Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

A motor vehicle collision occurred in Sussex County, Delaware, involving Joanne Dudsak, a New Jersey resident insured by New Jersey Manufacturers (NJM), and Christopher Koester, a Maryland resident insured by Allstate Insurance Company. NJM paid Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits to Dudsak and sought inter-company arbitration in Delaware to recover these costs. Allstate opposed, arguing that NJM's policy, being from New Jersey, did not qualify for arbitration under Delaware law, which requires the vehicle to be registered in Delaware for PIP subrogation rights.The arbitrator ruled in favor of NJM, awarding the full amount and rejecting Allstate's jurisdictional challenge. Allstate then filed a Petition to Vacate the Arbitration Award in the Delaware Chancery Court, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. NJM moved to dismiss the petition, claiming the issue was moot because Allstate had agreed to tender its policy limits, which would extinguish NJM's subrogation rights under Delaware law.The Delaware Chancery Court denied NJM's Motion to Dismiss, finding that a real dispute remained. The court then addressed the merits of Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court applied the standard of review under 10 Del. C. §5714(a)(5), which allows vacating an arbitration award if the arbitrated claim was barred by limitation and the objection was raised from the outset. The court found that §2118 of the Delaware PIP statute applies only to vehicles required to be registered in Delaware and does not cover out-of-state policies like NJM's. Consequently, the arbitrator exceeded his authority by accepting jurisdiction over the case. The court granted Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment, vacating the arbitration award. View "Allstate Insurance Co. v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted the motion filed by Petitioner, Delaware Department of Labor, pursuant to Court of Chancery Rules 12 and 55(b) for default judgment against Respondent, Drew's Tree Service, LLC, holding that Petitioner was entitled to relief.In this case arising from Respondent's alleged failure to pay workers' compensation insurance, Petitioner alleged that Respondent had not complied with Petitioner's subpoena requiring Respondent to obtain worker's compensation insurance and provide Petitioner proof of such insurance. When Petitioner did not provide proof of insurance, the matter was referred to the Department of Justice. Petitioner then filed this action. The Court of Chancery granted Petitioner's motion for default judgment, holding that Respondent was out of compliance with 19 Del. C. 2374(a) and that Petitioner was entitled to an assessment of $52,250 and an injunction prohibiting Respondent from operating its business in Delaware while Respondent was out of compliance. View "Del. Dep't of Labor v. Drew's Tree Service, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case involving a Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance company in rehabilitation under the jurisdiction of a Pennsylvania court and a management company that was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance company that was not a part of the rehabilitation proceeding the Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion to stay, holding that a stay was warranted in part.In In re Liquidation of Freestone Insurance Co., 143 A.3d 1234 (Del. Ch. 2016), the Court of Chancery was presiding over an insurance delinquency proceeding, and at issue was whether to lift a broad anti-suit injunction to permit litigation to proceed in another state against the delinquent insurer. The Court of Chancery held that the factors set forth in Freestone to consider in deciding whether to depart from the presumption against permitting collateral proceedings to go forward against the delinquent insurer supported a stay in the instant case as to the delinquent insurer but did not support a stay as to the management company. View "Principal Growth Strategies, LLC v. AGH Parent LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted Defendants' partial motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' amended complaint, holding that Plaintiffs did not satisfy the statutory definition of "creditor" as required to have standing to pursue their amended claims under the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (DUFTA).Defendant Genworth Life Insurance Company (GLIC) wrote a line of long-term care (LTC) insurance policies. Plaintiffs, a putative class of GLIC LTC policyholders and GLIC insurance agents who sold LTC policies, alleged that fraudulent transfers jeopardized GLIC's ability to pay LTC claims to its policyholders and LTC commissions to its insurance agents. Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add three new claims challenging the distribution of certain proceeds as intentional and constructive fraudulent transfers. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants' partial motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs' new DUFTA claims failed because they were not "claims" under DUFTA. View "Burkhart v. Genworth Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted a motion sought by the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Delaware (the Commissioner) asking the Court of Chancery to permit Scottish Re (U.S.) Inc. (the Company), a delinquent insurer, to make payments to a subset of primary insurers (cedents) for a portion of their losses, holding that the Commissioner was authorized to cause the Company to make the payments.The Company, a reinsurer, entered into reinsurance agreements with cedents in which the Company agreed to pay a portion of the losses that their insurers suffered. The Company was later placed in receivership, and the Commissioner was appointed as receiver. The Company stopped paying its cedents for the losses they incurred while the cedents continued to make premium payments to the Company. The Commissioner asked the Court to permit the company to make the payments tissue before the approval of a rehabilitation plan. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that the Commissioner established a prima facie case sufficient for the Court to grant the motion. View "In re Rehabilitation of Scottish RE (U.S.), Inc." on Justia Law

Freestone Insurance Company was a Delaware-domiciled insurer that was placed in liquidation. The liquidation proceeding was governed by the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (the Uniform Act). The order that placed Freestone into liquidation contained an injunction (the Anti-Suit Injunction) barring third parties from pursuing claims against Freestone other than through the statutory process for receiving evaluating, and paying claims (the Claims Process). U.S. Bank National Association (the Bank) moved to lift the Anti-Suit Injunction, claiming that it wished to litigate against Freestone outside of the Claims Process and establish the amount of its claims and its status as a general creditor of Freestone. The Court of Chancery denied the Bank’s motion, holding that granting relief on the facts of this case would contravene the policies of the Uniform Act, interfere with the Claims Process, and impose unnecessary costs on Freestone and the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Delaware, who was serving as the receiver for Freestone. View "In re Liquidation of Freestone Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Travelers, an insurer, was being sued for insurance benefits in a New Jersey court. Plaintiff there was a subsidiary of a defendant here, Sequa. Travelers sought specific performance of, and a declaratory judgment arising from, a release of claims by Sequa in favor of Travelers, made in connection with the settlement of coverage litigation in the Delaware Superior Court in 1997. The relief sought by Travelers here would relieve it from, or indemnify it for, liability in the coverage litigation being undertaken in New Jersey. Because the explicit language of the release excluded the sites for which plaintiff in the New Jersey action sought coverage, as a matter of contract law Travelers was not entitled to the specific performance or declaratory judgment it sought here. Accordingly, the court dismissed the matter.

This matter came before the court on the basis of two competing motions related to a petition for the appointment of a receiver under 8 Del. C. 279 for Kraft-Murphy Company, Inc., a defunct Delaware corporation that had been dissolved for more than twelve years. The first motion was a motion to perfect service on the company brought by petitioners, who were claimants in various asbestos-related tort suits filed against the company in various jurisdictions in the mid-Atlantic region. The second motion was a motion to dismiss, filed by the company's insurers on behalf of the company. The court held that service of process could be perfected on the dissolved corporation and that petitioners conceivably could be able to show that a receiver should be appointed for the corporation to enable it to respond to claims brought against it, because the corporation's informal plan of dissolution contemplated using its insurance contracts for that purpose. Therefore, the court granted petitioners' motion to perfect service and denied the company's motion to dismiss.

This action came before the court following the insolvency and proposed rehabilitation of a Delaware insurance company. At issue was whether the arbitration clause in the reinsurance agreements between the insolvent insurance company and the reinsurer were enforceable against the receiver under Delaware law. If so, the question became whether this court should, in its discretion, require the parties to honor their agreement to arbitrate in light of the ongoing rehabilitation of the insurer. The court held that Delaware law permitted enforcement of the arbitration clause of the reinsurance agreements against the receiver and that the parties should be required to arbitrate their competing claims to the disputed cash. In addition, the court ordered a partial stay of the proceedings pending resolution of the arbitration.

This action arose from a final arbitration award made in favor of defendant where plaintiff sought to vacate the award. At issue was whether the Arbitration Award should be filed under seal. Also at issue was whether the arbitrator concealed material information about past adversarial relationships with plaintiff-related entities amounting to evident partiality requiring the court to vacate the Arbitration Award. The court held that the existence of a confidentiality order did not necessarily require, without regard for whether it applied to the Arbitration Award or not, the sealing of the award. Rather, Court of Chancery Rule 5(g) controlled the treatment of that award and mandated that plaintiff show good cause as to why the Arbitration Award should be sealed. The court also held that because plaintiff was entitled to limited discovery into the arbitrator's alleged adversarial relationship with it, the court denied defendant's motion for a protective order and held in abeyance the entry of a scheduling order on motions for summary judgment.