Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court entering summary judgment in favor of Curtis Frye, Daryl Frye, and the Estate of Carroll Frye (collectively, the Estate) on the Estate’s action seeking enforcement of a property insurance contract for the loss of a dwelling by fire. The Court held that the trial court erred by interpreting Carroll’s insurance contract with MMG Insurance Company as providing coverage to the Estate because when the fire occurred, several weeks after Carroll’s death, none of the parties was both insured by MMG and in possession of an insurable interest. Therefore, Me. Rev. Stat. 24-A, 2406 preluded enforcement of the policy as to the dwelling as a matter of law. The Court remanded the case for entry of a summary judgment in favor of MMG. View "Estate of Carroll G. Frye v. MMG Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court entering summary judgment in favor of Curtis Frye, Daryl Frye, and the Estate of Carroll Frye (collectively, the Estate) on the Estate’s action seeking enforcement of a property insurance contract for the loss of a dwelling by fire. The Court held that the trial court erred by interpreting Carroll’s insurance contract with MMG Insurance Company as providing coverage to the Estate because when the fire occurred, several weeks after Carroll’s death, none of the parties was both insured by MMG and in possession of an insurable interest. Therefore, Me. Rev. Stat. 24-A, 2406 preluded enforcement of the policy as to the dwelling as a matter of law. The Court remanded the case for entry of a summary judgment in favor of MMG. View "Estate of Carroll G. Frye v. MMG Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Parents Theresa Allocca and Timothy Allen Davison, filed this action in their individual capacities, and Davison also filed as personal representative of the Estate of Timothy "Asti" Davison. Asti was fatally shot while operating a vehicle that an assailant, operating another vehicle, had forced onto a median on an interstate highway. The Parents sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits based on several automobile insurance policies issued by defendants York Insurance Company of Maine, Allstate Insurance Company, and Horace Mann Teachers Insurance Company. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers, concluding that neither any of the policies nor Maine’s UM statute provided coverage for the loss associated with Asti’s death. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough the conduct of the person who killed Asti was indisputably deliberate and not accidental, there is no evidence in the record that it was foreseeable to Asti himself, and so, based on that approach, his death would be viewed as 'accidental.' ... describing an intentional act, such as an intentional killing, as an 'accident' stretches the plain meaning of that word too far." Without addressing the superior court’s conclusion that the UM coverage in the policies was not applicable because the loss did not arise from the "use" of a motor vehicle, the Supreme Court concluded as a matter of law that Asti’s death was not caused by an "accident." View "Allocca. v. York Insurance Company of Maine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of North East Insurance Company on the reach and apply action Richardie Kelley brought pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 24-A, 2904. The superior court concluded that the damages awarded to Kelley in the underlying action were based on a claim that did not fall within the scope of the North East automobile insurance policy. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding Kelley failed to carry her burden of showing the damages she was awarded in the underlying action were based on a claim that fell within the scope of the North East policy. View "Kelley v. North East Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court finding that the tortfeasor who injured Appellants in a motor vehicle accident was not an underinsured driver pursuant to Maine’s underinsured motorist (UM) statute, and therefore, there was no gap in coverage requiring State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to pay UM benefits under two policies issued to Appellants. The court held that because Appellants recovered far more from the tortfeasor’s insurers than the maximum amount of UM coverage provided by the State Farm policies, they surpassed the same recovery that would have been available had the tortfeasor been insured to the same extent. Therefore, there was no UM gap that State Farm was responsible to cover. View "Wallace v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Three individuals were passengers in a vehicle driven by Kristina Lowe. Lowe negligently caused the vehicle to crash, and Rebecca Mason and Logan Dam died from injuries they sustained. At the time of the accident, Lowe was a resident at the home of her mother, Melissa Stanley. Stanley had a personal auto insurance policy issued by Amica that provided for $300,000 in liability coverage. The Estates brought wrongful death actions against Lowe, and the parties stipulated to the entry of judgments against Lowe in favor of the Estates in the amount of one million dollars. The Estates then filed reach-and-apply actions against Amica seeking to apply insurance money from Stanley’s policy to the judgments against Lowe. The superior court concluded that the Estates could not reach and apply insurance money from Stanley’s policy toward satisfaction of the judgments against Lowe because the “regular use” exclusion in the policy applied to preclude coverage for Lowe’s negligent use of the car. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the regular use exclusion in Stanley’s policy applied to preclude coverage in this case. View "Estate of Mason v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2014, the City Council of South Portland enacted an ordinance prohibiting the bulk loading of cure oil on marine tank vessels in South Portland. In 2015, the Portland Pipeline Corporation and American Waterways Operators (PPLC) sued the City of South Portland and its Code Enforcement Officer in federal court, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The complaint requested only nonmonetary relief. The City notified the Maine Municipal Association Property & Casualty Pool (Pool), which provides liability coverage to the City and its public officials, of the lawsuit and requested a defense, which the Pool declined to provide. The City then brought this action alleging breach of the duty to defend. The superior court granted summary judgment for the Pool, concluding that the Pool had no duty to defend because the complaint requested only declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages, and therefore, there was no potential that the City could be liable for damages within the scope of coverage. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that the Pool had no duty to defend because any potential damages would be excluded from coverage. View "City of South Portland v. Maine Municipal Association Property & Casualty Pool" on Justia Law

After acquiring a parcel of oceanfront property, Osprey Landing, LLC purchased a title insurance policy from First American Title Insurance Company. In connection with litigation with neighboring landowners, the subject property’s previous owner executed affidavits and a deposition that Osprey claimed created the risk of a future public prescriptive easement claim adverse to Osprey’s title. Osprey sent a request to First American invoking title insurance coverage asking First American to take some action to either perfect osprey’s title or compensate Osprey for this perceived title defect. First American declined, and Osprey filed suit to enforce First American’s purported duty to defend and indemnify Osprey. The superior court granted First American’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Miller’s statements did not create a “triggering event” requiring First American to take any action, and no obligation was imposed on First American under these circumstances to preemptively indemnify Osprey. View "Osprey Landing, LLC v. First American Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Barnie’s Bar & Grill, Inc. held an insurance policy by the United States Liability Insurance Company (USLIC) when Barnie’s was sued for negligence in connection with one man’s attack by a group of other patrons of the bar. USLIC declined to defend Barnie’s in the litigation, relying on the policy’s exclusions for assault and battery. Barnie’s sued USLIC in superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that USLIC had a duty to defend it and seeking damages for breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment for USLIC, concluding that USLIC had no contractual duty to defend Barnie’s. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that USLIC was not obligated to defend Barnie’s in the underlying litigation because the allegations of the underlying complaint fell squarely within the policy’s exclusions for assault and battery. View "Barnie's Bar & Grill, Inc. v. United States Liability Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Jon and Winifred Prime brought suit against Dawn Harlor stemming from a dispute over the Primes’ right to use a dock according to an easement Harlor had granted the the Primes. At all relevant times, Harlor was insured by Amica Mutual Insurance Company under a homeowner’s insurance policy providing that Amica would defend Harlor against claims that may result in covered damages. Amica denied Harlor’s request that Amica provide a defense in the underlying suit based on its conclusion that the suit could not result in covered damages. After Harlor settled the suit with the Primes, Harlor brought suit against Amica alleging that Amica breached the policy by failing to defend her in the underlying lawsuit. The superior court granted summary judgment for Amica, concluding that any damages that might have resulted from the underlying suit would not be covered by Harlor’s policies and, therefore, did not give rise to a duty to defend. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for the entry of summary judgment in favor of Harlor, holding that Amica breached its duty to defend. Remanded for further proceedings regarding Amica’s duty to indemnify Harlor for any or all of the amount that she paid to settle the underlying action. View "Harlor v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law