Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Native American Law
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In a dispute between Lexington Insurance Company ("Lexington") and the Suquamish Tribe ("Tribe"), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Tribe. The dispute arose from several insurance companies and underwriters refusing to compensate the Tribe for its insurance claims for lost business and tax revenue and other expenses resulting from the suspension of business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court held that the Suquamish Tribal Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Tribe’s claim against nonmember off-reservation insurance companies that participated in an insurance program tailored to and offered exclusively to tribes. The court concluded that the insurers' conduct occurred not only on the Suquamish reservation but also on tribal lands. The court further concluded that, under the Tribe’s sovereign authority over “consensual relationships,” as recognized under the first Montana exception to the general rule restricting tribes’ inherent sovereign authority over nonmembers on reservation lands, the Tribal Court had jurisdiction over the Tribe’s suit. View "LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY V. SMITH" on Justia Law

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The Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation California (Chumash) appealed a judgment following the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of Lexington Insurance Company (Lexington) in Chumash’s lawsuit against Lexington for denial of insurance coverage.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that, among other things, Chumash did not present sufficient evidence to show that the COVID-19 virus caused physical property damage to its casino and resort so as to fall within the property damage coverage provisions of the Lexington insurance policy. The court explained that had the Chumash Casino and Resort sustained property damage, it was required to specify what property was damaged and to submit a claim for the dollar amount of that loss. The absence of such information supports Lexington’s decision to deny coverage. View "Santa Ynez Band of Chumash etc. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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The Indian Health Service (IHS), operates direct healthcare facilities and funds Contract Health Services (CHS) programs for persons of American Indian descent, 25 U.S.C. 1603(5), (12). Under 25 U.S.C. 5301, tribes may manage and staff their own IHS facilities, contract with private insurers for tribal coverage, and operate their own CHS programs. IHS health programs are “the payer of last resort.” Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance must pay before IHS reimbursement is available. The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement Act authorized HHS to demand Medicare pricing from hospitals providing services to tribes through CHS programs, 42 U.S.C. 1395cc. The Tribe, which administers a CHS program, contracted with BCBSM for healthcare coverage. The Sixth Circuit previously reversed the dismissal of the Tribe’s lawsuit based on BCBSM’s alleged failure to insist on “Medicare-like rates” for care authorized by the Tribe’s CHS program and provided by Medicare-participating hospitals. On remand, the district court granted BCBSM summary judgment, concluding that the Tribe’s payments for CHS care through BCBSM's plans were not eligible for Medicare-like rates. The district court interpreted federal regulations as limiting the requirement of Medicare-like rates to payments for care that was authorized by CHS, provided by Medicare-participating hospitals, and directly paid for with CHS funds. The Sixth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court must first address whether the Tribe’s CHS program authorized the care for which they assert they were entitled to Medicare-like rates. If the CHS program authorized this care, the court should then consider BCBSM’s alternative arguments. View "Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan" on Justia Law

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Cherokee Services Group, LLC; Cherokee Nation Government Solutions, LLC; Cherokee Medical Services, LLC; Cherokee Nation Technologies, LLC (collectively referred to as the “Cherokee Entities”); Steven Bilby; and Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson Insurance”) appealed district court orders and a judgment reversing an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) order. The ALJ’s order concluded the Cherokee Entities and Bilby were protected by tribal sovereign immunity and Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) had no authority to issue a cease and desist order to Hudson Insurance. The district court reversed the ALJ’s determination. The Cherokee Entities were wholly owned by the Cherokee Nation; Bilby served as executive general manager of the Cherokee Entities. Hudson Insurance provided worldwide workers’ compensation coverage to Cherokee Nation, and the Cherokee Entities were named insureds on the policy. WSI initiated an administrative proceeding against the Cherokee Entities, Bilby, and Hudson Insurance. WSI determined the Cherokee Entities were employers subject to North Dakota’s workers’ compensation laws and were liable for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums. WSI also ruled that Bilby, as executive general manager, was personally liable for unpaid premiums. WSI ordered the Cherokee Entities to pay the unpaid premiums, and ordered Hudson Insurance to cease and desist from writing workers’ compensation coverage in North Dakota. The Cherokee Nation had no sovereign land in North Dakota, and the Cherokee Entities were operating within the state but not on any tribal lands. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court judgment, and reinstated and affirmed the ALJ’s order related to the cease and desist power of WSI, but the matter was remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings on the issue of sovereign immunity. View "WSI v. Cherokee Services Group, et al." on Justia Law

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In 1854, the Washington Territory and nine Native American tribes, including the Squaxin Island Tribe (the Tribe), entered into the 1854 Treaty of Medicine Creek (the Treaty), under which the Tribe relinquished their rights to land but retained “the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . , in common with all citizens of the Territory.” The District Court for the Western District of Washington has interpreted “fish” under the Treaty to include shellfish. In 1978, Leslie and Harlene Robbins (Robbins) purchased property in Mason County, Washington that included tidelands with manila clam beds. In connection with the purchase of the property, Robbins obtained a standard policy of title insurance from Mason County Title Insurance Company (MCTI) which provided MCTI would insure Robbins “against loss or damage sustained by reason of: . . . [a]ny defect in, or lien or encumbrance on, said title existing at the date hereof.” For years Robbins had contracted with commercial shellfish harvesters to enter Robbins’s property to harvest shellfish from the tidelands. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether MCTI had a duty to defend Robbins when the Tribe announced it planned to assert its treaty right to harvest shellfish from the property. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that because the insurance policy conceivably covered the treaty right and no exceptions to coverage applied, MCTI owed the property owners a duty to defend and, in failing to do so, breached the duty. Because this breach was unreasonable given the uncertainty in the law, MCTI acted in bad faith. Further, because the property owners did not seek summary judgment on MCTI’s affirmative defenses, the Supreme Court remanded to the superior court for consideration of the defenses. View "Robbins v. Mason County Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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An employee of a tribal enterprise sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court. Petitioner John A. Waltrip fell on a patch of ice while working as a surveillance supervisor at a casino and injured primarily his right shoulder. Petitioner initially obtained treatment from his personal physician but Tribal First, the employer Osage Million Dollar Elm Casino's claim administrator, sent him to an orthopedic specialist who recommended surgery in 2009. Petitioner filed a claim in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court on July 17, 2009, seeking medical treatment and temporary total disability. The Casino and Insurer Hudson Insurance Company asserted that court lacked jurisdiction based on the tribe's sovereign immunity. A hearing was held solely on the jurisdictional issue; the Workers' Compensation Court denied jurisdiction and dismissed the claim holding that the tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity and that the provisions of the tribe's workers' compensation policy did not subject the insurance company to liability for claims in state court. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari review. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity and was not therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court; and (2) the workers' compensation insurer did not enjoy the tribe's immunity and was estopped to deny coverage under a policy for which it accepted premiums computed in part on the employee's earnings. View "Waltrip v. Osage Million Dollar Elm Casino" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendant's liens were not valid, in whole or in part, where plaintiff received a substantial settlement from her insurer when she suffered serious injuries in a car accident and received extensive health care services from defendant. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant because it had a right to recover the money spent on plaintiff's medical care under 25 U.S.C. 1621e. The court reversed and held that section 1621e, which allowed healthcare providers to recover expenses from third-party tortfeasors, relevant insureres, or other third parties, did not apply to the action where defendant sought to enforce a right of recovery against plaintiff to whom it provided services.