Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Kentucky Supreme Court
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In this case heard before the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the primary issue was whether the Breathitt Circuit Court correctly dismissed Teresa Spicer's lawsuit against James Combs for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Spicer's suit arose from damages linked to Combs' actions, following a fatal ATV accident which resulted in the death of Tiara Combs, James Combs’ wife and Spicer's daughter. Prior to the lawsuit, Combs and Spicer, as co-administrators of Tiara's estate, had signed a release settlement with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, effectively absolving both Combs and Progressive of any further liability relating to the accident.After learning that Combs was intoxicated at the time of the accident, a fact he allegedly hid from her, Spicer sought to sue Combs personally for IIED. Combs moved to dismiss Spicer's complaint on the grounds that the previous release signed by Spicer barred her claim, and that her complaint did not meet the standard for an IIED claim. The circuit court dismissed the action, holding that the release was intentionally broad and included all potential claims, including IIED.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, ruling that the release did not prevent Spicer from asserting a personal cause of action against Combs. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court ruled that the language of the release only covered claims possessed by the estate and not Spicer's individual claims. Furthermore, the Court held that Spicer's complaint was sufficient to proceed under a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leaving it to the circuit court to resolve whether Spicer can sufficiently establish her claim at a later time. View "COMBS V. SPICER" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court concluding that the notice-prejudice rule adopted in Jones v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 821 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1991), applied in the underlying case, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether the claims-made-and-reported management liability policy issued by Allied World Specialty Insurance Company to Kentucky State University (KSU) provided coverage when KSU did not comply with the policy's notice provisions. The circuit court granted summary judgment for KSU after applying the notice-prejudice rule. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the notice-prejudice rule did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the policy's notice provisions were clear and unambiguous and that Allied World was entitled to deny coverage to KSU because KSU did not comply with the notice requirements; and (2) generally, the notice-prejudice rule shall not apply to a claims-made-and-reported policy that contains unambiguous notice requirements as condition precedent to coverage. View "Ky. State University v. Darwin Nat'l Assurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the administrative law judge's (ALJ) conclusion that medical providers did not have to submit their medical billing statements until after a determination of liability, holding that the statute is unambiguous.At issue was whether P&P Construction, Inc. and, by extension, the company's insurer, Kentucky Employers Mutual Insurance (KEMI), was responsible for payment of medical billings statements submitted outside of the forty-five-day period set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.020(4). The ALJ and Board determined that medical providers do not have to submit their billings until after a determination of liability. The court of appeals reversed, holding that medical providers are required to submit their billings within forty-five days of service, regardless of whether a determination of liability has been made, and therefore, employers and their insurance carriers are not responsible for payment of billings submitted after the forty-five day period. The Supreme Court, holding that under the unambiguous language of the statute, medical service providers must submit their billings within forty-five days of treatment, and such requirement applies both pre- and post-award. View "Farley v. P&P Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Brian Edwards of the Jefferson Circuit Court from enforcing certain discovery orders, holding that State Farm was not entitled to the writ.Betty Irvin was involved in an automobile collision with Deborah Combs, who was insured by State Farm. Irvin brought suit, alleging a negligence claim against Combs and a third-party statutory bad faith claim under Kentucky's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 304.12-230, against State Farm. The trial court bifurcated the bad faith claim against State Farm from the other claims. Later, State Farm filed this petition seeking to prevent Judge Edwards from enforcing his discovery orders on the grounds that Irvin's bad faith claim against it was not yet ripe. The court of appeals denied the writ petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Honorable Edwards" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals that because an insurance company's coverage under its policy had never been finally adjudicated, a third-party claimant's bad faith claim was premature, holding that the court of appeals erred.Relying on Pryor v. Colony Insurance Co., 414 S.W.3d 424 (Ky. App. 2013), the court of appeals held that the circuit court improperly allowed Plaintiffs to pursue their bad faith claims because coverage had not been established when they filed their third-party bad faith complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Pryor should not be construed as requiring a final judicial determination of coverage prior to filing a third-party tort claim against an insurer, and instead, this Court continues to apply the requirements of Wittmer v. Jones; and (2) the court of appeals erred concluding that the circuit court improperly permitted Plaintiffs to pursue their bad faith claims in violation of Pryor because coverage had not been established when they filed their third-party bad faith complaint. View "Estate of Bramble v. Greenwich Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Secura Supreme Insurance Company as the underinsured motorists' (UIM) carrier for Viviane Renot, holding that the trial court erroneously permitted Dr. David Porta to testify about medical questions beyond his qualifications.Renot was allegedly injured in a vehicle collision and brought this action against Secura as her UIM carrier. During trial, Secura called Porta, a biomechanics expert, to testify regarding his biomechanics and anatomical opinions relative to the mechanism of injury in the collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Secura, finding that the collision had not been a substantial factor in Renot's injuries. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erroneously permitted Dr. Porta to invade the exclusive province of medical doctors in determining medical causation, and the error required a new trial. View "Renot v. Secura Supreme Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to utilize Ky. R. Civ. P. 37.02(3) to assess attorney's fees against a non-party after the non-party failed to obey an order to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, holding that the plain language of CR 34.07(3) applies only to parties to an action.Plaintiffs brought two actions related to an automobile collision against their insurer, Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company, among others. Allstate disputed the charges assessed by Dr. David Megronigle for his chiropractic treatment to Plaintiffs, alleging that they were not properly compensable. Plaintiffs later filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to Megronigle. Thereafter, Allstate filed a motion for attorney's fees under CR 37.02(3). The court granted the motion and ordered Megronigle to pay Allstate the amount of $816. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of CR 37.07(3) applies only to parties to an action; and (2) Megronigle was not a party to the underlying action because he was involved solely by virtue of the subpoenas served upon him by Allstate. View "Megronigle v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to utilize Ky. R. Civ. P. 37.02(3) to assess attorney's fees against a non-party after the non-party failed to obey an order to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, holding that the plain language of CR 34.07(3) applies only to parties to an action.Plaintiffs brought two actions related to an automobile collision against their insurer, Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company, among others. Allstate disputed the charges assessed by Dr. David Megronigle for his chiropractic treatment to Plaintiffs, alleging that they were not properly compensable. Plaintiffs later filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to Megronigle. Thereafter, Allstate filed a motion for attorney's fees under CR 37.02(3). The court granted the motion and ordered Megronigle to pay Allstate the amount of $816. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of CR 37.07(3) applies only to parties to an action; and (2) Megronigle was not a party to the underlying action because he was involved solely by virtue of the subpoenas served upon him by Allstate. View "Megronigle v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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In this case arising the death of James Savage after he was thrown from his motorcycle and run over by Oscar Ramos, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals remanding this case back to the circuit court for a new trial, holding that remand was required under the circumstances.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Property & Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford was not the owner of the Jeep Wrangler at issue according to Ky. Rev. Stat. 186A.530(3), and Co-part of Connecticut, Inc. was required to obtain proof of insurance pursuant to sections 186A.215 and 186A.220; (2) the court of appeals improperly engaged in fact-finding that affected its judgment on other issues; (3) the court of appeals erred in ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Co-part to withdraw an admission; (4) strict liability does not apply as a matter of law for violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. 186A.500; and (5) Aull v. Houston, 345 S.W.3d 232 (Ky. App. 2010) is hereby abrogated to the extent that it can be read to hold that Social Security Disability benefits are inadmissible in a damages calculation in a wrongful death suit. View "Savage v. Co-Part of Connecticut, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting a directed verdict on a bad faith claim, holding that Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky. 1993), established the applicable legal standard for both common law and statutory bad-faith claims.Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC) brought a declaratory judgment action disputing coverage under a commercial general liability policy insuring K-2 Catering, LLC for claims Haley Belt made stemming from an accident that occurred during an event hosted by K-2's member-managers at their residence. Ultimately, judgment was entered declaring coverage under the policy. While the action was pending, Belt brought a separate action against K-2 and CIC, alleging bad faith and negligence in the settlement of her claims under K-2's policy. The negligence claims were settled and, after a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict against CIC. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred when it failed to grant CIC a directed verdict on the bad faith claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to apply the Wittmer standard and grant a directed verdict for CIC. View "Belt v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law