Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a dispute between Summit Park Townhome Association and its insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, over the value of property damaged in a hail storm. To determine the value, the district court ordered an appraisal and established procedural requirements governing the selection of impartial appraisers. After the appraisal was completed, Auto-Owners paid the appraised amount to Summit Park. But the court found that Summit Park had failed to make required disclosures and had selected a biased appraiser. In light of this finding, the court vacated the appraisal award, dismissed Summit Park’s counterclaims with prejudice, and awarded interest to Auto-Owners on the amount earlier paid to Summit Park. Summit Park appealed, raising six issues of alleged error with the proceedings. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, however, finding that in the absence of a successful appellate challenge to the disclosure order, Summit Park was obligated to comply and did not. The court was thus justified in dismissing Summit Park’s counterclaims. In addition, Summit Park’s failure to select an impartial appraiser compelled vacatur of the appraisal award under the insurance policy. View "Auto-Owners v. Summit Park" on Justia Law

Nautilus Insurance Company ("Nautilus") and Lyon Fry Cadden Insurance Agency, Inc. ("LFC"), separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for writs of mandamus directing the the trial court to vacate its orders denying their motions to dismiss the action filed against them by Precision Sand Products, LLC ("Precision"). From June 10, 2015, to June 10, 2016, Precision had in place a commercial general-liability insurance policy it had purchased from Nautilus through LFC, an insurance broker. In March 2016, Terry Williams sued Precision seeking recovery for injuries he allegedly suffered on Precision's property during the period the policy was in effect. Pursuant to the terms of the policy, Precision demanded that Nautilus defend and indemnify it against the Williamses' claims. Nautilus agreed, under reservation of rights, to defend Precision against the Williamses' claims. Then Nautilus filed a declaratory-judgment action against Precision and the Williamses at the federal district court, seeking a judgment declaring that, pursuant to an exclusion in the policy, Nautilus was not obligated to defend and indemnify Precision against the Williamses' claims. Precision filed in the Williamses' action a "crossclaim complaint" against Nautilus and LFC ("the state action"), asserting against both Nautilus and LFC various contract and negligence claims. Before the Alabama Supreme Court, LFC argued Precision could not recover against LFC for fraudulently procuring inadequate insurance or for negligently failing to procure adequate insurance unless and until Precision was actually denied coverage for, or a defense against, the Williamses' claims. The Supreme Court found the trial court, as a court of general jurisdiction, clearly had the constitutional and statutory authority to hear the types of claims Precision asserted against LFC. Thus, LFC did not demonstrate it had a clear legal right to dismissal from the state action based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over Precision's claims. Nautilus has demonstrated that, under section 6-5-440 Ala. Code 1975, it had a clear legal right to dismissal from the state action. Accordingly, the Court granted Nautilus's petition and issued the writ directing the trial court to dismiss Nautilus from the state action. Furthermore, the Court determined LFC failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that it had a clear legal right to dismissal from the state action. Accordingly, LFC's petition was also denied. View "Ex parte Nautilus Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brian and Nancy Langevin appealed a superior court order denying their motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to defendant, Travco Insurance Company (Travco). The trial court ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled to payment from Travco under their medical payments coverage to pay a lien asserted by the plaintiffs’ health insurer because such payment would constitute a “duplicate payment” contrary to the language of both RSA 264:16, IV (2014) and plaintiffs’ automobile insurance policy with Travco. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "Although our interpretation does not allow the plaintiffs to retain the benefit of payment from both a health insurer and an automobile insurer for the same medical expense, we recognize that it does leave open the possibility that the plaintiffs will receive a double benefit in a different sense — they may receive and retain the benefit of medical payments coverage, and a recovery from the third-party tortfeasor. This type of double benefit is not prohibited by RSA 264:16, IV." The Court found the plain language of RSA 264:16, IV prohibited duplicate payments for the same medical expense from only two sources: “medical payments coverage and a health insurance policy.” It does not address payments, duplicate or otherwise, from a tortfeasor or a tortfeasor’s liability insurer. Because the statute expressly prohibited “duplicate payment” only from medical payments coverage and a health insurance policy, with no reference to payments from the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s liability policy, the Court construed the prohibition on “duplicate payment” as applying only to medical payments from health insurers and automobile insurers. View "Langevin v. Travco Insurance Company" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether claims in an underlying personal injury suit against two contractors were covered under policies issued by Amerisure, in which the contractors were additional insureds. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that Amerisure improperly relied on a policy exclusion to avoid its duty to defend, and that Amerisure was liable under the terms of its policies to pay the full cost of the settlement plus prejudgment interest. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to defense fees and costs, and held that Amerisure was liable for the full amount of those fees and costs because Continental did not have an independent duty to defend in the underlying lawsuit. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Amerisure Insurance Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether claims in an underlying personal injury suit against two contractors were covered under policies issued by Amerisure, in which the contractors were additional insureds. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that Amerisure improperly relied on a policy exclusion to avoid its duty to defend, and that Amerisure was liable under the terms of its policies to pay the full cost of the settlement plus prejudgment interest. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to defense fees and costs, and held that Amerisure was liable for the full amount of those fees and costs because Continental did not have an independent duty to defend in the underlying lawsuit. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Amerisure Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Lincoln Benefit in a declaratory judgment action over an insurance policy. Considering sua sponte whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, the panel held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to strike plaintiff's expert report and plaintiff has not shown how an expert opinion could have been helpful in this case; there was no genuine dispute about whether plaintiff needed to pay certain sums to keep his policy from lapsing or whether Lincoln Benefit mailed the required notice at least 30 days before the policy lapsed; the policy was unambiguous and the district court's reading of the policy was proper; and because there was nothing to gain by deposing the Lincoln Benefit official most knowledgeable on policy lapses, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to delay consideration of the motion. View "Elhouty v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case involving long-tail insurance claims was whether, under the “pro rata time-on-the-risk” method of allocation, Century Indemnity Company was liable to its insured, KeySpan Gas East Corporation, for years outside of its policy periods when there was no applicable insurance coverage available on the market.KeySpan sought a declaration of coverage and determination of liability owed under the policies issued by Century. Supreme Court denied Century’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to those years in which the relevant insurance coverage was otherwise unavailable in the marketplace. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that, under the applicable insurance policies, Century did not need to indemnify KeySpan for losses that were attributable to time periods when liability insurance was otherwise unavailable in the marketplace. The Court of Appeals affirmed, thereby rejecting application of the unavailability rule for time-on-the-risk pro rata allocation. View "Keyspan Gas East Corp. v Munich Reinsurance America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that the main questions at issue in this appeal —concerning both the scope and limit of the Insurers' duties to defend and indemnify WECCO—were answered over a decade ago in In re Wallace & Gale Co., 385 F.3d 820, 833–34 (4th Cir. 2004). The court denied WECCO's request to either consider these questions anew or certify them to the Maryland Court of Appeals. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and rejected WECCO's challenges to the district court's interpretation of the completed-operations hazard to apply to bodily injury stemming from an individual's exposure to asbestos during a WECCO operation that was completed at the time the insurance policy took effect, regardless of whether such operation was ongoing when the individual was first exposed; decision to place the burden on WECCO to prove that an asbestos related bodily injury claim was not subject to a policy's aggregate limit; determination that St. Paul properly classified certain claims as "completed operations" claims; declaration that the aggregate limits of St. Paul's policies had been exhausted; and conclusion, in the alternative, that most of WECCO's breach-of-contract claims were time-barred. View "The Walter E. Campbell Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that the main questions at issue in this appeal —concerning both the scope and limit of the Insurers' duties to defend and indemnify WECCO—were answered over a decade ago in In re Wallace & Gale Co., 385 F.3d 820, 833–34 (4th Cir. 2004). The court denied WECCO's request to either consider these questions anew or certify them to the Maryland Court of Appeals. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and rejected WECCO's challenges to the district court's interpretation of the completed-operations hazard to apply to bodily injury stemming from an individual's exposure to asbestos during a WECCO operation that was completed at the time the insurance policy took effect, regardless of whether such operation was ongoing when the individual was first exposed; decision to place the burden on WECCO to prove that an asbestos related bodily injury claim was not subject to a policy's aggregate limit; determination that St. Paul properly classified certain claims as "completed operations" claims; declaration that the aggregate limits of St. Paul's policies had been exhausted; and conclusion, in the alternative, that most of WECCO's breach-of-contract claims were time-barred. View "The Walter E. Campbell Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of a dispute between an insured (Summit Park Townhome Association) and its insurer (Auto-Owners Insurance Company) over the value of property damaged in a hail storm. To determine the value, the district court ordered an appraisal and established procedural requirements governing the selection of impartial appraisers. After the appraisal was completed, Auto-Owners paid the appraised amount to Summit Park. But the court found that Summit Park had failed to make required disclosures and had selected a biased appraiser. In light of this finding, the court vacated the appraisal award, dismissed Summit Park’s counterclaims with prejudice, and awarded interest to Auto-Owners on the amount earlier paid to Summit Park. Summit Park appealed, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed. “In the absence of a successful appellate challenge to the disclosure order, Summit Park was obligated to comply and did not. The court was thus justified in dismissing Summit Park’s counterclaims. In addition, Summit Park’s failure to select an impartial appraiser compelled vacatur of the appraisal award under the insurance policy. Finally, Summit Park obtained due process through the opportunity to object to the award of interest.” View "Auto-Owners v. Summit Park" on Justia Law