Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

E.G. fell from a roof and became paralyzed from the waist down, never to walk again. Within months, his medical bills climbed past $400,000, and future costs projected into the millions. Three insurance companies potentially provided coverage for the man. This appeal is a battle between the two of them. The primary insurer for E.G.’s company was Southern-Owners Insurance Company. E.G. was performing subcontracting work for Beck Construction, which had a policy with American Builders Insurance Company and an excess policy with Evanston Insurance Company. Southern-Owners refused to pay any amount to settle the claim, and American Builders and Evanston ponied up a million dollars apiece instead. American Builders then sued Southern-Owners for common law bad faith under Florida’s doctrine of equitable subrogation. Southern-Owners moved for summary judgment, but the district court denied the motion. A federal trial jury heard the case and found in favor of American Builders.  Southern-Owners sought judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied those motions, too. On appeal, Southern-Owners challenges the denials of its summary judgment and post-trial motions.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence is not “so overwhelmingly in favor of [Southern-Owners] that a reasonable jury could not” have ruled for American Builders on bad faith and against Southern-Owners on breach of contract. Further, the court held that the jury’s verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Southern-Owners’ Rule 59 motion. View "American Builders Insurance Company v. Southern-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against West Bend Mutual Insurance Company (“West Bend”) after West Bend refused to pay claims for uninsured/underinsured (“UM/UIM”) benefits under an insurance policy that insured Plaintiffs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of West Bend. Plaintiffs contended the district court erred in concluding that British Columbia law rather than Iowa law determines the extent of Plaintiffs’ recoverable damages under the Policy.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiffs assert contract conflict of laws principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement”) require that Iowa law determine the extent of their recovery, Hall v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co specifically held that no conflict of laws problem exists when the tortfeasor is only subject to personal jurisdiction in courts that would apply identical law. Further, the court wrote that Section 516A.1 only requires that insurance companies offer the type of coverage at issue in this case. The statute does not define what it means for an insured to be “legally entitled to recover” damages from an uninsured or underinsured motorist such that it could abrogate Hall. Finally, the court found that the plain language of this provision provides only that West Bend may “reduce” its otherwise applicable coverage by certain other amounts available. Where, as here, the insurer has no liability under the Policy’s coverage provisions, the Available Insurance Provision does not operate as an affirmative grant of coverage extending to what are otherwise uncovered losses. View "Gregg Geerdes v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this insurance dispute over damages allegedly caused by the poor construction of an in-ground pool, holding that this Court overrules the portions of Wisconsin Pharmacy Co. v. Nebraska Cultures of California, Inc., 876 N.W.2d 72 (Wis. 2016), stating that "property damages" must be to "other property" for purposes of determining an initial grant of coverage in a commercial general liability (CGL) policy.Due to the damages caused by the cracking of Homeowner's pool, Homeowner was forced to demolish the entire pool structure and construct a new one. Two insurers on appeal had issued CGL policies to the pool's general contractor, and a third insurer issued a CGL policy to the supplier of the pump mix used for the pool's construction. All three insurers sought a declaration that their policies did not provide coverage to Homeowner. The Supreme Court held, under the circumstances of this case, that none of the insurers were entitled to summary judgment and accordingly remanded the cause back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "5 Walworth, LLC v. Engerman Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

After Wynndalco Enterprises, LLC was sued in two putative class actions for violating Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), its business liability insurer, Citizens Insurance Company of America, filed an action seeking a declaration that it has no obligation under the terms of the insurance contract to indemnify Wynndalco for the BIPA violations or to supply Wynndalco with a defense. Citizens’ theory is that alleged violations of BIPA are expressly excluded from the policy coverage. Wynndalco counterclaimed, seeking a declaration to the contrary that Citizens is obligated to provide it with defense in both actions. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings for Wynndalco.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the narrowing construction that Citizens proposes to resolve that ambiguity is not supported by the language of the provision and does not resolve the ambiguity. Given what the district court described as the “intractable ambiguity” of the provision, the court held Citizens must defend Wynndalco in the two class actions. This duty extends to the common law claims asserted against Wynndalco in the other litigation, which, as Citizens itself argued, arise out of the same acts or omissions as the BIPA claim asserted in that suit. View "Citizens Insurance Company of America v. Wynndalco Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Brian Edwards of the Jefferson Circuit Court from enforcing certain discovery orders, holding that State Farm was not entitled to the writ.Betty Irvin was involved in an automobile collision with Deborah Combs, who was insured by State Farm. Irvin brought suit, alleging a negligence claim against Combs and a third-party statutory bad faith claim under Kentucky's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 304.12-230, against State Farm. The trial court bifurcated the bad faith claim against State Farm from the other claims. Later, State Farm filed this petition seeking to prevent Judge Edwards from enforcing his discovery orders on the grounds that Irvin's bad faith claim against it was not yet ripe. The court of appeals denied the writ petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Honorable Edwards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals that because an insurance company's coverage under its policy had never been finally adjudicated, a third-party claimant's bad faith claim was premature, holding that the court of appeals erred.Relying on Pryor v. Colony Insurance Co., 414 S.W.3d 424 (Ky. App. 2013), the court of appeals held that the circuit court improperly allowed Plaintiffs to pursue their bad faith claims because coverage had not been established when they filed their third-party bad faith complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Pryor should not be construed as requiring a final judicial determination of coverage prior to filing a third-party tort claim against an insurer, and instead, this Court continues to apply the requirements of Wittmer v. Jones; and (2) the court of appeals erred concluding that the circuit court improperly permitted Plaintiffs to pursue their bad faith claims in violation of Pryor because coverage had not been established when they filed their third-party bad faith complaint. View "Estate of Bramble v. Greenwich Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to utilize Ky. R. Civ. P. 37.02(3) to assess attorney's fees against a non-party after the non-party failed to obey an order to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, holding that the plain language of CR 34.07(3) applies only to parties to an action.Plaintiffs brought two actions related to an automobile collision against their insurer, Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company, among others. Allstate disputed the charges assessed by Dr. David Megronigle for his chiropractic treatment to Plaintiffs, alleging that they were not properly compensable. Plaintiffs later filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to Megronigle. Thereafter, Allstate filed a motion for attorney's fees under CR 37.02(3). The court granted the motion and ordered Megronigle to pay Allstate the amount of $816. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of CR 37.07(3) applies only to parties to an action; and (2) Megronigle was not a party to the underlying action because he was involved solely by virtue of the subpoenas served upon him by Allstate. View "Megronigle v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Secura Supreme Insurance Company as the underinsured motorists' (UIM) carrier for Viviane Renot, holding that the trial court erroneously permitted Dr. David Porta to testify about medical questions beyond his qualifications.Renot was allegedly injured in a vehicle collision and brought this action against Secura as her UIM carrier. During trial, Secura called Porta, a biomechanics expert, to testify regarding his biomechanics and anatomical opinions relative to the mechanism of injury in the collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Secura, finding that the collision had not been a substantial factor in Renot's injuries. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erroneously permitted Dr. Porta to invade the exclusive province of medical doctors in determining medical causation, and the error required a new trial. View "Renot v. Secura Supreme Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to utilize Ky. R. Civ. P. 37.02(3) to assess attorney's fees against a non-party after the non-party failed to obey an order to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, holding that the plain language of CR 34.07(3) applies only to parties to an action.Plaintiffs brought two actions related to an automobile collision against their insurer, Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company, among others. Allstate disputed the charges assessed by Dr. David Megronigle for his chiropractic treatment to Plaintiffs, alleging that they were not properly compensable. Plaintiffs later filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to Megronigle. Thereafter, Allstate filed a motion for attorney's fees under CR 37.02(3). The court granted the motion and ordered Megronigle to pay Allstate the amount of $816. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of CR 37.07(3) applies only to parties to an action; and (2) Megronigle was not a party to the underlying action because he was involved solely by virtue of the subpoenas served upon him by Allstate. View "Megronigle v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Dr. Robert P. Rothenberg (Rob) tragically suffered a fatal heart attack prior to paying the initial premium on his term life insurance policy issued by Principal National Life Insurance Company (Principal). Principal filed this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellant— the policy’s intended beneficiary—was not owed death benefits in light of the nonpayment. Appellant filed a counterclaim, asserting claims against Principal for breach of contract, vexatious denial of proceeds, and negligence, as well as claims against Appellee, the couple’s insurance broker and financial planner, for negligence. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Principal and Appellee, finding, in part, that the policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding (1) that the Policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death and (2) that, assuming the Policy was not in effect, neither Principal nor Appellee were negligent because neither owed a duty to Appellant.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant did not pay the initial premium until after Rob’s death, at which time he was not in a similar state of health as when he applied for the policy. Moreover, any “privileges and rights” Rob (or Appellant) had to retroactively effectuate the Policy were terminated at Rob’s death pursuant to the Policy’s termination provision. Second, Rob’s signature on the EFT Form alone did not render the Policy effective on April 26, 2019, or earlier. View "Principal National Life Insurance Company v. Donna Rothenberg" on Justia Law