Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Calvin Stucky was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Calvin’s child, Sadee, was eighteen years old at the time of the accident. Sadee claimed damages for loss of parental services, society, or consortium, among other claims. Defendant-insurer moved for summary judgment with respect to Sadee’s loss of consortium claim, arguing that Montana law does not recognize a claim for loss of consortium by the adult child of an injured parent. The federal court, which had diversity jurisdiction, certified the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted the certified questions of law and answered (1) Montana law recognizes a claim for loss of consortium by the adult child of an injured parent; and (2) to assert such a claim, the plaintiff must show that a third party tortiously caused the parent to suffer a serious, permanent, and disabling injury compensable under Montana law, and that the parent’s ultimate condition of impairment is so overwhelming and severe that it has caused the parent-child relationship to be destroyed or nearly destroyed. View "N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Stucky" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sonia Graciano was injured after she was hit by a car driven by Saul Ayala. Ayala was insured by defendant California Automobile Insurance Company (CAIC). Three weeks after Graciano's attorney first contacted CAIC regarding the accident, Graciano misidentified both the driver and the applicable insurance policy. CAIC investigated the accident, identified the applicable policy and the correct driver, and offered to settle Graciano's claim with a "full policy limits offer." Graciano did not accept CAIC's full policy limits offer and, in this suit, alleged CAIC and its parent and affiliated companies acted in bad faith, based on an alleged "wrongful failure to settle." Graciano argued CAIC could have and should have earlier discovered the facts, and should have made the full policy limits offer more quickly. The jury found in favor of Graciano and this appeal followed. CAIC argued that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence to support the verdict that CAIC acted in bad faith by unreasonably failing to settle Graciano's claim against Saul. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the judgment. View "Graciano v. Mercury General Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff in this automobile-accident lawsuit sued her underinsured-motorist insurance carrier. Even though the UM carrier admitted liability and agreed to pay any damages awarded at trial that exceeded available liability coverage, plaintiff insisted on informing the jury of the insurance company’s status as a defendant. The trial judge refused to allow it. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Heflin v. Merrill" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review stemmed from a worker's compensation claim. Specifically, the issue the Court had to determine was whether a “wet floor” sign was a safety device and whether a nurse who slips on a recently mopped floor at work is entitled to a 10% increase in benefits when a “wet floor” sign was not posted near a mopped floor. The Court held that a “wet floor” sign is a safety device and that the nurse’s injury resulted from the negligence of the employer in failing to supply reasonable safety devices in general use. View "Benavides v. Eastern N.M. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Roger Brock was passenger in a vehicle driven by Brian Mason, which was involved in an accident with a logging truck, driven by Ryan Stevens. At the time of the accident, Stevens was insured through the owner of the logging truck, Malachi Sanders' policy issued by Aequicap Insurance Company. Brock sustained severe injuries as a result of the wreck and filed suit. Soon after the litigation began, Brock settled his claim against Stevens and Sanders with Aequicap for $185,000 for the release of all claims. Shortly after the settlement was reached but before Brock received any payment, Aequicap was declared insolvent. Because Aequicap was an insurer licensed to do business in the State of South Carolina and the insured was a resident of South Carolina, the claim was referred to South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (Guaranty). As a result, Brock made demand on Guaranty for payment of the full settlement amount of $185,000. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the construction and application of the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act), S.C. Code Ann. Secs. 38-31-10 to -170 (2002 and Supp. 2013), and specifically the exhaustion/non-duplication provision in section 38-31-100(1). Guaranty and Brock moved for summary judgment on the issue whether Guaranty may offset payments from solvent insurance carriers against Brock's settlement under section 38-31-100. The circuit court found section 38-31-100 was ambiguous and granted partial summary judgment to both parties, holding that Guaranty may offset some but not all of the benefits received by Brock from solvent insurance carriers. The Supreme Court disagreed that section 38-31-100 was ambiguous and hold that the unambiguous language of section 38-31-100 provides that Guaranty may offset all payments from all solvent insurers made to Brock as a result of this wreck.View "SC Property v. Brock" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Deputy Arnold and Sheriff Graves, alleging violations of federal and state law after Arnold fatally shot their father while responding to a 911 call that the father was threatening to commit suicide. Plaintiffs also filed suit against ReliaStar to recover $179,000 they allege ReliaStar owes them under the father's accidental death policy. The district court granted Arnold and Grave's motions for summary judgment and granted ReliaStar's motion for summary judgment. The court held that Arnold did not violate the father's Fourth Amendment rights when he entered the father's home without a warrant because he had an objectively reasonable belief that the father would imminently seriously injure himself, and the district court did not err in granting Arnold's motion for summary judgment on the warrantless entry claim because Arnold is entitled to qualified immunity; Arnold is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate the father's constitutional right to be free from excessive force; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Arnold on the assault and battery claims, the false imprisonment claims, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; the district court correctly granted Graves's motion for summary judgment; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for ReliaStar where the record was replete with factual evidence that ReliaStar relied on in determining that the father's death was not accidental, demonstrating that ReliaStar could have reached its determination without resorting to the conflict of interest at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Rice, et al. v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute between an insurance carrier (Plaintiff) and its insured (Defendant) regarding Plaintiff’s obligation to pay underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration panel concluded that the issue of whether the relevant policy provisions provided coverage for the claim should be resolved under the choice of law rules governing claims sounding in tort, rather than claims sounding in insurance and contract, and therefore, that New Jersey law rather than Connecticut law governed Defendant’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the policy. The trial court vacated the arbitration award, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court, in its opinion adopting the decision of the trial court, properly applied sections 6(2), 188 and 193 of the Restatement (Second), contract choice of law, to determine that Connecticut law governed the claim.View "Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Mortara" on Justia Law

Gary Corgatelli sought worker's compensation benefits from his employer Steel West and the State of Idaho's Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) for a 2005 back injury that he incurred as a result of his employment. The Idaho Industrial Commission concluded that Corgatelli had a permanent physical impairment of 15% of the whole person, attributing 5% to an earlier injury in 1994 and 10% to the 2005 injury, and that Corgatelli was totally and permanently disabled. The Commission further concluded that ISIF was liable for disability benefits because the effects of Corgatelli's preexisting impairment from the 1994 injury combined with his 2005 injury to cause total and permanent disability. The Commission subsequently issued an order to clarify that Steel West was entitled to credit on the disability award for permanent physical impairment benefits Steel West previously paid to Corgatelli for his 2005 injury. Corgatelli appealed the Commission's order to credit Steel West. ISIF cross-appealed the Commission's determination of ISIF liability. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commission erred when it allowed Steel West to offset its liability for total and permanent disability benefits with permanent physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli. Furthermore, the Court found no substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that ISIF was liable to Corgatelli for benefit payment. The Commission's award to Steel West of a credit for permanent physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli in 2006 and 2007 for his 2005 back injury was vacated. The Commission's finding of ISIF liability was reversed. And this case was remanded for further proceedings.View "Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc." on Justia Law

The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Arch Specialty Insurance Company, finding that Arch's general liability policy did not provide coverage for the claims asserted by the wrongful death beneficiaries of William Gray. The Grays' claimed negligent hiring, negligent training, and failure to implement appropriate triage protocols arose from the performance of or failure to perform medical services, against Arch's insured. The Grays appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Gray v. Arch Specialty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Berrey was injured in an automobile accident at work. The at‐fault driver, who did not work with Berrey, carried liability insurance, but the cost of Berrey’s injuries exceeded the policy’s limit. Berrey received partial compensation under her employer’s workers’ compensation scheme but, because her employer was not responsible for the accident, state law granted the workers’ compensation carrier a lien on any recovery from the at‐fault driver. The at‐fault driver’s insurer paid its full policy limit directly to the workers’ compensation carrier. Travelers provided underinsured motorist coverage to Berrey’s employer. The policy covered an employee injured by a third-party who did not carry adequate auto insurance to fully compensate for the employee’s loss. Travelers paid Berrey the difference between her total calculated damages and the at‐fault driver’s policy limit. Berrey claims that Travelers improperly deducted the at-fault driver’s insurance payment from the total it owed to Berrey because that payment was made directly to the workers’ compensation carrier rather than to Berrey herself. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Travelers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the language of the policy supported Travelers’s calculation and that Berrey’s reading would undermine the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.View "Berrey v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am." on Justia Law