Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

A fire damaged a hotel owned by Shri Ganesai, LLC, which had an insurance policy with AmGuard Insurance Company. The policy also covered the mortgagee, Academy Bank, N.A. AmGuard denied Shri's claim, suspecting arson by Shri's principal, Alex Patel. During the investigation, the building suffered additional damage from vandalism and frozen pipes. Shri and Academy sued AmGuard for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding damages for the fire, vandalism, and freeze damage.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied AmGuard's motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. AmGuard appealed, challenging the viability of Academy's vexatious-refusal claim, the exclusion of certain evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence regarding damages from vandalism and frozen pipes. The district court had granted summary judgment to AmGuard on Shri's vexatious-refusal claim but allowed the remaining claims to proceed to trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Academy's vexatious-refusal claim was viable despite the settlement of the underlying breach-of-contract claim, as AmGuard's delay in payment constituted vexatious conduct. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's exclusion of certain evidence, including the testimony of a witness and parts of Patel's deposition. Additionally, the court ruled that sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings on the timing and extent of the vandalism and freeze damage, and that the expert testimony admitted was reliable. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying AmGuard's motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. View "Academy Bank, N.A. v. Amguard Insurance Company" on Justia Law

On August 10, 2020, a derecho caused significant damage to the plaintiffs' property in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurer, State Farm, which initially paid $2,297.26 for the damage. After further submissions and inspections, State Farm increased the payment by $3,822.68. The plaintiffs' contractor estimated the repair costs at $21,537.45, but State Farm disagreed, leading to further disputes and inspections. Eventually, the plaintiffs requested an appraisal, which set the actual cash value (ACV) at $16,155.48 and the replacement cost value (RCV) at $21,069.59. State Farm paid the plaintiffs the difference between the initial payments and the new ACV but required documentation of repairs for the RCV.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in state court for breach of contract and bad faith, which was removed to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm, holding that the insurer had not breached the contract because it had paid the ACV and the plaintiffs had not completed repairs within the two-year policy deadline to claim the RCV. The court also found that State Farm had an objectively reasonable basis for its payment decisions, negating the bad-faith claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that State Farm did not breach the contract as the plaintiffs failed to complete repairs within the required two-year period. The court also held that State Farm had a reasonable basis for its initial payment decisions and did not act in bad faith. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to further payments under the policy and that State Farm's actions were justified. View "Henderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

In 2017, five plaintiffs sued three excess insurers, alleging breach of contract, declaratory relief, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty. The plaintiffs claimed that the insurers failed to cover litigation costs related to a series of disputes between the plaintiffs and another party, Paine. The insurance policies in question provided $40 million in excess coverage, divided into four layers of $10 million each.The San Francisco County Superior Court sustained the demurrers of two excess insurers, St. Paul and Liberty Mutual, without leave to amend, on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege exhaustion of the underlying insurance policies. The court overruled the demurrer of the first-level excess insurer, Twin City, allowing the claims against Twin City to proceed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege exhaustion of the underlying insurance policies, which is a prerequisite for triggering the excess coverage. The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief, bad faith, and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty were properly dismissed. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of curing the defects in their complaint through further amendment. The judgments in favor of St. Paul and Liberty Mutual were affirmed, and the plaintiffs' appeal was denied. View "Fox Paine & Co., LLC v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Levi Werley was seriously injured while riding an uninsured dirt bike. After the insurance of the driver who struck him did not fully compensate for his injuries, Levi’s parents sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under their own automobile insurance policies. Their insurer, Mid-Century Insurance Company, paid $250,000 under one policy but denied an additional $250,000 under another policy, citing a household vehicle exclusion. The Werleys argued that this exclusion was invalid and unenforceable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with the Werleys, ruling that the household vehicle exclusion was invalid under Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). The court held that the exclusion acted as a de facto waiver of stacking, which is not permissible under the MVFRL. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Werleys, entitling them to the additional UIM benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the District Court’s order. The Third Circuit held that the household vehicle exclusion in the Multi-Vehicle Policy was valid and enforceable. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnification Co. and Donovan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., noting that the Werleys had never paid premiums for UIM coverage on the dirt bike. The court emphasized that exclusions limiting UIM coverage are generally enforceable unless they act as impermissible de facto waivers of stacking, which was not the case here. The Third Circuit remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Mid-Century. View "Mid-Century Insurance Co v. Werley" on Justia Law

A fire damaged a malt beverage store owned by A Maxon Company, LLC (AMC). Acuity Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment to determine coverage under an insurance policy listing Greg and Tammy Weatherspoon as additional loss payees. The Weatherspoons counterclaimed for breach of contract. The circuit court granted Acuity’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Weatherspoons’ counterclaim, determining that the insurance policy terms prevented the Weatherspoons from recovering damages unless AMC successfully asserted a claim. The jury found that AMC principal, Russel Maxon, had intentionally started the fire, excluding coverage under AMC’s policy. The Weatherspoons appealed.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Corson County, South Dakota, initially denied the Weatherspoons’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the insurance contract was unambiguous and that the Weatherspoons’ claim was dependent on AMC’s claim. The court also denied Acuity’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there were factual disputes suitable for a jury. At trial, the court granted Acuity’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the Weatherspoons could not recover under the policy because AMC’s claim was excluded due to Russel’s intentional act.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the insurance policy’s Loss Payable Clause only allowed the Weatherspoons to collect if AMC could collect, and since the jury found that Russel intentionally started the fire, AMC was precluded from recovering. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony from Special Agent Derek Hill and allowing the impeachment of Tracy Maxon with prior inconsistent statements. The court concluded that the Weatherspoons’ arguments regarding ambiguity and third-party beneficiary status were unavailing. View "Acuity Insurance V. A Maxon Company" on Justia Law

American Building Innovation LP (ABI) was hired by Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour Beatty) as a subcontractor for a school construction project. ABI had a workers’ compensation insurance policy when it began work, but the policy was canceled due to ABI’s refusal to pay outstanding premiums from a previous policy. This cancellation led to the automatic suspension of ABI’s contractor’s license. Despite knowing it was unlicensed and uninsured, ABI continued working on the project.The Superior Court of Orange County found that ABI was not duly licensed at all times during the performance of its work, as required by California law. ABI’s license was suspended because it failed to maintain workers’ compensation insurance. ABI later settled its premium dispute and had the policy retroactively reinstated, but the court found this retroactive reinstatement meaningless because it occurred long after the statute of limitations for any workers’ compensation claims had expired. The court ruled that ABI could not maintain its action to recover compensation for its work due to its lack of proper licensure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that ABI was not entitled to retroactive reinstatement of its license because the failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance was not due to circumstances beyond ABI’s control. ABI’s decision not to pay the premiums and its false representations to the Contractors’ State License Board were within its control. Consequently, ABI was barred from bringing or maintaining the action under section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to Balfour Beatty under the subcontract’s prevailing party attorney fee provision. View "American Building Innovations v. Balfour Beatty Construction" on Justia Law

Mychal Byrd was injured in an automobile accident caused by an unknown motorist and subsequently died from his injuries. Byrd's medical expenses, totaling $474,218.24, were covered by the Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation Group Health Benefit Plan, a self-funded plan subject to ERISA. Byrd had an automobile insurance policy with Nationwide Insurance Company, which provided $50,000 in uninsured-motorist coverage. After Byrd's death, his family sued Nationwide in state court to collect the insurance proceeds. The Plan intervened, removed the case to federal court, and claimed an equitable right to the insurance proceeds.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the Plan, determining that the Plan was entitled to the insurance proceeds under the plan document. The plaintiffs, initially proceeding pro se, did not respond to the motion for summary judgment. After obtaining counsel, they moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The plaintiffs then appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court determined that the plaintiffs' claim did not fall within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions because the plaintiffs were neither plan participants nor beneficiaries. Consequently, the claim was not completely preempted by ERISA, and the federal court did not have jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to return it to Missouri state court. View "Kellum v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation Group Health Benefit" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Nhiem Tran and Nung Ha had a fire insurance policy with Nationwide General Insurance Company. Nationwide canceled the policy due to property hazards, including an unfenced swimming pool and rotting wood. Nationwide mailed a cancellation notice on May 22, 2015, and terminated the policy on June 6, 2015. Plaintiffs claimed they never received the cancellation letter but did receive, sign, and cash a refund check for the excess premium over a month before their house burned down on July 24, 2015. Nationwide denied their insurance claim, leading to this lawsuit.The Superior Court of Wake County found that Nationwide had properly canceled the policy by mailing the cancellation notice, satisfying statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute required actual receipt of the cancellation notice. Nationwide appealed, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded the case to determine the applicable statute. On remand, the trial court again ruled in favor of Nationwide, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that proof of mailing was sufficient for cancellation.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision but on different grounds. The Court held that plaintiffs had actual notice of the cancellation due to several factors: their prior knowledge of property hazards, receipt and cashing of the refund check, and the cessation of monthly premium withdrawals. The Court emphasized that actual notice was sufficient to meet statutory requirements, making the manner of giving notice secondary. Therefore, Nationwide effectively canceled the policy before the fire, and the judgment for Nationwide was affirmed. View "Ha v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co" on Justia Law

Donna Vanek, an employee of a construction company, was driving her personal Kia Optima to pick up supplies when a semitruck struck her car, killing her and her young nephew. The company’s Ford F-250, which Vanek would have used for the task, was in the repair shop at the time. The estates of Vanek and her nephew sued Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, arguing that the Kia qualified as a "temporary substitute" for the F-250 under the company’s insurance policy.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted summary judgment to Ohio Casualty, ruling that the Kia did not qualify as a "temporary substitute" under the policy. The court accepted Ohio Casualty’s interpretation that a non-covered vehicle could not be a "temporary substitute" unless all covered vehicles were out of service.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that a reasonable jury could find that the Kia qualified as a "temporary substitute" for the F-250. The court noted that witnesses testified Vanek would have used the F-250 if it had been available and that the Kia was used temporarily while the F-250 was in the shop. The court rejected Ohio Casualty’s interpretation that all covered vehicles must be out of service for a vehicle to qualify as a "temporary substitute," finding no basis for this in the policy’s text. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Olenik v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Acuity issued a commercial auto policy to Terra-Tek, LLC, which included John Waba and Sheila Foreman as additional named insureds. Waba was injured in an auto accident with an underinsured motorist while driving a vehicle not listed under Terra-Tek’s policy. Acuity denied Waba’s claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits, arguing that the vehicle he was driving was not covered under the policy. Acuity then sought a declaratory judgment to confirm that Waba was not entitled to UIM benefits.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in Brule County, South Dakota, reviewed the case. The court found that the UIM endorsement in Terra-Tek’s policy unambiguously provided coverage to Waba for the injuries sustained in the accident, despite the vehicle not being listed as a covered auto. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Waba, determining that the policy’s language did not require Waba to be occupying a covered auto to receive UIM benefits. Acuity appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the UIM endorsement’s language did not limit coverage to injuries sustained while occupying a covered auto. The court noted that the policy’s definition of an insured for UIM coverage did not include such a limitation, unlike the liability coverage section, which explicitly required the insured to be occupying a covered auto. The court concluded that the policy provided UIM coverage to Waba for the accident, affirming the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Terra-Tek and Waba. View "Acuity V. Terra-Tek" on Justia Law