Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Charles Rawlings suffered injuries as he was rolling straps beside his tractor-trailer while it was being unloaded. Thirteen months after the accident, Rawlings filed an action against Defendants, his employer and the companies involved in loading and unloading the trailer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the action based on the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.140(1)(a). The court of appeals reversed, applying the two-year statute of limitations in the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. At issue on appeal was whether Rawlings was in fact unloading his truck at the time of the accident, which would determine whether the one- or two-year statute of limitations applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rawlings's activity in releasing the straps and rolling them qualified him as a participant in the unloading process; and (2) therefore, the trial court correctly applied the one-year personal injury statute of limitations found in section 413.140(1)(a). Remanded.

Five years after Homeowners contracted for the construction of their home, Homeonwers sued Elite Homes, the construction company that built their home, and Motorists Mutual Insurance, the insurance company that provided commercial general liability (CGL) insurance to the construction company while the home was under construction, claiming the house was so poorly built it was beyond repair. Motorists settled Homeonwers' claims against itself and Elite. Under the terms of the settlement, Homeowners and Elite assigned to Motorists all claims they may have had against Cincinnati Insurance, which was a successor to Motorists as Elite's CGL insurer. Motorists then filed a third-party complaint against Cincinnati. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cincinnati, holding that Homeowners' claims of intangible economic loss did not qualify as an "occurrence" causing property damage under Cincinnati's CGL policy. The court of appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment. At issue on appeal was whether faulty construction-related workmanship, standing alone, qualifies as an "occurrence" under a CGL policy. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court's conclusion that the claims were not an "occurrence" was correct.

Appellant appealed from an order denying its petition for a writ of prohibition where appellant sought to prohibit appellee, a Jefferson Circuit Court judge, from referring its default judgment motion to the circuit court Master Commissioner for certain factual determinations. At issue was whether appellants were entitled to a writ where appellants alleged that the Jefferson Circuit Court's routine practice of referring default judgments to the commissioner did not comport with the role of commissioners as contemplated by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and that the Jefferson Circuit Court's alleged practice was unique among Kentucky's circuit courts and was at odds with the equal protection guarantees of both the Kentucky and United States Constitutions. The court held that appellant was not entitled to a writ prohibiting the reference to the commissioner because appellant could obtain ordinary appellate review of its objection.