Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Insurer and dismissing Insureds' suit seeking to force Insurer to pay for damages Hurricane Maria inflicted on their property, holding that Insureds' claims on appeal failed.Hurricane Maria struck Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017. Insureds brought this suit on January 9, 2019. In granting summary judgment in favor of Insurer, the district court concluded that this suit was time-barred under the terms of the insurance contract. Under Puerto Rico law, prescription of actions is interrupted by their institution before the courts, by extrajudicial claim of the creditor, and by act of acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by crediting Insurer's declarations but not Insureds' declarations; (2) Insureds' claims lacked the specificity required to meet their burden of proving prescription; and (3) the remainder of Insureds' claims on appeal were barred. View "Marcano-Martinez v. Cooperative de Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Academy filed suit in state court alleging that Continental breached an insurance policy by denying coverage for a claim asserted against it by a former executive. After removal to the district court, the district court issued a sua sponte order remanding the case to state court.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court's transmittal of its sua sponte order remanding this civil action to a state court based solely on the notice of removal does not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction. The panel also concluded that despite the district court's characterization of its order, 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) does not bar the panel's review because jurisdiction could not be determined when the district court issued its sua sponte order. The panel explained that section 1447(d) bars review only of a remand order that is based on a colorable section 1447(c) ground. In this case, the district court's requirement that a notice of removal prove subject matter jurisdiction is contrary to Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014), and accordingly, is not a "colorable" ground under section 1447(c). Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's remand order. View "Academy of Country Music v. Continental Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the following question: Under California's Motor Carriers of Property Permit Act, Cal. Veh. Code 34600 et seq., does a commercial automobile insurance policy continue in full force and effect until the insurer cancels the corresponding Certificate of Insurance on file with the California Department of Motor Vehicles, regardless of the insurance policy's stated expiration date? View "Allied Premier Insurance v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

In these original proceedings arising from suits by holders of underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance seeking recovery against their insurers following traffic accidents the Supreme Court held that insureds who bring only Insurance Code claims seeking policy benefits as damages must also succeed in an initial "car crash" trial in order to lay the predicate for their statutory claims.Following traffic accidents, holders of UIM insurance sought recovery against their insurers. The insureds, however, did not sue for breach of their insurance companies and brought only extracontractual Insurance Code Claims. In both cases, State Farm filed motions for bifurcated trial under Rule 174(b). After the trial courts denied State Farm's motions, State Farm petitioned for mandamus relief. In response, Petitioners argued that because they brought only statutory claims and because there were no breach of contract claims to try first, no bifurcation of trial was required. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that although Petitioners' claims were not labeled breach of contract Petitioners nevertheless just establish State Farm's liability under their insurance policies as a prerequisite to recovery on their Insurance Code claims. View "In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Insurer in this insurance dispute, holding that payment of an appraisal award does not absolve the insurer of statutory liability when an insurer accepts a claim but pays only the part of the amount it owed within the statutory deadline for payment.Homeowner reported a claim to Insurer for damage to his home. Insurer accepted Homeowner's claim and paid part of it before the statutory deadline. Dissatisfied with the amount, Homeowner sued, seeking full payment of the claim plus interest and attorney's fees under the Teas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, Tex. Ins. Code Chapter 542. While the suit was pending but after the statutory deadline had passed, Insurer invoked the policy's appraisal process, and the appraised awarded Homeowner more than Insurer paid. Insurer paid the difference then moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Insurer did not pay the amount that "must be paid" before the statutory deadline, it was not entitled to summary judgment. View "Hinojos v. State Farm Lloyds" on Justia Law

Defendant Foy Insurance Group, Inc. appealed a jury's verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff, 101 Ocean Blvd., LLC (Ocean), finding that Foy was negligent for failing to advise Ocean to purchase sufficient insurance coverage to rebuild a hotel, damaged in a 2015 fire, in compliance with the current building code and awarding damages to Ocean. After review of the superior court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's denial of Foy's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. View "101 Ocean Blvd., LLC v. Foy Insurance Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental Western Insurance Company and dismissing G&G Oil Company of Indiana's claim for losses from a ransomware attack, holding that neither party demonstrated that it was entitled to summary judgment.G&G Oil purchased an insurance policy from Continental. One provision of the policy - the "Computer Fraud" provision - covered loss "resulting directly from the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of money." G&G Oil was the target of a ransomware attack and submitted a claim for coverage of its losses under the "Commercial Crime" provision of the policy. Continental denied the claim. G&G Oil then brought this complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment for Continental. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, although G&G Oil's losses "resulted directly from the use of a computer," neither party was entitled to summary judgment. View "G&G Oil Co. of Indiana v. Continental Western Insurance Co." on Justia Law

An electronic gaming device designed and supplied by Planet Bingo, LLC caused a fire in the United Kingdom. Several third parties made demands that Planet Bingo pay their damages resulting from the fire. However, Planet Bingo’s liability insurer, the Burlington Insurance Company (Burlington), denied coverage. Planet Bingo filed this action for breach of contract and bad faith against Burlington. In a previous appeal, the Court of Appeal held that Burlington’s policy did afford coverage, though only if one of the third-party claimants filed suit against Planet Bingo in the United States or Canada. Such a suit was then filed. Burlington accepted the defense and managed to settle the suit for its policy limits. In this action, the trial court granted summary judgment for Burlington, ruling that Burlington had provided all of the benefits due under the policy. Planet Bingo appealed, contending that Burlington conducted an inadequate investigation, and that Burlington wrongfully failed to settle the third-party claims, instead, denying coverage in the hope that the claimants would sue Planet Bingo in the United Kingdom, which would have let Burlington off the coverage hook. Planet Bingo claimed (and Burlington did not dispute) that it lost profits because the fire claims remained pending and unsettled. The Court of Appeal held Planet Bingo made out a prima facie case that Burlington was liable for failure to settle. Even though none of the claimants made a formal offer to settle within the policy limits, one subrogee sent a subrogation demand letter; according to Planet Bingo’s expert witness, in light of the standards of the insurance industry, this represented an opportunity to settle within the policy limits. The Court therefore did not address Planet Bingo’s claim that Burlington conducted an inadequate investigation. The Court also did not decide whether lost profits were recoverable as damages, because this issue was not raised below. View "Planet Bingo LLC v. The Burlington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal reversing the judgment of the trial court granting a class injunctive relief, holding that Insurer was not entitled to immunity under the Insurance Code and that the Insurance Commission did not have exclusive jurisdiction.At issue was whether, if a title insurer charges rates without filing them with the Insurance Commissioner, a consumer can challenge the charges as unlawful in court. The trial court rejected Insurer's argument that it should be held immune from Plaintiff's putative class action under Cal. Ins. Code 12414.26, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the class claims were barred because Insurer was in fact immune and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory immunity for "act[s] done...pursuant to the authority conferred" by the rate-filing statutes does not shield title insurers from suit for charging unauthorized rates; and (2) the Insurance Commissioner does not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfiled-rate claims. View "Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court expanded the exception to the parental-immunity doctrine when the minor brings a direct-action suit against an insurance carrier for uninsured-motorist coverage to cover direct-action claims when underinsured benefits are at issue.A minor brought a direct-action suit against an insurance carrier for underinsured-motorist coverage. The insurer maintained that the minor could not recover under Arkansas's parental-immunity doctrine and denied the minor's claim against her mother's policy. The minor then filed a direct-action lawsuit against the insurer. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas certified a question of law regarding the exception to the parental-immunity doctrine. The Supreme Court answered that the State of Arkansas recognizes an exception to the parental-immunity doctrine when the source of recovery is uninsured-motorist benefits under a motor-vehicle liability policy. View "Tomey v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law