Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Improper transfers were made from a title insurance agent’s escrow account. The agent’s principal, United General Title Insurance Company, paid the loss and then sued to recover the loss from multiple entities and persons, including recipients of the transferred funds. United General recovered judgment against some entities and persons, but summary judgment was entered against it on various claims. After a jury trial, several recipients of the transferred funds successfully defended the action on the remaining issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court correctly granted summary judgment, with the exception of United General’s claims for conversion and a constructive trust; (2) there was no merit to the alleged errors that United General asserted occurred at trials; and (3) after trial, the district court correctly granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. View "United Gen. Title Ins. Co. v. Malone" on Justia Law

An adult passenger in a car was injured in a single-car accident. The passenger and his family brought suit against the vehicle’s unlicensed minor driver, the minor’s mother, the owner of the car, the insurance policy holder, the insurer, and the insurance adjuster who handled the claims arising from the accident. The passenger’s father attempted to raise a contractual interference claim, but the superior court concluded that the complaint did not state such a claim on his behalf. The superior court dismissed the father’s only other claim (intentional infliction of emotional distress), removed the father’s name from the case caption, and ordered the father to cease filing pleadings on behalf of other parties. After the superior court judge dismissed him from the action, the passenger’s father attempted to file a first amended complaint, which expressly stated his contractual interference claim on the theory that he was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between his son and his son’s doctors. But the superior court denied the father leave to amend the complaint because the father had already been dismissed from the case. Following a settlement among all of the other plaintiffs and defendants (which the father did not join) the superior court granted final judgment to the insurer. The insurer moved for attorney’s fees against the father under Alaska Civil Rule 82, but the father never responded to that motion. The superior court granted the award without soliciting a response from the father, and the father appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the father’s claims and denying leave to amend the complaint because the proposed first amended complaint was futile. But because the superior court had barred the father from filing any further pleadings in the case and had removed his name from the caption, the superior court had a responsibility to inform the self-represented father that he was permitted to file an opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees. Therefore, the Court vacated the fee award and remanded the case to the superior court to afford the father an opportunity to respond to the insurer’s motion for reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Bush v. Elkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim against Zenith after Santana Morales, Jr. was crushed to death by a palm tree while working as a landscaper for Lawns. The Florida Supreme Court answered the following certified questions in the affirmative: (1) Does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against Zenith under the employer liability policy? (2) If so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage "any obligation imposed by workers' compensation... law" operate to exclude coverage of the estate's claim against Zenith for the tort judgment? and (3) If the estate's claim is not barred by the workers' compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers' compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate's collection of the tort judgment? The court concluded that, given the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the certified issues, the district court correctly determined that the workers' compensation exclusion in Part II of the policy barred Zenith's coverage of the tort judgment against Lawns. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zenith. View "Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co." on Justia Law

One evening, Shawn McKiernan drove by Kevin Hough several times in an automobile owned by Rita Bower and taunted Hough as he drove past. McKiernan subsequently exited the insured vehicle and punched Hough, who was knocked to the pavement. Hough suffered a serious head injury as a result of the assault and battery. Hough filed a negligence complaint against Bower as the vehicle owner, alleging liability under the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws 31-33-6, which imputes vicarious liability upon the owner of a vehicle for its consensual use or operation. Due to the subsequent death of Bower, Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Company, the insurer of the vehicle, was substituted as a party defendant. The trial justice granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Quincy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish the causal relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injuries sustained by Plaintiff required to impute liability under section 31-33-6. View "Hough v. McKiernan" on Justia Law

Johnson’s trucking business operated 1986 and 1987 semi-tractor trucks, with one truck at a time insured through Acuity. In 2009, Johnson called Acuity’s agent, Holden, to switch insurance coverage to the 1987 truck. The 1987 truck broke down the next day. Johnson called Holden to switch the insurance back to the 1986 truck. A year later, Johnson's 1986 truck, pulling a J&B trailer, collided with Marlow’s vehicle, causing her death. Western insured the trailer. Holden claimed that Johnson had called in February 2010 and requested to switch coverage to the 1987 truck. Johnson denied ever making that request. At trial, Johnson pointed out that the 1987 truck remained inoperable; Johnson operated the 1986 truck throughout 2010. Johnson’s February 2010, renewal policy identified the 1986 International as covered. Johnson advised J&B that he would use the 1986 truck. Acuity and Johnson settled. The court denied Acuity’s motion to dismiss Johnson. Western's cross-claim against him remained pending; Johnson had assigned his claims against Western to Acuity and Acuity agreed to indemnify Johnson. Acuity paid $561,000 to Marlow’s estate and sought reimbursement. The court viewed the dispute as whether Johnson instructed Holden to change the coverage and rejected Acuity’s claim that Western lacked standing. The jury found that Johnson did not request a change. The court declared that Acuity had to provide primary insurance coverage. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the controversy did not concern contract reformation and upholding the district court's decision to allow Johnson to participate at trial. View "ACUITY v. Johnson," on Justia Law

Employee-petitioner Judy Barnes was employed as an administrative assistant at Charter 1 Realty. On the day of her injury, Barnes was asked to check the e-mail of one of the realtors before noon. Around 11:30 a.m., Barnes left her desk and walked toward the realtor's office. However, she stumbled, fell, and sustained serious injuries: a broken left femur, broken left humerus and a torn rotator cuff.Barnes subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation. At the hearing, Barnes testified she was hurrying to the realtor's office to check her e-mail and that caused her to fall. Evidence was also introduced that her husband did not like the shoes she wore, and he had told her she needed to pick up her feet when she walked. The single commissioner and appellate panel found that her fall was idiopathic and therefore noncompensable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the commissioner and appellate panel's findings, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty" on Justia Law

Claimant-petitioner Carolyn Nicholson, a supervisor in the investigations area of child protective services for the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS), was on her way to a meeting when her foot caught on the hall carpet and she fell. She received treatment for pain to her neck, left shoulder, and left side connected with her fall. Nicholson's claim for workers' compensation was denied by the single commissioner because she failed to prove a causal connection between her fall and employment. The commissioner held there was nothing specific to the floor at DSS which contributed to Nicholson's fall and that she could have fallen anywhere. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioner was entitled to workers' compensation. "Despite how straightforward this issue appears to be," both the commissioner and the court of appeals found petitioner was not entitled to recover. The Supreme Court disagreed with both, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nicholson v. SC Dept. of Social Services" on Justia Law

Fred and Tina Preisler operated a dairy farm and raised cattle. The Preislers hired Kuettel’s Septic to apply septage, which is primarily composed of human urine and fecal material, to their farm fields. The Preislers subsequently experienced problems with their well water. The Preislers sued Kuettel’s Septic, other defendants, and their insurers, alleging, among other claims, negligence in storing and in applying septage resulting in nuisance and trespass. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the insurers, concluding that a pollution exclusion clause precluded coverage for harm resulting from the Preislers’ water supply’s contamination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “a reasonable insured would understand that decomposing septage is a ‘contaminant’ and therefore a ‘pollutant’ as defined in the policies when it has decomposed and seeps into a water supply.” View "Preisler v. Kuettel's Septic Serv., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Robert and Jane Falk spread liquid cow manure onto their farm fields for the purpose of fertilization. The manure leeched into and contaminated the wells of the Falks’ neighbors. Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, the Falks’ insurer, filed a declaratory judgment motion claiming it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the Falks against allegations that they negligently spread manure on their property and thereby polluted their neighbors’ wells. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the Wilson Mutual policy issued to the Falks contained an exclusion for pollution and that manure is unambiguously a pollutant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that manure is not a pollutant because, to a reasonable farmer, manure is “liquid gold.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the pollution exclusion in the policy unambiguously excludes coverage for well contamination caused by the seepage of cow manure. View "Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathryn Kipling sued State Farm Automobile Insurance Company in Colorado federal district court for breach of contract because it did not pay her benefits under four insurance policies issued in Minnesota. The court determined that she would be entitled to benefits under Colorado law but not under Minnesota law. It then applied tort conflict-of-laws principles to rule that Colorado law governed. After its review, the Tenth Circuit held that the court erred by not applying contract conflict-of-laws principles. The district court was reversed and the matter remanded for further consideration. View "Kipling v. State Farm Mutual Automobile" on Justia Law