Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Environmental Law
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Doe Run commenced a declaratory action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in two underlying lawsuits (the Briley Lawsuit and the McSpadden Lawsuit). These underlying lawsuits sought damages arising out of Doe Run's operation of a five-hundred-acre waste pile (Leadwood Pile). The court concluded that the pollution exclusions in the CGL policies precluded a duty to defend Doe Run in the Briley Lawsuit. The court concluded, however, that the McSpadden Lawsuit included allegations and claims that were not unambiguously barred from coverage by the pollution exclusions in the policies. The McSpadden Lawsuit alleged that the distribution of toxic materials harmed plaintiffs, without specifying how that harm occurred. The McSpadden complaint also alleged that Doe Run caused bodily injury or property damage when it left the Leadwood Pile open and available for use by the public without posting warning signs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Doe Run commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in an underlying lawsuit. The underlying lawsuit alleged environmental property damage resulting from Doe Run's mine and mill operations. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Lexington had no duty to defend because the policies' absolute pollution exclusions unambiguously barred coverage of all claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Appellants hired Respondent as the general contractor to build a seasonal residence on Appellant's property. Respondent purchased a general liability insurance policy from Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Company that included an absolute pollution exclusion. Respondent later purchased a boiler for Appellant's home that bore a label warning that the boiler was designed to run on natural gas only. Respondent connected the boiler to a liquid propane line. Appellants were later transported to hospital due to carbon monoxide poisoning from the boiler. Appellants brought litigation against Respondent. Midwest initiated a declaratory judgment action, requesting that the district court find Midwest had no duty to defend or indemnify Respondent because coverage was barred under the absolute pollution exclusion. The district court denied Midwest's motion for summary judgment, concluding that it would be inappropriate to rule as a matter of law that the absolute pollution exclusion barred coverage under the facts in this case since Respondent did not cause any environmental pollution. The court of appeals reversed, holding that carbon monoxide constitutes a pollutant in the Midwest policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that carbon monoxide released from a negligently installed boiler is clearly a "pollutant" that is subject to the absolute pollution exclusion of the Midwest policy. View "Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters" on Justia Law

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This case concerned whether ILU had a duty to defend LaGen in an underlying suit filed against it by the EPA and the LDEQ for alleged Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, and state environmental law violations. Reading all of the relevant provisions together and giving them their plain meaning, the underlying EPA suit included allegations and prayers for relief that could potentially result in covered remediation costs. The court rejected ILU's argument that injunctive relief was excluded from coverage by the Fines and Penalties exclusion. Because the court found that ILU had a duty to defend on other grounds, the court declined to decide on interlocutory appeal whether New York law allowed indemnification for CAA civil penalties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's holding that under the policy ILU had a duty to defend LaGen in the underlying EPA and LDEQ suit. The court remanded for further proceedings and denied ILU's motion to dismiss LaGen's cross-appeal as moot. View "Louisiana Generating, L.L.C., et al v. Illinois Union Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a subrogation suit against defendants for recovery of insurance payments to its insured, Taube-Koret, for environmental response costs Taube-Koret incurred in cleaning up pollutants released on its property. The court concluded that plaintiff had no standing to bring suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, section 107(a) because it did not incur any "costs of response" related to the removal or remediation of a polluted site, and because the common law principle of subrogation did not apply to section 107(a); plaintiff could not bring a subrogation claim under section 112(c) because it did not allege that Taube-Koret was a "claimant"; and plaintiff's state law claims were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's third amended complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Systems/ Loral, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

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Respondents Christopher Roinestad and Gerald Fitz-Gerald were overcome by poisonous gases while cleaning a grease clog in a sewer near the Hog's Breath Saloon & Restaurant. The district court concluded that Hog's Breath caused respondents' injuries by dumping substantial amounts of cooking grease into the sewer thereby creating the clog and consequent build up of the gas. On summary judgment, the district court found the saloon liable under theories of negligence and off-premises liability and granted respondents damages. The saloon carried a commercial general liability policy issued by Petitioner Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company which sought a ruling it had no duty to indemnify Hog's Breath. The district court agreed that under the terms of the policy, the insurer had no duty under a pollution exclusion clause. The appellate court reversed the ruling in favor of the insurer, finding the pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous and that its application to cooking grease (a common waste product) could lead to absurd results and negate essential coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the saloon released enough grease to amount to a discharge of a pollutant, and that the insurance policy pollution exclusion clause barred coverage in this case. View "Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company v. Roinestad" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff here was Boston Gas Company and Defendant was Century Indemnity Company, one of Boston Gas's insurers. Environmental contamination was later found at many of Boston Gas's former gas plant sites. Boston Gas filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment as to Century's obligations under policies issued to Boston Gas. Jury trials were held with respect to two sites included in the cleanup, the Everett and Commercial Point sites. The Everett site litigation first went to trial. Before the parties reached a settlement, the supreme judicial court (SJC) found a pro rata allocation method applied for allocating liability for the contamination where Century had provided coverage for the risk for only a portion of the time during which the contamination took place. Meanwhile, the jury found Century liable for $1,699,145 in the Commercial Point litigation. The trial judge deferred entry of final judgment pending the outcome of the Everett appeal. The district court ultimately (1) concluded that in the wake of the SJC ruling in the Everett litigation, by allocating damages across a 121-year span in the case of the Commercial Point site, this reduced Century's share of damages from 100 percent to less than fifteen percent; and (2) vacated the damages award and ordered a new trial on the issue of which of the costs were subject to an exclusion in the GCL policy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Boston Gas Com. v. Century Indem. Co." on Justia Law

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Enviro-Chem conducted waste-handling and disposal operations at three sites north of Zionsville, Indiana, until it ceased operations in 1982, leaving considerable amounts of pollutants. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency undertook cleanup and identified potentially responsible parties (PRPs), including former owners, their corporate entities, and their insurers. A trust was established to fund cleanup and trustees sued to recover cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) (CERCLA), the Indiana Environmental Legal Actions Statute (ELA), and more. Work continues at the site at issue. The district court dismissed, in part, on limitations grounds, construing the complaint as seeking contribution. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of three counts, holding that claims to recover costs incurred pursuant to the 2002 Administrative Order by Consent between the EPA and PRPs and that related claims, including the ELA claim, were not moot. The court upheld denial of an insurer’s motion for summary judgment on preclusion grounds. View "Bernstein v. Bankert" on Justia Law

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This appeal concerned the construction of a single word, "sudden," within a pollution exclusion clause in a series of liability insurance policies barring coverage for certain damages unless the events causing those damages were "sudden and accidental" (an issue of first impression in New Mexico). Concluding that "sudden" lacks a single clear meaning, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that the word unambiguously signifies "quick, abrupt, or a temporarily short period of time. . . .Under well-established principles of insurance law," the Court construed this ambiguity in favor of the insured, Petitioner United Nuclear Corporation, and interpreted the term "sudden" in the insurance policies at issue in this dispute to mean "unexpected." the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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In this declaratory judgment proceeding, the defendant, Citizens Insurance Company of America, appealed a superior court order which ruled in favor of the plaintiff, The Barking Dog, Ltd., which operates a dog kennel and grooming business at several locations in New Hampshire. The court ruled that an insurance policy issued by the defendant provided coverage for damage to the plaintiff’s septic system and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $20,000, the agreed upon damage amount. The court also ruled that the defendant was not prejudiced by the plaintiff’s failure to disclose its expert’s report in a timely manner or its failure to disclose its expert’s curriculum vitae and, accordingly, permitted the plaintiff’s expert to testify at trial. The defendant argued that both rulings were error. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "The Barking Dog, Ltd. v. Citizens Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law