Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Symetra appealed the district court's refusal to award attorneys' fees under the Texas and Washington State Structured Settlement Protection Acts (SSPAs). Rapid cross appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees as damages for tortious interference and the district court's permanent injunction, arguing that the injunction relies on an erroneous interpretation of the SSPAs. The court concluded that the district court erroneously held that Symetra could not recover any fees under the SSPAs where specific transfers were challenged throughout this litigation and Symetra can recover some portion of its fees related to some of those transfers. Therefore, remand is appropriate, but Symetra bears the burden of segregating fees and the district court retains discretion to deny Symetra's attorneys' fees request for failure to segregate. The court also concluded that the district court's award of fees incurred in state court with respect to one annuitant as damages for tortious interference under Texas law was proper where the natural and proximate cause of Rapid's conduct toward the annuitant was to drag Symetra into Indiana state court litigation. The district court's requirement that state court transfer orders also list first-refusal rights contravenes the SSPAs. However, the court found no error in the district court's analysis of first refusal rights under the SSPAs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Symetra Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd." on Justia Law

Illinois insurance regulators permitted WellPoint to acquire RightCHOICE health insurance. WellPoint caused RightCHOICE Insurance to withdraw from the Illinois market. WellPoint offered the policyholders costlier UniCare policies as substitutes. Those who chose not to pay the higher premiums had to shop for policies from different insurers, which generally declined to cover pre-existing conditions. Former RightCHOICE policyholders filed a purported class action. The district court declined to certify a class and entered judgment against plaintiffs on the merits. No one appealed. Absent certification as a class action, the judgment bound only the named plaintiffs. Their law firm found other former policyholders and sued in state court. Defendants removed the suit under 28 U.S.C. 1453 (Class Action Fairness Act); the proposed class had at least 100 members, the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, and at least one class member had citizenship different from at least one defendant. Plaintiffs sought remand under section 1332(d)(4), which says that the court shall “decline to exercise” jurisdiction if at least two-thirds of the class’s members are citizens of the state in which the suit began and at least one defendant from which “significant relief” is sought is a citizen of the same state. The district court declined remand, declined to certify a class, and again rejected the case on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that “Counsel should thank their lucky stars that the district court did not sanction them under 28 U.S.C. 1927 for filing a second suit rather than pursuing the first through appeal."View "Phillips v. Wellpoint Inc." on Justia Law

The court concluded that this appeal presented an issue of first impression that the Alabama Supreme Court is best-suited to resolve. Accordingly, the court certified the following question to the Alabama Supreme Court: Is an attorney whom an insurance company hires as an attorney agent providing a "legal service" within the meaning of Ala. Code 6-5-574 when he performs a title search, forms an unwritten opinion about the status of title, and then acts on that unwritten opinion by issuing a commitment to insure or an insurance policy? View "Mississippi Valley Title Ins., et al. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Reifer suffered a worker’s compensation injury at IU-20 where she provided special education. Her injuries prevented her from returning to work. She retained Attorney Russo. Russo carried legal malpractice insurance with Westport in compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. When IU-20 initiated disciplinary proceedings against Reifer, Russo failed to appear at the hearing. When IU-20 terminated her, Russo failed to appeal. Russo filed suit alleging violation of Reifer’s employment rights, which he lost for failure to exhaust state remedies. When Reifer sought alternate employment, Russo advised her to answer an application question as to whether she had ever been terminated in the negative. Reifer was terminated and disciplined for the false answer. Reifer commenced a malpractice claim against Russo. Russo’s “claims-made” policy only covered losses claimed during the policy period or within 60 days of the policy’s expiration. Russo failed to inform Westport of the action until several months after the policy lapsed and he failed to secure a replacement policy. Westport refused to defend Russo. Russo admitted liability. A jury awarded Reifer $4,251,516. Russo assigned to Reifer his rights under the Westport policy. Reifer sought a declaratory judgment that Westport was required to show it was prejudiced by Russo’s failure to notify and, failing to do so, owed a duty to defend and indemnify. The federal district court, sua sponte declined to exercise jurisdiction and remanded to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Lewis was injured in an automobile accident and her health plan paid $180,000 for her medical treatment Lewis filed a tort suit against the driver (her son-in-law), represented by Georgia lawyer Lashgari, and obtained a $500,000 settlement. Lashgari knew the plan had a subrogation lien, but split the proceeds between himself and Lewis. He claimed that the plan was owed nothing. The plan filed suit under ERISA to enforce the lien, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3). The defendants argued that because the settlement funds have been dissipated, the suit was actually for damages, not authorized by ERISA. The district judge ordered the defendants to place $180,000 in Lashgari’s trust account pending judgment. The defendants did not comply. A year later, the defendants having neither placed any money in a trust account nor produced any evidence of their inability to pay, the judge held them in civil contempt, ordered them to produce records that would establish their financial situations, and ordered Lashgari to documents relating to the contempt to the General Counsel of the State Bar for possible disciplinary proceedings against him. The defendants appealed the contempt order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, characterizing the appeal as frivolous and the defendants’ conduct as outrageous. View "Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Steidl and Whitlock were convicted of 1987 murders, largely based on testimony by two supposed eyewitnesses. Long after the convictions, an investigation revealed that much of the testimony was perjured and that exculpatory evidence had been withheld. The revelations led to the release of the men and dismissal of all charges. Steidl had spent almost 17 years in prison; Whitlock had spent close to 21 years. They sued. By 2013, both had settled with all defendants. Because the defendants were public officials and public entities, disputes arose over responsibility for defense costs. National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the defense of former State’s Attorney, McFatridge, or Edgar County, agreeing to pay their costs under a reservation of rights until the issue was resolved. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of National Casualty. In another case McFatridge sought a state court order that the Illinois Attorney General approve his reasonable expenses and fees; the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim. In a third case, National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that another insurer was liable for costs it had advanced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the other company is liable. It would be inequitable for that company to benefit from National’s attempt to do the right thing, especially since it did not do the right thing and contribute to the defense costs under a reservation of rights. View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. White Mountains Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

Companion, a South Carolina insurer, appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint alleging legal malpractice against defendants, Louisiana residents and attorneys at a Louisiana law firm. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Companion's complaint against defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction in a Texas Forum where defendants maintained no offices in Texas, had no personnel stationed there, paid no Texas taxes, and had no registered agent for service of process; defendants transacted only limited and discrete business in Texas over an appreciable period; and the venue issue was unnecessary for a decision in this case because the court affirmed the dismissal on personal-jurisdiction grounds. View "Companion Property and Casualty Co. v. Palermo, et al." on Justia Law

Amicas agreed to a merger for $5.35 per Amicas share. Shareholders sued in Massachusetts state court, contesting the adequacy of a proxy statement used to seek approval. A preliminary injunction stopped the vote. The suit settled when a third party made a $6.05 per-share tender offer. Amicas shareholders gained $26 million. The lawyers who filed the suit sought attorneys’ fees based on the difference between the bids. Carolina Casualty had issued a policy covering what Amicas and its directors pay their own litigation lawyers and what Amicas must pay adversaries’ lawyers. The state court awarded $3,150,000, using a lodestar of $630,000 (1,400 hours at $450 per hour) times five, to reflect the risk of nonpayment and “an exceptionally favorable result.” Carolina Casualty filed a diversity suit, claiming that coverage was limited to $630,000. The district judge affirmed, but denied damages for bad faith or vexatious failure to pay. The Massachusetts appeal settled with payment of a sum that cannot be affected by the results of federal litigation. The Seventh Circuit held that the case was not moot, but affirmed, rejecting an argument that the award constituted excluded “civil or criminal fines or penalties … punitive or exemplary damages, the multiplied portion of multiplied damages.” View "Carolina Cas. Ins. Co v. Merge Healthcare Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two limited liability companies that made loans to Goldan, LLC. Goldan failed to repay the loans. Plaintiffs later discovered that their mortgages had not been recorded as agreed upon. Plaintiffs sued Goldan and its two principals, Mark Goldman and Jeffrey Daniels, alleging a number of claims. One claim was asserted against Daniels, a lawyer, for legal malpractice for failing to record the mortgages. Daniels' malpractice carrier, American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (American) refused to provide defense or indemnity coverage. Daniels defaulted in Plaintiffs' action against him. Daniels assigned to Plaintiffs his rights against American. Plaintiffs subsequently brought an action against American for breach of contract and bad faith failure to settle the underlying lawsuit. Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs' motions as to the breach of contract claims and dismissed the bad faith claims. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by breaching its duty to defend Daniels, American lost its right to rely on policy exclusions to escape its duty to indemnify; and (2) the lower courts properly dismissed Plaintiffs' bad faith claims. View "K2 Inv. Group, LLC v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The law firm represented a potential buyer in the purchase of a drugstore. Buyer and Seller executed the sales contract separately. The firm misfiled the contract executed by Buyer, however, and Seller subsequently attempted to rescind the contract, which it characterized as an offer, because it had not timely received a copy of the contract executed by Buyer. When Seller’s efforts to avoid the purported contract were successful, Buyer sent a “formal notice of claim” to the firm, which sought coverage from its professional liability insurer. That insurer concluded that the firm was not entitled to coverage because it failed to properly notify the insurer of the mistake that ultimately led to the malpractice claim. The firm sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted the insurer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the firm’s knowledge of the email exchange with Seller’s counsel and of an Alabama declaratory-judgment action constituted knowledge of “any circumstance, act or omission that might reasonably be expected to be the basis of” a malpractice claim. View "Koransky, Bouwer & Poracky, P. C. v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law