Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Insurance Law
Colony Insurance Company v. First Mercury Insurance Company
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered an appeal by Colony Insurance Company against First Mercury Insurance Company related to a settlement agreement for an underlying negligence case. Both companies had consecutively insured DL Phillips Construction, Inc. (DL Phillips) under commercial general liability insurance policies. After the settlement, Colony sued First Mercury, arguing that First Mercury needed to reimburse Colony for the full amount of its settlement contribution, as it contended that First Mercury's policies covered all damages at issue. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of First Mercury, prompting Colony's appeal.In the underlying negligence case, DL Phillips was hired to replace the roof of an outpatient clinic in Texas. Shortly after completion, the roof began leaking, causing damage over several months. The clinic's owner sued DL Phillips for various claims, including breach of contract and negligence. A verdict was entered against DL Phillips for over $3.7 million. Both Colony and First Mercury contributed to a settlement agreement, and then Colony sued First Mercury, arguing it was responsible for all the property damage at issue.The appellate court held that under the plain language of First Mercury's policies and relevant case law, First Mercury was only liable for damages that occurred during its policy period, not all damages resulting from the initial roof defect. The court also found that Colony failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact about whether there was an unfair allocation of damages, which would be necessary for Colony's contribution and subrogation claims. As such, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of First Mercury and denied summary judgment for Colony. View "Colony Insurance Company v. First Mercury Insurance Company" on Justia Law
N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Herring
In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to determine whether defendant Cassie Herring, who was injured in a car accident, qualifies for benefits under the underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage of her mother and stepfather's automobile insurance policy. The policy defined an "insured" to include any "family member" who is a resident of the named insured’s household. The question was whether Herring was a "resident" of her mother's household.Herring was injured while riding in a car with her father, and the driver of the other car was insured. The other driver's insurance company tendered the limit of its policy to Herring. Herring then sought additional coverage under the UIM provision of her mother and stepfather's policy. The insurer, North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming that Herring was not a resident of her mother’s household and thus did not qualify for the UIM benefits.The trial court granted summary judgment for Herring and her parents, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Farm Bureau appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact about Herring’s residency.The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed with Farm Bureau and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Farm Bureau, raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether Herring was a resident of her mother's household at the time of the accident. The court noted that there were discrepancies between Herring's testimony and the affidavits submitted by her and her parents, which created credibility issues that should be resolved by a jury. Therefore, the court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Herring" on Justia Law
In re Fairpoint Insurance Coverage Appeals
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The case centered around an insurance dispute involving Verizon Communications, Inc. and several of its insurers. The dispute arose after Verizon settled a lawsuit brought by a litigation trust, which was pursuing claims against Verizon arising out of a transaction Verizon had made with FairPoint Communications Inc. The litigation trust had alleged that Verizon made fraudulent transfers in the course of the transaction, which harmed FairPoint's creditors. After settling the lawsuit, Verizon sought coverage for the settlement payment and defense costs from its insurers.The insurers denied coverage, arguing that the litigation trust's claims did not qualify as a "Securities Claim" under the relevant insurance policies. The Superior Court disagreed, ruling that the litigation trust's claims were brought derivatively on behalf of FairPoint by a security holder of FairPoint, as required to qualify as a Securities Claim under the policies.The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed this decision, finding that the litigation trust's claims were direct, not derivative. The court reasoned that the trust's claims were brought on behalf of the creditors, not FairPoint or its subsidiary, and the relief sought would benefit the creditors, not the business entity. Therefore, the claims did not meet the definition of a Securities Claim under the insurance policies. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the insurers were not obligated to cover Verizon's settlement payment and defense costs. View "In re Fairpoint Insurance Coverage Appeals" on Justia Law
Broadway Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Depositors Insurance Company
A car dealership, Broadway Ford Truck Sales, Inc., in St. Louis, Missouri, suffered a significant fire damage to its business premises and filed claims under its insurance policy provided by Depositors Insurance Company. However, disputes arose over the coverage and Broadway Ford sued Depositors for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment favoring Depositors.At the time of the fire, Broadway Ford had an insurance policy that covered loss or damage to its Building and Business Personal Property (Building/Property) and loss of Business Income and Extra Expenses (BI/EE) due to a suspension of operations. Broadway Ford and Depositors later entered into a Limited Settlement Agreement and Release of Disputed Property Damage Claims (LSA), in which Depositors agreed to pay a certain amount for the fire damage and Broadway Ford released Depositors from any claims related to the property damage. BI/EE claims were not included in this agreement and remained open.Broadway Ford’s complaint against Depositors alleged that Depositors breached the policy's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that Depositors’ conduct amounted to vexatious refusal under Missouri law. The district court granted Depositors' motion for summary judgment, finding that Broadway Ford’s complaint was foreclosed by the LSA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo.The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that Broadway Ford had released its claims related to the Building/Property coverage in the LSA and could not pursue litigation for additional compensatory damages in the form of the “business income” it lost and the “extra expenses” it incurred due to Depositors’ alleged mishandling of its Building/Property coverage claim. View "Broadway Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Depositors Insurance Company" on Justia Law
US v. Taylor-Sanders
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the case involved defendant Glenda Taylor-Sanders, a licensed insurance agent, who pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. Taylor-Sanders had used her position to defraud several trucking companies and an insurance finance company, BankDirect Capital Finance, by misappropriating funds meant for insurance premiums and obtaining loans under the guise of non-existent insurance policies. She used the funds for personal expenditures, leading to the lapse of some of the trucking companies' insurance policies.In her plea agreement, Taylor-Sanders agreed to pay full restitution to all victims harmed by her relevant conduct, and she waived all rights to contest the conviction and sentence in any appeal, unless it was due to ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. However, she later attempted to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that she didn't fully understand the implications of her plea and that she never acted with the requisite intent to defraud. The district court denied her motion to withdraw the plea, concluding that her claim was not credible and that she had not provided a fair and just reason to withdraw her guilty plea.After being sentenced to 66 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay over $700,000 in restitution, Taylor-Sanders appealed her conviction, sentence, and the restitution order. She argued that her guilty plea wasn’t knowing and voluntary, that the district court miscalculated her offense level, and that the district court made several errors when awarding restitution.The Court of Appeals found that Taylor-Sanders's guilty plea and plea waiver were valid and the issues she raised on appeal fell within the scope of her appeal waiver. The court distinguished between claims that a sentence is "illegal" because the district court lacked the authority to issue the sentence (which remain reviewable despite an appeal waiver) and claims that a sentence was "imposed in violation of law" because it has otherwise merely "been touched by a legal error" (in which case the court will enforce the appeal waiver). The court dismissed Taylor-Sanders's appeal in its entirety. View "US v. Taylor-Sanders" on Justia Law
Armory Hospitality, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co.
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit heard an appeal by Armory Hospitality, LLC, an event venue in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Armory had an insurance policy with Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company and filed a claim to recover its business losses due to the closure of bars, restaurants, and performance venues for over a year by Minnesota’s Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The insurer denied the claim, leading to Armory suing. However, the district court dismissed Armory’s complaint, holding that the policy did not cover the losses, a decision which Armory appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. The court interpreted the insurance policy under Minnesota law, which requires unambiguous policy language to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Armory sought coverage under three clauses in its policy: the Building Coverage clause, the Business Income clause, and the Civil Authority clause. The first two clauses required “direct physical loss of or damage to” Armory’s property, which the court decided had not been met since the closure of the venue due to the pandemic did not satisfy the physicality requirement. The court disregarded Armory's argument that the "loss of" property included its inability to use its venue, citing previous precedent requiring physicality for both "loss of" and "damage to" property.As for the Civil Authority clause, the court found that Armory could not prove a causal link between the contamination of nearby properties (a hospital and a jail) by COVID-19 and the Governor’s orders to close venues. Hence, the court concluded that Armory could not recover under any of the clauses in its policy, and therefore affirmed the district court's dismissal of Armory's complaint. View "Armory Hospitality, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. McGrath
In this case, a joint venture between Watershed Ventures, LLC and Patrick M. McGrath failed, leading to bankruptcy and litigation. McGrath and two investment vehicles he controlled sought coverage from Watershed's insurer, Scottsdale Insurance Company, under a directors and officers liability policy. Scottsdale denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment as to its coverage obligations. McGrath countered with claims against Scottsdale and third-party claims against Watershed. The district court issued two summary judgment decisions. The first ruled that McGrath is an insured under the policy, while the second dismissed one of McGrath's counterclaims. The parties agreed to a "Stipulated Conditional Final Judgment Subject to Reservation of Rights of Appeal," which would become void if either of the district court’s two summary judgment rulings were partly vacated or reversed on appeal. The parties appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed both Scottsdale's appeal and McGrath's cross-appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the Stipulated Conditional Final Judgment was not a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The court reasoned that the Stipulated Conditional Final Judgment did not resolve all claims of all parties, was not entered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and did not finally resolve whether Scottsdale breached its duty to defend under the policy. View "Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. McGrath" on Justia Law
Tambellini v. Erie Insurance
In this case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Joseph Tambellini, Inc. and HTR Restaurants, Inc., along with other businesses, had their business interruption insurance claims related to the COVID-19 pandemic denied by their insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange. The businesses had sued Erie in various courts across Pennsylvania. Due to the factual and legal overlap among these claims, the businesses moved for all state-wide litigation to be coordinated in Allegheny County for all pre-trial and trial purposes under Rule of Civil Procedure 213.1.Erie appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. According to the Superior Court, the trial court exceeded the authority of Rule 213.1 by ordering the coordination of similar actions against Erie that had not yet been filed. The Superior Court further held that the businesses were parties who were empowered by Rule 213.1 to file the motion for coordination.Upon the parties’ cross-appeals, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review of both holdings. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the Superior Court that the trial court lacked authority to coordinate actions that had not yet been filed. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that Erie had waived any argument that the businesses could not seek coordination when it failed to raise this issue in the trial court. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order. View "Tambellini v. Erie Insurance" on Justia Law
HTR Restaurants v. Erie Insurance
In a dispute arising from insurance coverage for business interruption losses during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, various businesses, including Joseph Tambellini, Inc. and HTR Restaurants, Inc., had sued their insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange, for denial of their claims. The businesses moved for the coordination of all state-wide litigation, including future filings, in Allegheny County under Rule 213.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for the coordination of actions in different counties that involve a common question of law or fact. The motion was granted by the trial court, but on appeal, the Superior Court held that the trial court exceeded the authority of Rule 213.1 by ordering the coordination of similar actions against Erie that had not yet been filed.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the Superior Court. The court found that the term "pending" in Rule 213.1 clearly refers to cases that have already been filed, and does not include cases that are imminent or impending. The court further noted that Erie had waived the argument that the plaintiffs were not entitled to seek coordination as it had not raised this issue in the trial court. The Superior Court's order was affirmed, holding that Rule 213.1 does not permit the coordination of actions that have not been filed at the time of the coordination motion and Erie had waived its argument that the plaintiffs were not entitled to seek coordination. View "HTR Restaurants v. Erie Insurance" on Justia Law
Smith v. Prudential Insurance Company of America
Brian Smith, a Rhode Island resident, sued Prudential Insurance Company of America for breach of fiduciary duty after the company terminated his long-term disability benefits under an insurance policy. The policy stated a three-year limitations period to file a lawsuit, which began on the date Smith was required to submit proof of his disability, not on the date Prudential allegedly breached the policy by stopping payment. Consequently, by the time Smith filed his lawsuit, the limitations period had expired. Smith appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit after the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential on the grounds that Smith's lawsuit was filed too late.Smith argued that enforcing the limitations scheme would violate Rhode Island public policy. While the Court of Appeals found compelling reasons to believe that the limitations scheme might indeed contravene Rhode Island public policy, they also recognized that reversing and remanding on that ground would potentially expand Rhode Island law. Consequently, the Court of Appeals decided to certify the public policy question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The certified question is whether, in light of specific state laws and Rhode Island public policy, Rhode Island would enforce the limitations scheme in this case to bar Smith's lawsuit against Prudential. View "Smith v. Prudential Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law