Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

A&T Maritime Logistics, Inc. had an insurance contract with RLI Insurance Company and a bareboat charter agreement with Alexis Marine, L.L.C. While operating the M/V Uncle John, a vessel owned by Alexis Marine, A&T Maritime caused the ship to allide with an embankment. Believing the damage to be minimal, A&T Maritime did not take immediate action. After a lawsuit was filed, RLI was notified of the claim. A&T Maritime and Alexis Marine sought defense and indemnification from RLI, which denied coverage under the insurance contract. The district court upheld RLI's denial of coverage on summary judgment, finding that RLI was prejudiced by the delayed notice.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially denied A&T Maritime's and Alexis Marine's motions for partial summary judgment seeking reimbursement for defense costs, noting that the policy did not include a duty to defend. The Champagnes, who had purchased the damaged property, settled their claims for $200,000, funded solely by Alexis Marine. RLI then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Uncle John was not covered under the policy. The district court disagreed but granted partial summary judgment to RLI, holding that the prompt notice requirements were breached and RLI was prejudiced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that RLI was actually prejudiced by the delayed notice from both A&T Maritime and Alexis Marine, as the damage worsened over time and the opportunity to settle for a lower amount was lost. Consequently, the denial of coverage for both A&T Maritime and Alexis Marine was appropriate. The court also concluded that RLI had no duty to reimburse defense costs, as indemnification depended on coverage, which was voided due to the breach of the prompt notice requirement. View "A&T Maritime Logistics v. RLI Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Jeffrey Cubberley and Philip Seaver, filed a lawsuit against The Commerce Insurance Company, seeking declaratory relief and compensation for alleged breach of contract. They claimed that Commerce was obligated to cover "inherent diminished value" (IDV) damages to their vehicles, which were damaged in collisions caused by Commerce's insured drivers. Commerce paid for the repairs but refused to compensate for IDV damages, leading the plaintiffs to argue that their vehicles were worth less in the resale market post-repair.The plaintiffs initially filed their lawsuit in the Superior Court, which was later transferred to the business litigation session. The case was stayed pending the outcome of McGilloway v. Safety Ins. Co., which held that IDV damages were recoverable under the 2008 standard Massachusetts automobile policy. After the stay was lifted, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Commerce moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the 2016 standard policy excluded IDV damages. The motion judge granted the dismissal, concluding that the policy did not cover IDV damages and that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts suggesting an entitlement to relief. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their breach of contract claims because they had not obtained final judgments against the insureds, as required by G. L. c. 175, § 113, and G. L. c. 214, § 3 (9). Additionally, the court found that part 4 of the 2016 standard policy explicitly excluded coverage for IDV damages to third-party vehicles. The court also determined that neither G. L. c. 90, § 34O, nor the decision in McGilloway provided a legal basis requiring insurers to cover IDV damages under the 2016 standard policy. Thus, the plaintiffs' complaint did not plausibly establish an entitlement to relief. View "Cubberley v. The Commerce Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty") and Atain Specialty Insurance Company ("Atain") were involved in a contract dispute. Liberty sued Atain for breach of contract after Atain refused to indemnify Liberty for a $1 million appeal bond related to a racial discrimination case against McClure Hotel. Atain argued that it was not obligated to indemnify Liberty based on equitable estoppel, claiming it relied on Liberty's misrepresentation that the bond was closed.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of Liberty, rejecting Atain's equitable estoppel defense. The court found that Liberty had not misrepresented the status of the appeal bond to Atain.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that even if Liberty had made a misrepresentation, Atain could not demonstrate detrimental reliance because it had access to all necessary information to understand its obligations under the indemnity agreement. Atain, as a sophisticated party, should have known that the appeal bond remained in effect until the judgment in the underlying action was satisfied, regardless of the outcome of the separate coverage action. Therefore, Atain's equitable estoppel defense failed, and the grant of summary judgment to Liberty was affirmed. View "Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Atain Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Bellin Memorial Hospital hired Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc. to upgrade its computer software. Kinsey failed to implement the agreed-upon software, leading Bellin to sue Kinsey in Wisconsin state court for breach of contract and other claims. Bellin also sued Kinsey’s president and a senior product consultant. Kinsey’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, provided a defense under a professional liability insurance policy. During the trial, Bellin and Philadelphia Indemnity entered into a partial settlement, resolving some claims and specifying the conditions under which Bellin could collect damages from Kinsey. Bellin prevailed at trial and was awarded damages.The Wisconsin circuit court ruled that the limited liability provision in the Agreement did not apply due to Kinsey’s material breach. The court granted a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim against Kinsey, leaving the question of damages to the jury. The jury awarded Bellin $1.39 million, later reduced to $750,000 plus costs. The jury found Kinsey and its president not liable for intentional misrepresentation and misleading representation.Philadelphia Indemnity filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaration that the state court’s judgment was covered by the insurance policy and that the $1 million settlement offset the $750,000 judgment. The district court ruled for Bellin, concluding that the state court judgment was not covered by the insurance policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the insurance policy covered only negligent acts, errors, or omissions, and the state court’s judgment was based on a breach of contract, not negligence. Therefore, the $1 million set-off provision did not apply, and Bellin could recover the full amount of the judgment. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc." on Justia Law

Christopher Meek purchased a universal life insurance policy from Kansas City Life Insurance Company, which combined a standard life insurance policy with a savings account. Meek alleged that Kansas City Life improperly included profits and expenses in the cost of insurance, which was not mentioned in the policy, leading to a lower cash value in his account. Meek filed a federal lawsuit for breach of contract and conversion, and the district court certified a class of about 6,000 Kansans with Meek as the lead plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri found that Meek's lawsuit was timely for payments going back five years under Kansas’s statute of limitations. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Meek on the breach-of-contract claim, interpreting the policy against Kansas City Life. The conversion claim was dismissed. A jury awarded over $5 million in damages, which was reduced to $908,075 due to the statute of limitations. Both parties appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s class certification, finding that common questions of law and fact predominated. The court also upheld the application of Kansas law for both the conversion claim and the statute of limitations. The court agreed with the district court’s interpretation of the insurance policy, concluding that the cost of insurance should not include profits and expenses. The court found that the jury’s damages award was supported by reasonable evidence and did not warrant an increase.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, including the class certification, the application of Kansas law, the partial summary judgment in favor of Meek, and the damages award. View "Meek v. Kansas City Life Ins. Company" on Justia Law

Christopher Meek purchased a universal life insurance policy from Kansas City Life Insurance Company, which combined a standard life insurance policy with a savings account. Meek alleged that Kansas City Life improperly included profits and expenses in the cost of insurance, which was not mentioned in the policy, leading to a lower cash value in his account. Meek filed a federal lawsuit for breach of contract and conversion, and the district court certified a class of about 6,000 Kansans with Meek as the lead plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri found that Meek's lawsuit was timely under Kansas’s five-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract claims. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Meek on the breach-of-contract claim, concluding that the policy's cost-of-insurance provision was ambiguous and should be construed against Kansas City Life. The jury awarded over $5 million in damages, which was reduced to $908,075 under the statute of limitations. Both parties appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the cost-of-insurance provision in the policy did not include profits and expenses, as these were not listed factors. The court also upheld the class certification, finding that common questions of law and fact predominated over individual issues. Additionally, the court agreed with the district court's application of Kansas law for the conversion claim and the statute of limitations for the breach-of-contract claim. The court found that the jury's damages award was supported by sufficient evidence and did not warrant an increase. View "Meek v. Kansas City Life Ins. Company" on Justia Law

Employees of Mercedes-Benz Research and Development North America, Inc. accidentally set fire to a property leased from Airport Boulevard Associates, LLC (ABA) while transferring gasoline between vehicles. ABA's insurer, Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company, paid ABA for the damages and sought reimbursement from Mercedes and its insurer, Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company. Unable to resolve the matter, Pioneer filed a lawsuit in federal court.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Pioneer's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Mercedes and Allianz. Pioneer appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision regarding Allianz, holding that the No-Fault Act did not apply because the vehicle was exempt from registration and the Allianz policy did not provide property protection insurance. The court also rejected Pioneer's argument for apportionment of recovery between the insurers, as the policies insured different parties and risks.However, the court reversed the district court's decision regarding Mercedes. The court found that Mercedes potentially breached the lease by handling hazardous materials, specifically gasoline, on the property. This breach could allow Pioneer to recover damages despite the lease's waiver-of-subrogation clause. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the claims against Mercedes. View "Pioneer State Mut. Ins. v. HDI Global" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a roofing business owner, sought a judgment declaring that the defendant, a workers' compensation insurance carrier, was obligated to defend and indemnify him in connection with a claim filed by his employee. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, determining that the defendant did not effectively cancel the workers' compensation insurance policy. The court found that the conflicting notices provided by the defendant, including a noncooperation notice and a cancellation notice, did not constitute an unambiguous and unequivocal notice of cancellation.The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the defendant effectively canceled the policy before the employee's injury by complying with the statutory requirements of § 31-348, which governs the reporting and cancellation of workers' compensation insurance policies. The plaintiff argued that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the cancellation notice effectively canceled the policy.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that insurers must strictly comply with § 31-348 when canceling a workers' compensation insurance policy. However, compliance with the statute does not supplant an insurer's obligations under contract law, which requires that a notice of cancellation must be definite, certain, and unambiguous. The court held that the Appellate Court incorrectly limited its analysis to the statutory compliance and failed to consider all relevant communications between the parties.The Supreme Court found that the defendant's notice of cancellation was not objectively definite and certain due to the conflicting noncooperation and cancellation notices, which provided indefinite and ambiguous information about the status of the plaintiff's insurance coverage. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case with direction to affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff. View "Napolitano v. Ace American Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Eiden Construction, LLC (Eiden) entered into a subcontract with Hogan & Associates Builders, LLC (Hogan) for earthwork and utilities on a school construction project. Hogan sued Eiden and its bonding company, AMCO Insurance Company (AMCO), for breach of contract, claiming Eiden failed to complete its work, including draining sewage lagoons and constructing a fire pond. Eiden counterclaimed for unpaid work, arguing it was not responsible for draining the lagoons and that Hogan did not comply with the subcontract’s notice and opportunity to cure provisions. AMCO argued it was not liable under the performance bond because Eiden did not breach the subcontract and Hogan did not provide proper notice.The District Court of Uinta County found for Hogan on the claim regarding the sewage lagoons but not on other claims, ruling AMCO was not liable under the bond due to lack of notice. Eiden and Hogan both appealed. Eiden argued the court erred in finding it responsible for draining the lagoons and in awarding Hogan damages billed to an associated company. Hogan contended the court erred in not awarding damages for other work and in its calculation of prejudgment interest.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held Eiden breached the subcontract by not draining the lagoons and that Hogan was entitled to recover costs for supplementing Eiden’s work. The court found Eiden’s late completion of the septic system justified Hogan’s directive to expedite lagoon drainage. It also ruled Hogan properly paid the supplemental contractors, despite invoices being sent to an associated company. The court rejected Hogan’s claims for additional damages, concluding Eiden complied with the notice to cure provisions for the fire pond and other work. The court also upheld the lower court’s calculation of prejudgment interest, applying the offset before calculating interest. View "Hogan & Associates Builders, LLC v. Eiden Construction, LLC" on Justia Law

A five-year-old child tragically died after being struck by a vehicle driven by an Alltrade employee at an apartment complex owned by Whispering Brook Acquisitions LLC. Alltrade had a commercial general liability policy with Motorists Mutual Insurance Company, while Whispering Brook had a similar policy with First Specialty Insurance Corporation. Both policies contained "other insurance" provisions, which led to a dispute over which insurer was primarily responsible for covering the incident.The Jefferson Circuit Court determined that Alltrade and its employees were insured under First Specialty’s policy. The court found that the "other insurance" provisions in both policies were mutually repugnant excess clauses, meaning neither could claim to be secondary to the other. Consequently, the court ruled that both insurers shared primary liability and must contribute equally to defend and indemnify the insureds. Motorists' argument that First Specialty should be primarily liable due to an indemnification provision in the Service Agreement between Alltrade and Whispering Brook was rejected. First Specialty appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that First Specialty’s provision was a nonstandard escape clause, making Motorists primarily liable.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that both "other insurance" provisions were mutually repugnant excess clauses, requiring Motorists and First Specialty to share primary liability equally. The court also overruled the earlier decision in Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Haddix, which the Court of Appeals had relied upon. Additionally, the court found that Motorists had waived its indemnification argument by not filing a cross-appeal and requesting the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court's summary judgment. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "MOTORISTS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY V. FIRST SPECIALTY INSURANCE CORP." on Justia Law