Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

In this insurance dispute, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling for Plaintiff on her action brought under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and ch. 176D and awarding trebled damages in the amount of $5.4 million but reversed and remanded for calculation of prejudgment interest based on actual damages and not the treble damages figure of $5.4 million, holding that Plaintiff's measure of damages was her "actual damages" because there was no "judgment" in her case.Plaintiff, who was injured in a car accident at age twenty after drinking at a nightclub, sued the nightclub's insurer (Defendant), alleging that Defendant violated chapters 93A and 176D. The federal district court ruled for Plaintiff and assessed actual damages of $1.8 million against Defendant. The court then trebled the award after concluding that Defendant's violations were willful. The First Circuit affirmed on the whole but reversed as to the calculation of prejudgment interest, holding that the district court did not err in finding Defendant's violation of chapter 93A and 176D but erred when it calculated prejudgment interest on the trebled damages award instead of the single damages award. View "Capitol Specialty Insurance Corp. v. Higgins" on Justia Law

After a car accident killed the insured, her mother, and her son, the trustee sought underinsured motorist coverage for the son, who was not named as an insured on the policy. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to State Farm.The Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal because the notice of appeal designated the correct judgment and the parties have addressed the merits of the judgment on the pleadings in their brief. On de novo review, the court held that the son was an insured on the mother's policy and thus was ineligible for excess insurance protection under the insured's policy. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Merrill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Continental, seeking damages for breach of contract, bad faith, and misrepresentation, and declaratory relief. The district court dismissed all claims, holding that TLC, the registered residential living center plaintiff had moved into, was not a covered provider.The Eighth Circuit applied South Dakota law and considered the interpretation of the Qualified Long Term Care insurance policy de novo, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Continental. In this case, the policy excluded TLC because TLC was not an "assisted living center" under South Dakota law. View "Van Dusseldorp v. Continental Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Owners, which had issued an insurance plan to her father, for underinsured motorist benefits. On Owner's first appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court improperly applied a heightened duty of care to the driver of the vehicle as the designated driver. On remand, the district court stated that it was not applying a heightened standard and did not alter the fault allocation.After careful review, the court was not satisfied that the order on remand eliminated the legal error that this court identified in the original conclusions of law. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for new findings and conclusions on the allocation of fault. The district judge is no longer in service in the district court and thus the chief judge of the district court should reassign this case for further proceedings. View "Hiltner v. Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff fell from the trunk of the car that her friend was driving and sustained serious injuries. In a related case, the district court held a bench trial to apportion the fault between the friends involved in the accident. In this case, plaintiff filed suit to recover the portion of the judgment allocated to one of the friends, seeking underinsured motorist benefits for the friend's portion of the judgment. The district court granted Owners' motion for summary judgment.The Eighth Circuit held that removal was not proper under diversity jurisdiction where the parties conceded that the amount in controversy was statutorily insufficient. The court also held that there was no supplemental jurisdiction because this case was a separate action and not another claim in an underlying action over which the federal courts have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand the case to state court. View "Mensah v. Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this dispute over the amount of loss after a fire occurred at the home of Respondents the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court granting Respondents' motion to confirm an appraisal award but denying Respondents' motion for preaward interest as untimely, holding that the district court erred by applying the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act, Minn. Stat. 572B.01-.31, to a fire loss appraisal award.Respondents' home was insured against fire loss by Appellant. When Appellant and Respondent were unable to agree on the amount of the loss Respondents requested an appraisal. After an appraisal panel issued an award, which State Farm paid, Respondents sought confirmation of the appraisal and moved the court to grant preaward interest on the appraisal award. The superior court confirmed the appraisal award but denied the motion for preaward interest as untimely. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Act did not apply to the appraisal process under the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy, Minn. Stat. 65A.01; and (2) a remand was necessary to allow the district court to determine whether Respondents were owed preaward interest and, if so, the amount of interest owed. View "Oliver v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in this insurance dispute, holding that deaths caused by the improper use of a portable generator did not arise out of the uninsured premises as defined by an exclusion in the insurance policy.The Insurer in this case sold a homeowner's policy to Mark Wakelin for a property he owned in Braintree. The policy provided Wakelin protection against personal liability and property damage and contained an exclusion for bodily injury arising out of a premises owned by the insured but not insured under the policy. Wakelin owned a cabin without electrical power in Maine, which was uninsured. Two of Wakelin's children and two of their friends died from carbon monoxide poisoning when a portable generator Wakelin left at the cabin was improperly used. The Insurer initiated this action against Wakelin seeking a judgment declaring that coverage for the wrongful death claims against Wakelin was barred under the exclusion. The superior court denied the Insurer's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the generator was not a condition of the uninsured premises, and therefore, the accident did not arise out of the uninsured premises, and the coverage exclusion at issue did not apply. View "Green Mountain Insurance Co. v. Wakelin" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the business court finding that the policy was unambiguous and dismissing Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract, holding that the term actual cash value (ACV) is not susceptible to more than one meaning and unambiguously includes the depreciation of labor.The policy at issue in this case failed explicitly to provide that labor depreciation will be deducted when calculating the ACV of the damaged property. Plaintiff's home was insured by Defendant when the home was damaged by a storm. Defendant calculated the ACV by reducing the estimated cost of repair by depreciation of property and labor. Plaintiff brought this action seeking to represent a class of all North Carolina residents to whom Defendant paid ACV payments where the cost of labor was depreciated. The business court dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the insurance policy unambiguously allowed for depreciation of the costs of labor and materials. View "Accardi v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Flameproof, a distributor of fire retardant and treated lumber (FRT lumber), maintained liability insurance through Lexington, covering liability for "property damage” that is “caused by an occurrence that takes place in the coverage territory.” “Occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” “Property damage” is “physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of that property,” or loss of use of property that is not physically injured. Three lawsuits arose from Flameproof’s sale of lumber to Minnesota-based contractors. The contracts called for FRT lumber meeting the requirements of the International Building Code (IBC). The complaints alleged that Flameproof “unilaterally” decided to deliver its in-house FlameTech brand lumber, which purportedly was not IBC-compliant. After the material was installed, the owners discovered that the lumber was not IBC-certified. Flameproof “admitted” that it had shipped FlameTech lumber rather than the FRT lumber advertised on its website and ordered. The FlameTech lumber was removed and replaced, damaging the surrounding materials. The lawsuits alleged negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, deceptive business practices, false advertising, consumer fraud, breach of warranties, and breach of contract. Lexington sought a ruling that it owed no duty to defend Flameproof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Lexington. The underlying complaints do not allege an “occurrence”—or accident—as required to trigger Lexington’s duty to defend under the policy. View "Lexington Insurance Co. v. Chicago Flameproof & Wood Specialties Corp." on Justia Law

Guerline Felix’s vehicle collided with Brian Richards’ vehicle in New Jersey. Richards was insured under a New Jersey automobile insurance policy issued by AAA Mid-Atlantic Insurance Company (AAA). The policy provided bodily injury (BI) liability coverage, as well as uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage. Felix was insured by the Government Employee Insurance Company (GEICO) under a policy written in Florida. That policy provided up to $10,000 in property liability and personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, but it did not provide any BI liability. Felix sued Richards for personal injuries, and, in a separate action, Richards sued Felix and AAA for personal injuries. AAA then filed a third-party complaint against GEICO, claiming that GEICO’s policy was automatically deemed to include $15,000/$30,000 in BI coverage and that payment would eliminate the claim for UM/UIM coverage by AAA. The motion court determined that the New Jersey "deemer" statute applied to GEICO’s policy, rejecting the argument that the statute created a carve-out for BI coverage based upon the basic policy, as well as GEICO’s constitutional challenge. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the petition for certification filed by GEICO. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the deemer statute did not incorporate by reference the basic policy’s BI level for insurers, like GEICO, to which the second sentence of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 applied. From the perspective of the insurers’ obligation, the required compulsory insurance liability limits remained $15,000/$30,000. As to the equal protection claim, New Jersey insureds were the ones who had a choice to purchase less than the presumptive minimum BI amount. The obligation of in-state insurers to offer and provide that minimum was the same as the obligation imposed under the deemer statute’s second sentence on authorized insurers writing an out-of-state policy. "The equal protection claim therefore falls flat," and the Appellate Division's judgment was affirmed. View "Felix v. Richards" on Justia Law