Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Jessica J. Wright and her insurers for equitable garnishment to collect a state court judgment. Wright had hacked into plaintiff's voicemail and Facebook services, sending disparaging letters and emails about him, and making anonymous phone calls and texts to harass or defame him, among other things. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurers and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that the Umbrella Policy covered personal injury arising from defamation or privacy violations and excluded coverage for personal injury arising from mental abuse. Therefore, the acts in this case - whether they were the results of Wright's negligence - were mental abuse and not covered by the insurance policy.

A young boy died after he trespassed onto plaintiff Corporation's property and played on industrial equipment. A settlement was eventually reached with the decedent's estate. Corporation thereafter filed suit against its Insurer, asserting that Insurer was liable to Corporation for the defense expenses it had incurred from the representation provided by Insurer's independent legal counsel. The superior court granted summary judgment for Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Corporation was not entitled to have Insurer subsidize the engagement of independent counsel to represent Corporation in addition to the law firm that Insurer had hired to represent Corporation in connection with the fatal accident because there was no actual conflict between the prime interests of the Insurer and those of the Corporation since no civil action had been commenced when Corporation engaged independent counsel; and (2) Corporation's argument that Insurer ratified its engagement of independent counsel by not objecting to the fact that Corporation had engaged independent counsel was without merit.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Mark Tibert, Melvin Tibert, Sue Tibert, and William Tibert appealed a district court judgment that dismissed their declaratory judgment action against Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. Mark, Melvin, and William Tibert are brothers, and Sue Tibert is Mark's wife. The Tiberts were involved in a lengthy dispute with Minto Grain, LLC, and its owners William and Katherine Slominski. Mark and Sue Tibert and Melvin Tibert owned homes on property adjacent to a grain elevator owned and operated by Minto Grain. Minto Grain intended to expand its facility, and acquired a portion of BNSF Railway's right-of-way on a roadway abutting and providing access to the Tiberts' properties. The Tiberts had various homeowner's policies and umbrella policies, which included personal injury liability endorsements, with Nodak. In 2004, Minto Grain brought an action against the Tiberts, alleging civil conspiracy, wrongful interference with business, tortious interference with contract, nuisance, trespass, and abuse of process. The Tiberts delivered the complaint to Nodak. Nodak denied it had a duty to indemnify or defend the Tiberts under the policies. The Tiberts brought this declaratory judgment action against Nodak, seeking indemnification and recovery of their costs of defending the underlying action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to indemnify the Tiberts for the damages paid to Minto Grain, but did err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to defend the Tiberts in the underlying action. The Court considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the parties and found them to be either unnecessary to its decision or without merit.

Employee was injured in a work-related accident in Minnesota and then moved to Wyoming where she received medical treatment. The Wyoming medical providers submitted their charges to Employer's workers' compensation insurer. Relying on Minn. Stat. 176.136, subd. 1b(d), the insurer made payments in the amount provided under the workers' compensation benefit structure in Wyoming. Employee filed a workers' compensation medical request for the unpaid balance, arguing that Minn. Stat. 176.135, subd. 1 was controlling. The workers' compensation judge agreed and found for Employee. The workers' compensation court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Minn. Stat. 176.136, subd. 1b(d) limits a Minnesota employer's workers' compensation liability to an out-of-state medical provider to the amounts provided in the workers' compensation schedule of benefits in the state where the provider is located; and (2) section 16.136, subd. 1b(d) was not unconstitutional as applied.

Plaintiffs were catastrophically injured in automobile accidents. All sustained traumatic brain injuries and are now mentally impaired. State Farm initially paid no-fault insurance benefits for the cost of attendant care services rendered at home, but reduced the rates on the basis of market surveys of the cost of the services. State Farm refused to raise the rates because it could not verify whether plaintiffs had received the type of care that would justify paying higher rates. Plaintiffs refused to submit documentation regarding the nature and extent of the care they were receiving. Plaintiffs sued. The district court awarded plaintiffs monetary sanctions, instead of default judgment, in response to State Farm’s violation of discovery orders. A jury rendered a verdict in State Farm’s Favor. The Sixth Circuit dismissed appeal regarding the discovery sanctions, for lack of jurisdiction, but otherwise affirmed.

In two civil actions, Plaintiffs in the underlying action alleged that Cheaters, Inc. and Cheaters Holding Corporation negligently and/or recklessly served alcoholic beverages to William Powers, who afterwards drove a vehicle off the premises and collided with other vehicles, resulting in one death and injuries to others. Before the accident, United National Insurance Corporation had issued an insurance policy to Cheaters and the Holding Corporation. Based on the policy's on-premises endorsement and liquor liability exclusion, United National disclaimed any responsibility for the defense and/or indemnification of the Holding Corporation. Plaintiff corporations then filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment as to their rights under the terms of the policy. The superior court hearing justice granted United National's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the on-premises endorsement, which limited coverage to on-premises losses only, applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that coverage was barred by the on-premises endorsement.

Casey Stuivnga and Britni Evans were injured in a single-vehicle accident. The vehicle was owned by Stuivenga. Both Stuivenga and Evans claimed the other person was driving and was liable to the other for their injuries. They both sought proceeds available under an automobile insurance policy issued to Stuivenga by Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Progressive determined that Evans' and Stuivenga's competing claims could not be settled in an amount equal to or less than the policy's per person liability limit of $25,000. Progressive commenced an interpleader action and deposited the $25,000 with the district court, asking the court to determine to whom the funds should be issued. Ultimately, a jury found that Evans was the driver at the time of the accident and released the $25,000 to Stuivenga. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this appeal was not moot, as the issue presented at the outset of the action of who was driving had not ceased to exist, and Stuivenga's payment of the funds to third parties did not render the Court unable to grant effective relief; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Evans' motion for a new trial.

Claimant Carl Wynne was a truck driver. While he was in Tennessee driving a truck for his former employer, he heard that Triad Transport, Inc. was hiring. Claimant called Triad’s headquarters in McAlester and spoke to a recruiter who had hiring authority. Claimant requested that an application be sent by fax to Odessa, Texas, where he lived. He completed the application and sent it by fax to McAlester. A week or so later, the recruiter phoned while Claimant was driving somewhere between Georgia and Arizona that his application had been approved. Claimant agreed to travel to McAlester for orientation. He returned his prior employer's truck to a terminal in Tuscon, Arizona, and a Triad employee gave him a ride to a Triad satellite terminal in Laveen, Arizona. There, he passed a drug test, was provided a fuel card, and dispatched to Rockwall, Texas with a load. In 2010, Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Colorado while he was driving Triad’s truck. He filed a Form 3 claim for benefits in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court which Triad opposed. The trial tribunal conducted a hearing solely on the issue of the court's jurisdiction. Two witnesses were presented, Claimant and the President of Employer. Claimant testified concerning when and where he was actually hired, and Employer's President testified to the general hiring practices of his company. The recruiter was not called to testify. The trial tribunal made several findings of fact and concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the case of Claimant's subsequent injury as Claimant's hiring and final assent to permanent employment relationship between claimant and respondent occurred in Oklahoma. A three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court unanimously affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court’s de novo review of the record, the testimony of the witnesses, and the arguments of the parties lead to the conclusion that Claimant's final assent to employment did not occur until he attended the orientation in Oklahoma, “[t]hat process began when Claimant first made contact with [Triad’s] recruiter, but it did not end until Claimant gave his final assent to employment during the orientation in Oklahoma. The Workers' Compensation Court did not err in determining that it has jurisdiction to hear the claim.”

Plaintiff James Casale was employed by Defendant City of Cranston when he was injured. During his incapacity, Plaintiff received injured-on-duty (IOD) benefits from the City. In accordance with its policy with Plaintiff, Plaintiff's insurer, Amica Mutual Insurance Company, tendered $100,000 in uninsured motorist benefits to Plaintiff minus the amount that the City paid to Plaintiff for IOD benefits. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination that R.I. Gen. Laws 45-19-1.1, which requires that an employer be reimbursed out of the proceeds received from the third party, was inapplicable to his case and that the City was not entitled to reimbursement from uninsured motorist benefits Plaintiff recovered under the policy. The trial justice concluded that the City was not entitled to reimbursement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice correctly held that Defendant was not entitled to reimbursement for the IOD payments paid to Plaintiff; and (2) because Plaintiff did not collect any money from the tortfeasor, section 45-19-1.1 was inapplicable to this case.

After sustaining injuries in an auto accident, Tavis McArthur filed this suit in federal district court to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under his State Farm automobile insurance policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that McArthur had failed to exhaust the liability limits of the tortfeasor's insurance, a precondition of his UIM benefits policy. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions to the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held (1) exhaustion clauses that require the liability insurer to pay out its full policy limits before permitting payment of UIM benefits are generally enforceable in the State of Utah; and (2) because UIM exhaustion provisions are conditions precedent and not covenants capable of being breached, no showing of prejudice is required to sustain their invocation.