Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Timothy Hop's automobile was damaged in an accident with a driver insured by Safeco Insurance Company. In addition to the costs of repair, Hop sought "residual diminished value" (RDV) for his vehicle. When Safeco failed to pay RDV, Hop filed a class action complaint for declaratory relief in the district court, seeking a declaration that Safeco was required to investigate and pay class members, people whose vehicles were damaged by a Safeco insured and who were not paid RDV by Safeco, for RDV of their vehicle. The district court granted Hop's motion for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying a class action before Hop had satisfied the statutory requirements to bring an individual third party action against Safeco. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Hop's class action without prejudice.

At issue in this case were coverage limits associated with underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance and whether coverage provided under disputed insurance policies complies with the requirements of Alaska insurance statutes. The Respondent families hold UIM policies. They alleged they suffered emotional distress and loss of consortium as a result of a collision that killed one familyâs child and severely injured the other familyâs child. The insurer accepted that the policyholders incurred damages. However, it contended that the families exhausted the coverage limits available to them under the UIM policies because the family members seeking damages were not âinâ the fatal collision. The superior court concluded that the families had not exhausted their UIM coverage under Alaska insurance statutes and reformed the insurance policies to allow the emotional distress claims to proceed to arbitration. The superior court dismissed the familiesâ loss of consortium claims as outside the coverage of the policies. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the families exhausted the coverage limits available under their policies and that these policies were consistent with statutory requirements, the Court reversed the superior courtâs decision to reform the policies. Because coverage limits are exhausted, the Court declined to consider whether loss of consortium was covered under the policies.

In this case, the Supreme Court was called to determine whether the heirs of an uninsured motorist killed in an automobile accident had a rightful claim under the Wrongful Death Act or whether N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) extinguished that claim, as it did the survival action. In 2005, Lawrence Aronberg was driving southbound on the New Jersey Turnpike when a tractor trailer careened into the rear of his car, killing him. The truck was operated by Wendell Tolbert and owned by Fleetwood Taggart (Fleetwood Trucking). On the day of the fatal accident, Aronberg, then thirty-four years old, was an uninsured motorist. Just three weeks earlier, Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company (Allstate) had cancelled Aronbergâs automobile insurance policy because of his failure to keep his premiums current. Plaintiff Sheila Aronberg, as General Administratrix of her sonâs Estate, filed a survivorship and wrongful death action against defendants Tolbert and Fleetwood Trucking. The âSurvivorâs Actâ permits an appointed representative to file any personal cause of action that decedent could have brought had he lived. In contrast, the âWrongful Death Actâ provides to decedentâs heirs a right of recovery for pecuniary damages for their direct losses as a result of their relativeâs death due to the tortious conduct of another. The trial court held that because the decedent did not carry insurance at the time of the accident, his estate could not recoup on its survival claim per N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a), but could recoup on the wrongful death action. The court found that the Wrongful Death Act granted heirs an independent right of recovery, regardless of the decedentâs failure to procure insurance. The Appellate Division granted defendantsâ motion for leave to appeal and in a split decision affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held when an uninsured motoristâs cause of action is barred by the uninsured motorist statute, an heir has no right of recovery under the Wrongful Death Act.

While away for a competition in a school-supported event, students caused damage to a motel where they were lodging. The motel's property insurer paid to repair the damage then exercised its right of subrogation pursuant to its insurance contract with the motel to seek to recover compensation for those responsible for the loss. The insurer filed a complaint against the school district, alleging it was liable for breach of contract based on its failure to protect and safeguard the property from damage during the period of occupancy and to refrain from activities that would damage the property. The superior court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the school district did not undertake to be responsible to pay damages in a subrogation action, the insurer's action against the school board was barred.

Through its opinion in this case, the Supreme Court addressed an exception in the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) that permitted compensation for injuries incurred in travel by employees when those injuries "[arose] out of and in the course of employment." Eloy Doporto, Jr., Mike Lucas, Jose Turrubiates, and Pete Rodriguez (collectively, the Workers), employed by Permian Drilling Corporation (Permian) and insured by American Home Assurance, were involved in an automobile accident while traveling to their work site, resulting in the death of Doporto and injuries to the others.  Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the injuries suffered by the Workers arose out of and in the course of their employment because the travel was mutually beneficial to employees and employer and the Workers encountered special hazards unique to their employment while traveling, thus rendering the Workers "traveling employees" whose injuries are compensable under the Act.

After self-insured Employer filed for bankruptcy, it continued to take payroll deductions from Employees for medical coverage but stopped paying the provider hospital for the covered charges. The hospital then directly billed Employees for services that should have been paid by Employer. Employees filed suit to stop the hospital's attempts to collect payment, seeking relief under the theories of declaratory judgment, injunction, breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and bad faith breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital on all of Employees' claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employees had standing as third party beneficiaries to enforce the provisions of the hospital agreement and payer agreement; and (2) Employees were not obligated to pay for covered medical services under the agreements. Remanded.

Five years after Homeowners contracted for the construction of their home, Homeonwers sued Elite Homes, the construction company that built their home, and Motorists Mutual Insurance, the insurance company that provided commercial general liability (CGL) insurance to the construction company while the home was under construction, claiming the house was so poorly built it was beyond repair. Motorists settled Homeonwers' claims against itself and Elite. Under the terms of the settlement, Homeowners and Elite assigned to Motorists all claims they may have had against Cincinnati Insurance, which was a successor to Motorists as Elite's CGL insurer. Motorists then filed a third-party complaint against Cincinnati. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cincinnati, holding that Homeowners' claims of intangible economic loss did not qualify as an "occurrence" causing property damage under Cincinnati's CGL policy. The court of appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment. At issue on appeal was whether faulty construction-related workmanship, standing alone, qualifies as an "occurrence" under a CGL policy. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court's conclusion that the claims were not an "occurrence" was correct.

Employee injured his knee while climbing into his employer-provided truck as he was preparing to leave on a work-related trip. The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) denied Employee's requested workers' compensation benefits related to his injury. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) granted summary judgment in favor of the Division. The district court affirmed the OAH's decision. At issue on appeal was whether Employee's injury was sustained while he was being transported by a vehicle of the employer as the statute requires. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute plainly and unambiguously requires that for an injury sustained during travel to be compensable, it must occur as the employer's vehicle is carrying the employee from one place to another; and (2) because Employee here was entering the vehicle in preparation for that transportation when he was injured, the injury he sustained was not compensable.

Plaintiff was injured while driving his employer's tow truck. Plaintiff filed suit against the driver of the other car involved in the accident, and later sought to invoke his employer's uninsured motorist policy in an amount equal to the liability coverage for bodily injury. The employer's insurer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit uninsured motorist coverage to the amount listed in the policy rather than the amount fixed by statute. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, directing that the insurer's motion for partial summary judgment be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the insured signs an application indicating the selection of uninsured motorist coverage lower than the liability limits but neglects to initial a provision designed to confirm the selection of coverage less than the standard provided by statute, the requirement under Tenn. Code Ann. 56-7-1201(a)(2) that the selection be in writing has been satisfied.

State Farm petitioned for review of the Third District's determination that the household exclusion in its policy issued to respondents was ambiguous and therefore could not be enforced to eliminate coverage for bodily injuries suffered by members of the household of a permissive-driver insured. The court held that the plain language of the household exclusion precluded coverage for bodily injuries suffered by members of the household of a permissive-driver insured, such as the parents in this case. Therefore, the court quashed the Third District's decision, approved Linehan v. Alkhabbaz, and remanded for further proceedings.