining the 80th percentile of charges for a treatment in the geographic area, and this practice is not an unfair practice under the CPA.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington ruled that Liberty Mutual's practice of using the FAIR Health database to determine the 80th percentile of charges for a treatment in the geographic area is not unfair or unreasonable and does not violate the CPA or the personal injury protection (PIP) requirements to establish standards under which reasonable charges for medical procedures are determined. The court reasoned that comparing charges for the same treatment in the same geographic area is relevant to the determination of reasonableness. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court to enter a summary judgment order in favor of Liberty Mutual. View "Schiff v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiffs, a minor and her parents, sued their health insurer, Premera Blue Cross, for denying coverage for the minor’s stay in a wilderness therapy program, claiming that the denial violates mental health parity laws. The plaintiffs also alleged breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim based on alleged violation of federal parity laws does not form a viable common law action. The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that a violation of federal parity law would give rise to a viable common law action for breach of contract.Furthermore, the Court held that the breach of contract action based on Premera's alleged violation of state parity laws could not succeed based on the statutory language that was in place at the time.However, the Court did affirm the lower court’s finding that the plaintiffs were not required to produce evidence of objective symptomatology to support their insurance bad faith claim for emotional distress damages. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the bad faith and Consumer Protection Act claims. View "P.E.L. v. Premera Blue Cross" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Gene Moran, who was a patient at Huntington Beach Hospital (the Hospital) three times in 2013, sued defendants Prime Healthcare Management, Inc., Prime Healthcare Huntington Beach, LLC, Prime Healthcare Services, Inc., and Prime Healthcare Foundation, Inc. (collectively defendants) under various theories in 2013. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal found that while most of Moran’s claims lacked merit, he had sufficiently alleged facts supporting standing to claim the amount that self-pay patients were charged was unconscionable, and reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the case. Moran’s sixth amended complaint included both the allegations regarding unconscionability and a new theory of the case: defendants had violated the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) by failing to disclose Evaluation and Management (EMS) fees charged in the emergency room through signage or other methods. The complaint sought relief under both the old and new theories for violations of the UCL, CLRA, and for declaratory relief. Defendants moved to strike the allegations regarding EMS fees, arguing their disclosure obligations were defined by statute. The trial court agreed and struck the allegations from the sixth amended complaint. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc." on Justia Law