Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in ERISA
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Plaintiffs, current and former employees of RingCentral, participated in RingCentral’s employee welfare benefits plan. The plan participated in the “Tech Benefits Program” administered by Sequoia Benefits and Insurance Services, LLC, a management and insurance brokerage company. The Tech Benefits Program was a MEWA that pooled assets from employer-sponsored plans into a trust fund for the purpose of obtaining insurance benefits for employees at large-group rates. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action on behalf of the RingCentral plan and other Tech Benefits Program participants, asserting that Sequoia owed fiduciary duties to the plan under ERISA because Sequoia allegedly exercised control over plan assets through its operation of the Tech Benefits Program. Plaintiffs alleged that Sequoia violated its fiduciary duties by receiving and retaining commission payments from insurers, which Plaintiffs regarded as kickbacks, and by negotiating allegedly excessive administrative fees with insurers, leading to higher commissions for Sequoia.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing as to either of their two theories of injury. The panel held, as to the out-of-pocket-injury theory, Plaintiffs failed to establish the injury in fact required for Article III standing because their allegations did not demonstrate that they paid higher contributions because of Sequoia’s allegedly wrongful conduct. And Plaintiffs failed to plead the third element, that their injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief. View "RACHAEL WINSOR, ET AL V. SEQUOIA BENEFITS & INSURANCE, ET AL" on Justia Law

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After the decedent died, Plaintiff, his surviving spouse, filed suit seeking relief under a provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act allowing “a participant or beneficiary” of an employee benefit plan “to recover benefits due” “under the terms of [the] plan.” The parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts and an administrative record and cross-moved for judgment based on those undisputed materials. The district court entered judgment for Prudential. The court concluded Prudential “reasonably denied Plaintiff’s request for benefits” because “decedent received timely notice of his conversion rights” and “did not convert his life insurance to an individual policy during the conversion period.” The district court also rejected Plaintiff’s request to “apply the doctrine of equitable tolling and find that Plaintiff is entitled to the life insurance benefits she seeks.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court that the plan administrator did not abuse its discretion in concluding Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the terms of the plan. The court explained that “Employers have large leeway to design [employee benefit] plans as they see fit,” but “once a plan is established, the administrator’s duty is to see that the plan is maintained pursuant to that written instrument.” Here, Prudential did not abuse its discretion by fulfilling its duty here, and the district court correctly resolved the single claim before it based on the agreed-on facts and consistent with well-established law. View "Kathy Hayes v. Prudential Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued Minnesota Life Insurance Company and Securian Life Insurance Company, alleging that their denial of her claim for life insurance benefits violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The district court dismissed her complaint under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1132(a)(3) claim. First, her contention that Minnesota Life and Securian failed to notify her husband of his conversion right does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty because the terms of her husband’s policy did not require notice, and Plaintiff points to no provision of ERISA that would require such notice. Second, her assertion that Minnesota Life and Securian misrepresented that her husband’s conversion window would be extended rests on a misreading of the February 24 letter; Minnesota Life and Securian made no such representation. View "Kristina Powell v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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After her husband died of a heroin overdose, Plaintiff sought accidental death benefits under an employer-sponsored benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The plan’s insurer, Symetra Life Insurance Company, denied her claim, and Plaintiff sued. The district court granted summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. Symetra appealed, arguing that Plaintiff’s suit is barred by her failure to exhaust internal review procedures and that her husband’s death otherwise falls under an exclusion to coverage.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Symetra contends that the exclusion applies to Plaintiff’s husband’s death because he “purposely” used heroin. But just because the act of using an illegal substance is purposeful does not mean that an injury stemming from that act, including a fatal overdose, was too. Symetra also maintains that Plaintiff’s husband, as a “longtime drug user,” was surely aware of the risks of using heroin and that his “generalized knowledge” of such risks is sufficient for his death to fall under the “intentionally self-inflicted injury” exclusion. The court reasoned that even assuming Symetra’s characterization of Plaintiff’s husband’s drug use is accurate, the argument attempts to replace an exclusion that applies only to “intentionally self-inflicted” injuries with one that also includes injuries resulting from reckless, or even negligent, conduct. The court wrote that the plain language of Symetra’s “intentionally self-inflicted injury” exclusion does not apply to unintended injuries like Plaintiff’s husband’s heroin overdose. Thus, Symetra’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim for accidental death benefits based on that exclusion was erroneous. View "Terri Yates v. Symetra Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Appellant American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 3 (“Appellant”) filed suit against the State of Maryland alleging that the State breached a statutorily formed contract with current state employees to provide them with certain prescription drug benefits upon retirement. The district court agreed that Maryland law created a contract, it held that the contract was unilateral in nature and that the promised benefits do not vest until an employee retires with sufficient years of service. The district court determined that the current employees represented by Appellant had no vested contractual right to the retirement prescription drug benefits and dismissed the complaint.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. However, the court did so because it found that the statutory language does not create a contract with state employees. The court explained that in reviewing the language of the statutes at issue, it concluded that they do not create a contract binding upon the State. While Section 2-508 does “entitle” retirees to a subsidy, it does not include any unmistakable contract language. Rather, it only “entitles” a retiree to the “same State subsidy allowed a State employee.” The court explained that nothing in Sections 2-508 or 2-509.1 leaves the court with an unmistakably “clear indication that the legislature intended to bind itself contractually.” Therefore, “all doubts must be resolved in favor of the continuance of the power” of the state legislature to modify or repeal enactments of a previous legislature. View "AFSCME Maryland Council 3 v. State of Maryland" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs-Appellees, emergency care physician groups in Texas (the “Plaintiff Doctors”), have provided various emergency medical services to patients enrolled in health insurance plans insured by Defendants-Appellants UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company or UnitedHealthcare of Texas, Incorporated (collectively, “UHC”). The Plaintiff Doctors are not within UHC’s provider network. In their operative complaint, the Plaintiff Doctors allege (among other claims) that UHC has failed to remit the “usual and customary rate” for the emergency care that the Plaintiff Doctors provide to patients insured by UHC in violation of the Emergency Care Statutes. UHC moved to dismiss the Plaintiff Doctors’ complaint, which was denied in part by the district court. The district court rejected UHC’s argument that the Emergency Care Statutes did not authorize a private cause of action. UHC immediately sought interlocutory review of two issues: (1) whether the Emergency Care Statutes authorize an implied private cause of action, and (2) whether the Plaintiff Doctors’ claim under the Emergency Care Statutes is otherwise preempted by ERISA.   The Texas Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that the Texas Insurance Code “does not create a private cause of action for claims under the Emergency Care Statutes.” Therefore, the Fifth Circuit found that the Plaintiff Doctors’ claim for violation of the Emergency Care Statutes must be dismissed. Because there is no private cause of action under the Emergency Care Statutes, the second issue before the court—whether the Plaintiff Doctors’ claim under the Emergency Care Statutes is otherwise preempted by ERISA—is now moot. View "ACS Primary v. UnitedHealthcare" on Justia Law

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Department of Labor regulations required the administrator of an employee benefit plan to give a claimant, “upon request,” copies of “all documents, records, and other information” that the administrator considered in making an adverse benefit determination. In 2018, the regulations were amended to eliminate “upon request” and require an administrator to provide such information “sufficiently in advance” of an adverse determination “to give the claimant a reasonable opportunity to respond.”Zall, a dentist for 20 years, sought long-term disability benefits in 2013 after pain and numbness forced him to stop working. His insurer, Standard denied the claim. In 2014, after considering additional medical information and consulting an orthopedic surgeon, Standard approved Zall’s claim, including retroactive payments. Less than a year later, Standard began reviewing his case to see if his condition was subject to a 24-month benefit limit applicable to any disability “caused or contributed to by … carpal tunnel or repetitive motion syndrome” or “diseases or disorders of the cervical, thoracic, or lumbosacral back and its surrounding soft tissue.” Standard ultimately terminated Zall’s benefits.Zall filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, arguing that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and that Standard violated ERISA’s procedural requirements by failing to afford him “a full and fair review.” The district court granted Standard summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The plain language shows that the amended regulation applies; Standard failed to comply. View "Zall v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company denied Plaintiff’s claim for long-term disability benefits after concluding that she was not “Totally Disabled” as defined by her disability insurance plan. Plaintiff brought an under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B), arguing that the denial of benefits violated that Act. After conducting a bench trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, the district court awarded judgment to Plaintiff. Reliance appealed, arguing that courts in the Fourth Circuit are required to resolve ERISA denial-of-benefits cases via summary judgment and that the district court erred in dispensing with this case through a bench trial. Reliance also argued that this Court must review the district court’s legal conclusions.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court first held that because the plan at issue here did not require objective proof of disability, the court rejected Reliance’s contention that Plaintiff’s claim fails for the lack of such evidence. Further, the court wrote that the record supports the district court’s determination that Plaintiff’s disability was not limited to a “specific locale.” Accordingly, the court agreed that Plaintiff was “totally disabled” under the terms of the plan. View "Anita Tekmen v. Reliance Standard Life Ins." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs in these 177 consolidated appeals1 were participants in a 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan (the “Plan”) provided to employees by DST Systems, Inc. (“DST”), a financial and healthcare services company based in Kansas City, Missouri. At the time in question, DST was the Plan’s sponsor, administrator, and a designated fiduciary. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc. (“Ruane”) was a Plan fiduciary involved in managing the Plan’s investments. Between October and December 2021, the district court issued seven largely identical orders confirming the arbitration awards to 177 claimants and granting their requests for substantial costs and attorneys’ fees. Defendants appealed, raising numerous issues.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment including the awards of attorney’s fees, and the consolidated cases are remanded to the district court for determination of transfer and subject matter jurisdiction issues, to the extent necessary. The court concluded that transfer under Section 1631 is an issue that can be addressed before the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is resolved. The court declined to consider the issue because Badgerow has changed underlying circumstances that may affect whether transfer “is in the interest of justice.” View "Theresa Hursh v. DST Systems, Inc" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff challenged Lincoln’s denial of her claim for long-term disability benefits. On de novo review, the district court affirmed Lincoln’s denial of Plaintiff's claim, but it adopted new rationales that the ERISA plan administrator did not rely on during the administrative process. Specifically, the district court found for the first time that Plaintiff was not credible and that she had failed to supply objective evidence to support her claim.The Ninth Circuit held that when a district court reviews de novo a plan administrator’s denial of benefits, it examines the administrative record without deference to the administrator’s conclusions to determine whether the administrator erred in denying benefits. The district court’s task is to determine whether the plan administrator’s decision is supported by the record, not to engage in a new determination of whether the claimant is disabled. Accordingly, the district court must examine only the rationales the plan administrator relied on in denying benefits and cannot adopt new rationales that the claimant had no opportunity to respond to during the administrative process.Here, the district court erred because it relied on new rationales to affirm the denial of benefits. View "VICKI COLLIER V. LINCOLN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law