Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Claimant-appellant Stephen Arrants appealed a superior court order that affirmed an Industrial Accident Board's order granting employer-appellee Home Depot's petition to terminate appellant's total disability benefits. Appellant raised two claims on appeal: (1) the Board's decision was in error because all experts agreed that his condition had not improved since the 2007 Board finding of total disability; and (2) the Board's decision was not supported by competent evidence in the record. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both arguments were without merit, and affirmed the superior court. View "Arrants v. Home Depot" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary E. Spellman ("Spellman") petitioned the Industrial Accident Board (the "Board") for a workers' compensation award against her employer, Appellee Christiana Care Health Services ("Christiana"). The Board denied the petition and the Superior Court affirmed. Appellant worked as a home health aide, where she used her personal vehicle to attend to Christiana's clients at their homes. While Appellant was reimbursed for mileage between client appointments, she was not reimbursed for travel to the first appointment, from the last appointment, or "off the clock" when she attended to personal business. In the middle of her work day, Appellant was off the clock when her car hit a patch of ice causing Appellant to crash her car. She sustained injuries to her head and hip. In her petition, Appellant argued that her status as a traveling employee exempted her from the "going and coming" rule that precludes workers' compensation for injuries suffered while going or coming from work. Alternatively, Appellant argued her injuries were compensable because she was engaged in a "mixed purpose" trip at the time of her accident. Having "no difficulty" sustaining the judgment of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Spellman v. Christiana Care Health Services" on Justia Law

Two employees of Connections CSP, Inc. were killed in an automobile collision during the course and scope of their employment. Connections owned the vehicle and had purchased underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) for the vehicle and also worker's compensation insurance which covered the employees. The UIM insurer paid its policy limit of $1,000,000. The worker's compensation insurer also paid benefits to the representatives of the decedents. The worker's compensation insurer then sought to enforce a lien upon the UIM payment equal to the worker's compensation benefits it paid. But the UIM policy specifically excluded the direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or self-insurer under a worker's compensation claim. Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Superior Court enforced the lien based upon its interpretation of 19 Del. C. 2363(e), which allows reimbursement of a worker's compensation carrier "from the third party liability insurer." The UIM insurer appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that General Assembly eliminated the ability of a worker's compensation insurer to assert a lien against the UIM payments made pursuant to the employer's UIM policy. Because the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in enforcing a lien, the Supreme Court reversed its decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Holly Noel-Liszkiewicz appealed a superior court's decision to affirm the Industrial Accident Board's denial of her claim for worker's compensation benefits. Appellant was a customer service representative for Employer La-Z-Boy before being laid off. Almost two years after the lay off, Appellant petitioned the board seeking compensation for occupational asthma, pulmonary fibrosis, and respiratory failure allegedly caused by exposure to chemicals at La-Z-Boy’s facility. La-Z-Boy denied that Applicant suffered any illness or injury that was causally related to her work. Finding Appellant's arguments to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed both the Board and the superior court. View "Noel-Liszkiewicz v. La-Z-Boy" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants National Grange Mutual Insurance Company and The Main Street Insurance Group (collectively "NGM") appealed a Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Elegant Slumming, Inc. in this property insurance coverage dispute. NGM raised two claims on appeal: (1) NGM contended the trial court erred in finding that the property insurance policy at issue requires only "some evidence," rather than "physical evidence," to show what happened to lost property; (2) and that the trial court erred in finding the amount of Elegant Slumming’s attorney’s fees reasonable. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in concluding that testimonial evidence, by itself, fulfills the "physical evidence" requirement of the policy, and that Elegant Slumming did present physical evidence in addition to testimonial evidence to show what happened to the lost property and therefore coverage was not barred by the policy exclusion. Furthermore, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to statute in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "National Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Elegant Slumming, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff-appellants, Bruce Bermel and Pamela Jurga, as husband and wife, appealed the final judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion for summary judgment of the defendant-appellee, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The appellants contended that the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Liberty. Bermel was injured in an automobile accident when his personal motorcycle was struck head-on by another driver. Bermel, then an employee of the Siemens Corporation, contended that the business policy issued to Siemens by Liberty on a company car that was assigned for his business and personal use, provided him with $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage even when he was operating a non-work vehicle in circumstances unrelated to his employment. Bermel brought this action for underinsured benefits (“UIM”) against Liberty arguing: (1) that the Liberty Policy covering the company car he used was personal to him, even though Siemens was the named insured; (2) that he was entitled to personally access the Liberty Policy because Siemens automatically deducted a nominal fee from his paycheck for his personal use of the vehicle assigned to him that was insured by the Liberty Policy; and (3) that the Liberty Policy was ambiguously drafted and should have been construed in his favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court correctly found Siemens, and not Bermel, to be the named insured on the Liberty Policy, that the nominal fee charged to Bermel by Siemens for the use of the car did not make Bermel a named insured under the Liberty Policy, and that the Liberty Policy was unambiguous. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "Bermel v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Intel Corporation appealed a Superior Court order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. (AGLI) in a dispute over the interpretation of an excess insurance policy under California law. AGLI sought and obtained a declaration from the Superior Court that AGLI had no duty to reimburse Intel for defense costs or indemnity claims in connection with Intel's defense of various antitrust lawsuits, because the underlying insurance policy limits of $50 million were not exhausted as required by the AGLI policy. Intel read the AGLI Policy to allow Intel to exhaust the limits of its underlying policy with XL Insurance Company by adding Intel's own contributed payments for defense costs to the amount of Intel's settlement with XL. Under Intel’s interpretation, the XL Policy was exhausted and AGLI's duty to defend was triggered. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that AGLI's reading was the only reasonable reading, and accordingly, affirmed. View "Intel Corporation v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., et al." on Justia Law

After an attorney filed a settlement offer under Rule 68, opposing counsel accepted the offer. Before either attorney filed the offer and acceptance with the Superior Court, the accepting attorney realized he had made a mistake, and revoked his acceptance. The attorney who had extended the offer responded to his revocation by filing the written acceptance, thereby securing a final judgment in the form of the settlement order by means of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 68’s instruction to the Prothonotary. The attorney did not mention that the written acceptance had been revoked before it was filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court judge’s order denying the Motion to Vacate the Judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ceccola v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee William Mohr was struck in Delaware as a pedestrian by a car insured in Delaware. He recovered the minimum $15,000 coverage limit from the carrier that insured the striking car. Plaintiff also sought to recover from Defendant-Appellant Progressive Northern Insurance Company which sold an automobile insurance policy to Plaintiff's mother. Under the policy, Plaintiff's mother was the named insured, and Plaintiff was a member of her household. The Progressive policy, by its terms, did not cover Plaintiff as a pedestrian. The superior court held nonetheless that Plaintiff was entitled to recover under Progressive's policy because insofar as it denied PIP coverage, the policy conflicted with the Delaware automobile insurance statute which mandated such coverage. Progressive appealed. The court ordered Progressive to pay the difference between the amount Plaintiff recovered from the striking-car's policy and PIP limit of his mother's policy. Finding no error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Progressive Northern Insurance Co. v. Mohr" on Justia Law

In two similar cases, Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Joseph Schlanger Trust (Schlanger) and PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust (Dawe), an insurer sought a judicial declaration that a life insurance policy was void as an illegal contract wagering human life that accordingly lacked an insurable interest. The district court denied both motions to dismiss and certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Delaware concerning the incontestability provision under 18 Del. C. 2908 and the insurable interest requirement under 18 Del. C. 2704. The certified question, shared by both Dawe and Schlanger, concerned whether an insurer could claim that a life insurance policy never came into existence, on the basis of a lack of insurable interest, where the challenge occurred after the insurance contract's mandatory contestability period expired. The court answered in the affirmative and held that a life insurance policy lacking an insurable interest was void as against public policy and thus never came into force, making the incontestability provision inapplicable. The second certified question concerned whether the statutory insurable interest requirement was violated where the insured procured a life insurance policy with the intent to immediately transfer the benefit to an individual or entity lacking an insurable interest. The court answered in the negative, so long as the insured procured or effected the policy and the policy was not a mere cover for a wager. The third certified question concerned whether the relevant statutory provisions conferred upon a trustee an insurable interest in the life of the individual insured who established the trust if the insured intended to transfer the beneficial interest in the trust to a third-party investor with no insurable interest. The court answered in the affirmative, as long as the individual insured actually established the trust. If, however, the insured did not create and fund the trust then the relationship contemplated under section 2704(c)(5) was not satisfied.