Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, an alleged embezzler, entered an Alford plea to first-degree theft and entered a deferred judgment on that charge. The subrogated insurer (EMCC) of Defendant's employer brought a civil action against Defendant to recover $66,749 it paid on the theft loss. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of EMCC in that amount, concluding that Defendant's Alford plea precluded her from denying the theft or the amount. Defendant appealed, contending her deferred judgment should have no res judicata effect in the civil case. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment establishing Defendant's liability to EMCC for damages of $10,000 based on issue preclusion and reversed the summary judgment in excess of $10,000, holding (1) the victim of a crime or the victim's subrogated insurer may invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion in a civil action based on the defendant's Alford plea regardless of whether the defendant successfully complies with the conditions for the deferred judgment on the criminal charge; but (2) the preclusive effect of Defendant's Alford plea is limited to $10,000, the minimum amount required to support a charge of first-degree theft, and genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in excess of $10,000.

The Employment Appeal Board (Board) denied Willie Hall's application for unemployment insurance benefits. Hall filed a petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the decision of the Board and assessed costs against Hall. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment as it related to court costs, holding (1) pursuant to Iowa Code 96.15(2), any individual claiming benefits shall not be charged fees of any kind, including court costs, in a proceeding under the statute by a court or an officer of the court; and (2) therefore, the district court erred by requiring that Hall pay court costs.

This case involved a dispute between Insured and Insurer regarding underinsured motorist benefits. The district court denied Insurer's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Insured with interest running from the date Insured filed his action against Insurer. Insured filed a motion to modify the judgment, asking the court to amend the judgment to start the running of interest from the date Insured filed his action against the original tortfeasors. The district court granted the motion and modified the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) found that the order denying Insurer's motion for summary judgment was not reviewable; (2) vacated the court of appeals; (3) affirmed the district court's judgment required Insurer to pay its underinsured motorist limit to Insured; and (4) reversed the part of the judgment awarding interest from the date Insured filed the original action against the tortfeasors, holding that Insured failed to timely file his posttrial motion and that the district court erred when it considered the motion. Remanded.

Plaintiff brought a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident then voluntarily dismissed the action eleven days prior to trial in order to further develop expert testimony on the extent of permanent injuries caused by the accident. Two months later, Plaintiff refiled the action. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant, holding that Iowa's savings statute was inapplicable under the facts of the case. The court of appeals affirmed. The issue on appeal was whether the voluntary dismissal of Plaintiff's claim under the circumstances met the savings statute requirement that the claim "fails" without "negligence in its prosecution." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claim did not meet the requirements of the savings statute and that the district court properly granted summary judgment for Defendant.

Plaintiff Mark Peak broke his leg while helping Ellis and Rachel Adams move furniture using a rented U-Haul truck. The liability insurer for U-Haul paid its policy limits of $20,000 to Peak in exchange for a release that specifically named Ellis and arguably covered Rachel. When Peak sought additional compensation from another of insurer for the Adamses, the insurer denied coverage based on the release. Peak filed a negligence action against Adamses, alleging they were liable for negligence in their operation of the rental truck and their failure to remove snow from their driveway. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding the release barred Peak's claims against both Ellis and Rachel. The court of appeals reversed. At issue was whether the release covered Ellis and Rachel as well as U-Haul and its insurer. On further review, the Supreme Court held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Ellis based on the release, while fact questions precluded summary judgment for Rachel. The Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court judgment.