Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

An adult passenger in a car was injured in a single-car accident. The passenger and his family brought suit against the vehicle’s unlicensed minor driver, the minor’s mother, the owner of the car, the insurance policy holder, the insurer, and the insurance adjuster who handled the claims arising from the accident. The passenger’s father attempted to raise a contractual interference claim, but the superior court concluded that the complaint did not state such a claim on his behalf. The superior court dismissed the father’s only other claim (intentional infliction of emotional distress), removed the father’s name from the case caption, and ordered the father to cease filing pleadings on behalf of other parties. After the superior court judge dismissed him from the action, the passenger’s father attempted to file a first amended complaint, which expressly stated his contractual interference claim on the theory that he was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between his son and his son’s doctors. But the superior court denied the father leave to amend the complaint because the father had already been dismissed from the case. Following a settlement among all of the other plaintiffs and defendants (which the father did not join) the superior court granted final judgment to the insurer. The insurer moved for attorney’s fees against the father under Alaska Civil Rule 82, but the father never responded to that motion. The superior court granted the award without soliciting a response from the father, and the father appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the father’s claims and denying leave to amend the complaint because the proposed first amended complaint was futile. But because the superior court had barred the father from filing any further pleadings in the case and had removed his name from the caption, the superior court had a responsibility to inform the self-represented father that he was permitted to file an opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees. Therefore, the Court vacated the fee award and remanded the case to the superior court to afford the father an opportunity to respond to the insurer’s motion for reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Bush v. Elkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim against Zenith after Santana Morales, Jr. was crushed to death by a palm tree while working as a landscaper for Lawns. The Florida Supreme Court answered the following certified questions in the affirmative: (1) Does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against Zenith under the employer liability policy? (2) If so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage "any obligation imposed by workers' compensation... law" operate to exclude coverage of the estate's claim against Zenith for the tort judgment? and (3) If the estate's claim is not barred by the workers' compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers' compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate's collection of the tort judgment? The court concluded that, given the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the certified issues, the district court correctly determined that the workers' compensation exclusion in Part II of the policy barred Zenith's coverage of the tort judgment against Lawns. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zenith. View "Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Cross-defendant Michael Tope appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of First American Title Insurance Company in a cross-action to recover money under a title insurance policy after default on a real estate loan to purchase and rehabilitate a home. The property was subject to a notice of abatement action issued by San Joaquin County requiring repair of defects in the rehabilitation of the residence. The subject of the suit was that First American allegedly breached the title insurance policy by failing to provide coverage for the notice of abatement action. Plaintiffs, investors in a real estate loan, sued defendants and cross-complainants Stockton Mortgage Real Estate Loan Servicing Corporation (SMRELS), Stockton Mortgage, Inc., Stockton Management & Development, Inc., and Ross Cardinalli Jr. (collectively cross-complainants) for damages arising from cross-complainants' alleged failure to follow up on the status of the release of a notice of abatement action. Cross-complainants, in turn, initiated this suit against First American, Alliance Title Company, and two of Alliance's employees for damages, indemnity, and declaratory relief arising out of First American's refusal to provide coverage under the title insurance policy, and Alliance's alleged representation, on behalf of First American, that it would obtain a release of the notice of abatement action prior to the close of escrow. First American moved for summary judgment mainly on grounds that the notice of abatement action was not covered under the title insurance policy, cross-complainants were not insured under the title insurance policy, and the preliminary title report relied on by cross-complainants was not a contract. The trial court granted First American's motion and entered summary judgment in its favor. Cross-complainants appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v. Tope" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cogswell Farm Condominium Association filed a declaratory judgment action with respect to two exclusions in insurance policies issued by respondents Tower Group, Inc. and Acadia Insurance Company. The trial court held that the two exclusions at issue precluded coverage for petitioner's underlying lawsuit against Lemery Building Company, Inc. In 2009, Cogswell sued Lemery and others, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and negligent supervision in the construction of 24 residential condominium units. Cogswell asserted that the "weather barrier" components of the units – including the water/ice shield, flashing, siding, and vapor barrier – were defectively constructed and resulted in damage to the units due to water leaks. Because the units were sold at different times and the policies were in effect during two different time periods, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in holding that one policy exclusion served as a bar for coverage for each unit after it was sold. Furthermore, the Court found that the other exclusion was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting respondents summary judgment with respect to that exclusion. The trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cogswell Farm Condominium Ass'n v. Tower Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathryn Kipling sued State Farm Automobile Insurance Company in Colorado federal district court for breach of contract because it did not pay her benefits under four insurance policies issued in Minnesota. The court determined that she would be entitled to benefits under Colorado law but not under Minnesota law. It then applied tort conflict-of-laws principles to rule that Colorado law governed. After its review, the Tenth Circuit held that the court erred by not applying contract conflict-of-laws principles. The district court was reversed and the matter remanded for further consideration. View "Kipling v. State Farm Mutual Automobile" on Justia Law

Electrical problems at a plastic bag manufacturing plant led to an increased number of defective bags being produced. A dispute arose between the manufacturer and its insurer regarding what provision of the policy covered the losses associated with the defective bags and regarding what policy limit should apply to the manufacturer’s property loss. The district court submitted both issues to the jury. The jury awarded the manufacturer damages for breach of the insurance contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in sending the two questions to the jury because (1) categorizing the insured’s loss under the policy is a question of law and not a question of fact, and (2) determining which policy limit applies presents a question of law. Remanded. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Coast Converters, Inc." on Justia Law

Ibson and her family were insured by UHS through a policy available to her to as a member of her law firm. Due to an error, UHS began informing Ibson’s medical providers that Ibson and her family no longer had insurance coverage. Although UHS eventually paid the claims it should have paid all along, Ibson sued, raising state law claims of breach of contract, negligence, and bad faith, and seeking punitive damages. UHS responded that Ibson’s claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and barred by the policy’s three-year contractual limitations period. The district court agreed and entered summary. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, agreeing that Ibson’s state law claims are preempted under ERISA, but rejecting entry of summary judgment on the basis of the three-year contractual limitations period. View "Ibson v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In this matter, Appellants John and Kathy St. John challenged the Superior Court’s decision to affirm a declaratory judgment order finding Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company (“Penn National”) liable for a judgment against its insured LPH Plumbing and Heating under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy in effect from July 1, 2003 to July 1, 2004. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether, under the facts of this case and the policy language at issue, Penn National was instead liable for the judgment against its insured under a separate policy of CGL insurance as well as a companion umbrella policy in effect from July 1, 2005 to July 1, 2006. Furthermore, the Court also considered whether the multiple trigger theory of liability insurance coverage (adopted by the Supreme Court in "J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.," 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993)), within the context of asbestos bodily injury claims applied in this case, where property damage was continuous and progressive, to trigger coverage under all policies in effect from exposure to the harmful condition to manifestation of the injury. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed all aspects of the lower court’s decision finding that coverage was triggered under the policy in effect from July 1, 2003 to July 1, 2004, when property damage became reasonably apparent, and declining to apply the multiple trigger theory of liability insurance coverage. View "PA Natl Mut Casualty v. St. John" on Justia Law

In 2007, Jared Wolfe was injured when his vehicle was hit from behind by an automobile driven by Karl Zierle. Wolfe attributed blame to Zierle and demanded $25,000 from Zierle’s insurer carrier, Appellant Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, equating to half the liability limits under the applicable policy. Allstate counteroffered $1,200, which Wolfe refused. Wolfe then instituted a personal injury action against Zierle seeking compensatory damages grounded in negligence. Allstate assumed Zierle’s defense while maintaining its additional right, under the policy, to effectuate a settlement. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted certification from a federal appeals court to clarify whether, under Pennsylvania law, an insured may assign the right to recover damages from his insurance company deriving from the insurer’s bad faith toward the insured. The Court concluded that the entitlement to assert damages under Pennsylvania law may be assigned by an insured to an injured plaintiff and judgment creditor such as Wolfe. Having answered the certified question, the Court returned the matter to the federal court. View "Allstate Prop & Casualty Ins Co. v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether a negligence claim brought against an insurer by its insureds for alleged statements made by the insurer’s adjuster and an engineer the insurer had retained (that mold the insureds discovered while performing home renovations was harmless and that they should continue their renovations) was barred by the “gist of the action” doctrine on the grounds that the true gist or gravamen of the action was an alleged breach of the insurance contract (their homeowners’ policy); and (2) whether the provisions of Pa.R.C.P. 1042.1 and 1042.3 required the insureds to obtain a certificate of merit in order for them to proceed with their negligence suit against the professional engineer employed by the insurer to evaluate the mold. After careful review, the Supreme Court held that the insureds’ negligence claim was not barred by the gist of the action doctrine, as the claim was based on an alleged breach of a social duty imposed by the law of torts, and not a breach of a duty created by the underlying contract of insurance. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the insureds were not required to obtain a certificate of merit in order to proceed with their negligence suit against the professional engineer, since they were not patients or clients of the engineering company which employed him. Consequently, the Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bruno v. Erie Insurance" on Justia Law