Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Wilson Paving & Excavating, Inc. was one of several subcontractors retained to perform services in connection with a renovation project at Sand Springs Memorial Stadium at Charles Page High School. Specifically, Wilson Paving contracted to dig trenches and lay pipe for a storm drainage system being installed under the athletic field. Wilson Paving utilized a local staffing agency, Labor Ready, to secure temporary workers to assist on the project. Steven Broom went to the offices of Labor Ready to obtain employment. Broom was directed by Labor Ready to work with Wilson Paving at Sand Springs High School. He reported to the high school and, at the instruction of Wilson Paving, began work laying pipe. The trench in which Broom was working collapsed twice - the first time covering him in dirt to his waist and the second time covering him in dirt to his neck. People on the job site freed Broom from the neck to the waist while waiting on emergency personnel to arrive. Once on the scene, emergency personnel could not enter the trench to rescue Broom until the trench was safely reinforced. During this time, Broom remained buried from the waist down. Emergency personnel eventually removed Broom from the trench, and he was transported to the hospital where he was treated for serious injuries, including rib fractures, collapsed lungs, pulmonary contusions, blood within the chest, fluid around the spleen and kidney, and a left kidney laceration. Before the trench collapsed, one of Wilson Paving's employees, Jack Bailey, was using a backhoe to dig the trench and to retrieve pipe from an area adjacent to the trench. Wilson Paving believed the trench collapse was due to the work of another contractor who had allegedly removed a monument and flag pole near the area of the collapse but failed to alert Bailey of such before he began digging the trench. Broom pursued and received workers' compensation benefits from Labor Ready for the injuries he sustained in the accident. Broom also sued Wilson Paving for his injuries in a third-party action to collect for his injuries as a result of Wilson's employee. The trial court found in favor of Broom and entered judgment against Wilson Paving for $1,150,000.00. Broom then sought post-judgment garnishment of Wilson Paving's Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Mid-Continent Casualty Company. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Mid-Continent, finding that coverage for Broom's injuries was precluded under the "earth movement" exclusion clause in Mid-Continent's policy. The Court of Civil Appeals found that the earth movement exclusion clause did not prevent coverage for Broom's injuries, but affirmed summary judgment on different grounds. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Mid-Continent's Commercial General Liability Policy provided coverage for Broom's injuries. View "Broom v. Wilson Paving & Excavating" on Justia Law

Appellant Tommie Patterson was injured in a hit-and-run accident and sued his car insurance company claiming it had breached his insurance contract by failing to reasonably compensate him for his injuries. He later moved to amend his complaint to include racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, and bad faith claims, but the superior court denied the motion. A jury returned a liability verdict that was smaller than the insurance company's offer of judgment. The superior court ruled that the insurance company was the prevailing party and awarded attorney's fees and costs. Patterson appealed the denial of his motion to amend, the awarding of attorney's fees and costs, and several of the court's other procedural and evidentiary rulings. Finding no abuse of discretion in the court's rulings, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Patterson v. GEICO General Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner Terry Ann Bartlett was injured in a motor vehicle accident in New York in August 2004, when the motorcycle owned and operated by Jeffrey Vilagos on which she was a passenger, was struck by a motor vehicle operated by Myroslaw Mykijewycz. Mykijewycz was insured by Allstate Insurance Company under a policy that provided liability insurance coverage up to $100,000 per person. Vilagos's motorcycle, which was registered and garaged in New Jersey, was insured by respondent Foremost Insurance Company. The Foremost policy was issued in New Jersey and provided uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage up to $250,000 per person. Petitioner also owned a motorcycle, which was registered and garaged in New Hampshire, and which was insured by respondent Progressive Northern Insurance Comapny under a policy that also provided UIM coverage up to $250,000 per person. Petitioner's other vehicles, which were both registered and garaged in New Hampshire, were insured by respondent Commerce Insurance Company under a policy that provided UIM coverage up to $250,000 per person. Petitioner's home was also insured by Commerce under a policy that contains a personal umbrella endorsement that provides $1,000,000 of single limited UIM coverage. Petitioner's New York attorney requested coverage information from Foremost, which Foremost provided. In April 2005, petitioner's attorney informed Progressive and Commerce that the petitioner intended to pursue UIM claims. Allstate offered petitioner its policy limit ($100,000). Petitioner's attorney notified Foremost, Progressive and Commerce of this fact and advised the respondent-insurers that, pursuant to New York law, they were either "required to grant [petitioner] permission to collect" the $100,000 from the Allstate policy "or to pay [her] [that] amount] within thirty (30) days." However, the New York law to which the attorney referred did not govern any of the insurers. Only Commerce responded to petitioner's attorney, granting petitioner permission to settle with Allstate. Allstate was thereafter released from liability. Petitioner sued Foremost, Progressive, and Commerce in New York in January 2011, more than six years after the accident. That lawsuit was eventually dismissed. While the insurers' motions to dismiss were pending, petitioner filed the underlying petition in this case for declaratory judgment. She moved, and the insurers cross-moved, for summary judgment. Commerce appealed, and petitioner cross-appealed the Superior Court's order partially granting and partially denying petitioner's summary judgment motion, denying Commerce's cross-motion for summary judgment, and granting cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Foremost and Progressive. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that petitioner forfeited her right to recover primary insurance coverage under the Foremost policy and her right to recover excess insurance coverage under the Progressive policy and reversed its conclusion that Commerce had to "drop down" to provide primary coverage. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bartlett v. Commerce Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Insurer Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Insurance Company appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendants Energy Wise, Inc. and Michael and Shirley Uhler in this declaratory-judgment action. Energy Wise was a Vermont corporation that specialized in insulating buildings and homes. It purchased a commercial general liability (CGL) policy from insurer, effective March 1, 2010 to March 1, 2011. In late 2010, Energy Wise installed spray-foam insulation at the Shrewsbury Mountain School. A school employee, Shirley Uhler, and her husband later filed suit against Energy Wise. Ms. Uhler asserted that she was "exposed to and encountered airborne chemicals and airborne residues" from the spray-foam insulation and suffered bodily injury as a result. The Uhlers raised claims of negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and loss of consortium. Energy Wise requested coverage under its CGL policy, and insurer agreed to defend Energy Wise under a bilateral reservation of rights. In September 2012, insurer filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, asserting that its policy did not cover the claims at issue. Insurer cited the "Total Pollution Exclusion Endorsement" in its policy, which excluded coverage for "[b]odily injury . . . [that] would not have occurred in whole or in part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of ‘pollutants' at any time." Insurer argued that the court should have granted summary judgment in its favor because the "total pollution exclusion" in its policy plainly and unambiguously precludes coverage in this case. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with insurer, and therefore reversed the trial court's decision and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in insurer's favor. View "Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Energy Wise Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

On April 24, 2008, Defendant ran a stop sign and struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing significant physical injuries. Plaintiff received basic reparations/personal injury protection benefits (PIP) from her insurer, Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC). On September 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed her complaint. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. At issue on appeal was when the last payment was made by the CIC. The CIC issued a check to a physical therapist on March 17, 2009 that was either received or lost and then issued a replacement check on September 25, 2009. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court, concluding that a replacement check does not constitute making payment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the September 2009 check was the last “payment” of PIP. Remanded. View "Beaumont v. Zeru" on Justia Law

Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC operated a Hampton Inn hotel in Siloam Springs, Arkansas. It purchased a general liability insurance policy from Century Surety Company covering the Hampton Inn for the period of November 13, 2012, through November 13, 2013. Siloam Springs purchased the Commercial Lines Policy through Century Surety's agent, RCI Insurance Group of Claremore, Oklahoma. On January 21, 2013, several guests at the Hampton Inn suffered bodily injury due to a sudden, accidental leak of carbon monoxide from the heating element of an indoor swimming pool. Siloam Springs sought coverage under the Commercial Lines Policy. Century Surety denied coverage, relying on an exclusion set out in the Commercial Lines Policy. That provision (the "Indoor Air Exclusion") excluded from coverage "[b]odily injury' . . . arising out of, caused by, or alleging to be contributed to in any way by any toxic, hazardous, noxious, irritating, pathogenic or allergen qualities or characteristics of indoor air regardless of cause." After Century Surety removed the case to federal court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In its motion, Century Surety asserted that because the insurance contract was to be performed in Arkansas, Oklahoma choice-of-law rules made Arkansas law applicable. It further argued that the Indoor Air Exclusion unambiguously excluded coverage for the carbon-monoxide based injuries to the guests at the Hampton Inn. For its part, Siloam Springs "decline[d] to contest" Century Surety's assertion that Arkansas law applied because, it asserted, "Arkansas law does not differ from Oklahoma law in any way material to [the] coverage dispute." As to the merits, Siloam Springs asserted the Indoor Air Exclusion was ambiguous and, as such, had to be construed in favor of coverage. Without definitively resolving whether Oklahoma or Arkansas law applied, but relying on precedent from Arkansas, the district court granted summary judgment to Century Surety. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review called for the Court to determine the citizenship, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, of a limited liability company ("LLC"). Because the materials before the Court did not demonstrate that complete diversity of citizenship existed at the time of the filing of the complaint, the matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Siloam Springs Hotel v. Century Surety Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ronald Lee Cline was severely injured when his motorcycle collided with a turning car driven by a teenager with a provisional license. He settled with the driver and the driver’s parents for their $100,000 insurance policy limit. Cline executed a release that released the driver and his parents “and any other person, corporation, association, or partnership responsible in any manner or degree” for the accident. Cline subsequently sued defendant Berniece Delores Homuth, the driver’s grandmother and the sole adult in the car with him at the time of the collision, for negligent supervision. Homuth raised the release as an affirmative defense. She moved for summary judgment; the trial court denied the motion. A court trial followed, centering on the validity of the release and whether Homuth was an intended third party beneficiary of the release. Cline appealed the judgment in favor of Homuth, arguing the extrinsic evidence demonstrated that Homuth was not an intended beneficiary of the release. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that Cline failed to provide sufficient evidence to counter Homuth’s showing that she was an intended beneficiary of the release. View "Cline v. Homuth" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on a dispute over insurance coverage following a private airplane crash. Garmin International, Inc., purchased an insurance policy from Appellees (the insurance companies). In 2008, while the insurance policy was in effect, Appellant Henry Bartle, an individual who had some dealings with Garmin, crashed while piloting his malfunctioning personal aircraft, injuring himself and his passengers. Bartle sought coverage under Garmin’s insurance policy for indemnification from claims brought against Bartle by his injured passengers. Appellees, the insurers, brought suit federal district court seeking a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act that Bartle did not qualify as an "Insured" under Garmin’s policy. Bartle submitted evidence to the district court to demonstrate he was indeed an "Insured," but the district court refused to consider much of the evidence because the evidence failed to conform to district court rules regarding proper citation. Without considering this evidence, the district court granted summary judgment to the insurers, finding that Bartle was not an "Insured" under the policy. Bartle appealed both the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurers and its refusal to consider the excluded evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[t]he district court concluded, and Mr. Bartle acknowledged, that the exhibits submitted could not be feasibly used by the district court without great difficulty. The district court cannot be expected to review evidence, evaluate arguments, or arrive at reasoned conclusions without usable citations. In this case the merits cannot be separated from the process, and ultimately Mr. Bartle bore the responsibility to present evidence that would allow a rational trier of fact to find in his favor." View "Certain Underwriters v. Bartle" on Justia Law

A trucking company purchased a liability insurance policy covering its tractors and trailers. The policy stipulated that liability coverage would be limited to "$1,000,000 each ‘accident.’" A tractor-trailer rig insured under the policy was involved in a single accident. The question this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on whether $1,000,000 was the limit per accident for both vehicles (the tractor and the trailer) or whether each vehicle has liability coverage in the amount of $1,000,000. The district court interpreted the policy to limit its coverage to $1,000,000; the Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed. Because this dispute affects not only the parties to this lawsuit but arguably New Mexico’s place among the many jurisdictions that have grappled with similar policy language, the New Mexico Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and reversed. The Supreme Court found that the Declarations page of the policy at issue provided that the dollar limit was $1,000,000 each accident. Section II(C) of the policy then said the same thing in terms of a "per accident" outside limit on what the insurer would pay: "Regardless of the number of covered ‘autos’ . . . or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’," the most Northland will pay "for the total of all damages . . .resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations [$1,000,000 each accident]." Therefore, the argument advanced by plaintiffs, the Luceros, that the policy provided $1,000,000 in coverage for "'each covered auto in each accident' simply does not find support in the language of the policy. The policy limits Northland’s exposure to $1,000,000 per accident regardless of the number of covered autos involved in any one accident." View "Lucero v. Northland Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether certain provisions of The Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA), specifically 51 O.S. 2011 sections 158(E) & 162(D), permitted the State of Oklahoma or a political subdivision to set off from liability amounts previously paid to a GTCA tort claimant from the claimant's own insurer, thereby abrogating the collateral source rule for claims arising under the GTCA with respect to these insurance benefits. Plaintiff-appellee Carolyn Mariani was injured when her vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer operated by an employee of defendant-appellant Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma State University. Mariani filed suit under the GTCA, alleging the driver's negligence, that the driver was an employee of the State of Oklahoma, and that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the negligent acts occurred. Mariani admitted that her insurer, AAA, had compensated her in underinsured/uninsured (UM) motorist benefits and medical payment coverage. The State moved for an interlocutory order ruling it had the right to set off Mariani's insurance receipts from its total liability pursuant to 51 O.S. 2011 sections 158(E) & 162(D). Mariani objected, and the trial court issued an interlocutory order denying the State's motion for the right to a setoff. The trial court certified its order for immediate review and the State filed a Petition for Certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the State's petition to review the interlocutory order. At trial, the State once again asserted it was entitled to a setoff of Mariani's insurance benefits pursuant to the GTCA. The State renewed its motion for a setoff at the conclusion of evidence, but the trial court denied the State's renewed motion. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed the trial court: "[a]n interpretation that Sections 158(E) and 162(D) serve to abrogate the collateral source rule for claims under the GTCA, allowing the State to set off collateral source benefits received by claimants from those claimants' own insurers, punishes those claimants for their foresight in procuring coverage. Such an interpretation is also contrary to the plain meaning of the sections when read in their entirety and in the context of the GTCA itself. We will not carve out an exception to the collateral source rule where the plain and clear language of the law does not provide for one." View "Mariani v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma State Univ." on Justia Law