Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company appealed a superior court order that denied its motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner Rebecca Rivera. The court ruled that an automobile policy (policy) issued to Rivera’s parents excluded liability coverage but afforded uninsured motorist coverage for injuries Rivera sustained in a single-vehicle accident in Dracut, Massachusetts. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Petitioner's favor: "the terms of the owned vehicle exclusion appear to remove [Petitioner's vehicle] from the definition of uninsured motor vehicle even though, as to Rivera, there [was] no insurance available. While Liberty Mutual is free to limit the extent of its liability through the use of an exclusion it cannot do so in contravention of statutory provisions or public policy."

Plaintiffs Marc and Laurie Brown appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to Defendant Concord Group Insurance Company in their insurance coverage action. In 2005, Plaintiffs purchased a house from then-owner Michael Rogers. Two years later, they discovered water leaking into the house near a sliding glass door. They contacted Eugene Spencer, the person who built the house, to repair the problem. In 2009, Plaintiffs again observed water leaking into the house near the same sliding glass door. This time they contacted Daniel Lewis to repair the problem. Lewis later testified that damage was caused by leaks Spencer did not discover during his repair, but probably would have discovered had he removed all of the siding on the wall. The damage required extensive repair work. Concord Group insured Spencer. His policy did not cover "property damage" to his work "arising out of [his work] or any part of [his work]." Plaintiffs argued that the policy provided coverage because Spencer negligently repaired their house in 2007, and the damage in 2009 would not have occurred but for his negligence. Upon review of the policy in question, the Supreme Court concluded it was error for the trial court to grant Concord Group summary judgment because what caused the damage (either the 2003 or the 2007 work) was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policy provided coverage in this case. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner Lachlan MacLearn and Intervenor Simon Hutchings appealed a superior court order that denied their motion for summary judgment. Petitioner was driving his 2006 Prius when he was involved in an accident with Hutchings. At the time of the accident, Petitioner also owned a 2000 Audi A6 that was insured by Respondent Commerce Insurance Company. Hutchings sued Petitioner for damages from his injuries. Hutchings made a demand upon Commerce for defense and indemnification. Commerce denied the claim, stating that coverage was barred by the terms of the policy it held on Petitioner's Audi. Petitioner petitioned for a declaratory judgment that Commerce was obligated to defend and indemnify him against Hutchings' suit. The trial court granted Commerce's motion and denied Hutchings', finding the policy barred coverage. Upon review of the policy and the arguments submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding the policy did not cover Petitioner's use of the Prius, nor grant him indemnification from Commerce for the accident arising out of his use of it.

Petitioner Christopher Ruel, a licensed real estate appraiser, appealed a superior court order that remanded his case to the New Hampshire Real Estate Appraiser Board for a new disciplinary hearing. In the spring of 2007, Kenneth Frederick hired Petitioner to appraise his property in Kingston. The New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) sought to take Frederick's property by eminent domain and Frederick used Petitioner's appraisal in negotiating a settlement with DOT. DOT performed its own appraisal and valued the property at approximately fifty thousand dollars less than did Petitioner. After finalizing the settlement, a DOT appraisal supervisor reviewed Petitioner's appraisal and filed a grievance against him with the Board. In April 2010, four members of the Board voted to order Petitioner to pay a $500 fine and attend two appraisal courses. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the superior court should have dismissed the Board proceedings against him because: (1) the DOT lacked standing to file the initial grievance and, therefore, the case should never have been heard; (2) the Board violated its governing statute by taking more than two years to dispose of his case; (3) the Board's delay materially prejudiced him; and (4) the Board's determination to continue with the hearing and render a final decision without a quorum violated his due process rights. Upon careful review of the Board's hearing record, the Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's arguments on appeal.

Petitioner Premium Research Services appealed a superior court's dismissal of its petition brought under the state Right-to-Know Law for disclosure of documents relating to disbursements from the second injury fund. Petitioner sought information so that it could know whether a carrier reported reimbursement to the National Council on Compensation Insurers. If reimbursements were reported, then the Council would reduce an employer's insurance premium. Petitioner sought to monitor the reimbursement process to ensure employers were not being overcharged for workers' compensation insurance. Petitioner filed its petition against the Department of Labor for disclosure of the documents. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the documents sought were exempt from disclosure under the plain meaning of the RTK law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Petitioner's petition.

Respondents New Hampshire Department of Corrections and Liberty Mutual Insurance Copmany (Insurer) appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) that Petitioner Michael Whitaker (Claimant) was entitled to ongoing temporary total disability indemnity benefits. Claimant first filed a workers’ compensation claim in January 2008, alleging that he suffered emotional injuries in 2007 because of harassment and retaliation at his DOC job. The insurer denied the claim on the ground that Claimant’s injuries were not causally related to his employment. In 2009, the CAB ruled in Claimant’s favor, awarding him benefits from the date he was deemed unable to work, through "at least" October 20, 2008, the date of the initial hearing before a department of labor hearing officer. The insurer did not appeal the CAB’s decision. In late 2009, Claimant sought to have his benefits increased to the higher temporary total disability rate when he was hospitalized for "[m]ajor depressive disorder, recurrent, severe, with psychotic features." The insurer denied this request on the ground that Claimant had failed to demonstrate that his hospitalization was related to his 2007 work injury. A department of labor hearing officer ruled in the insurer’s favor in January 2010; Claimant appealed to the CAB. The insurer argued that because Claimant had filed a claim with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights seeking damages for his allegedly wrongful discharge from the DOC, he waived his claim for increased benefits. The CAB was unpersuaded by Insurer's argument, and approved Claimant's claim. After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration, Insurer appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful review of the CAB record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding all of the issues the Insurer's raised on appeal unsupported by legal authority.

Petitioners, the Estate of June M. Day (Estate) and Byron and Stephanie Day, appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to Respondent Hanover Insurance Company, arguing Hanover's consent to settle a claim by Petitioners with the insurer of a third party tortfeasor did not preclude Hanover from contesting its liability to provide the Estate underinsured motorist coverage under its insurance contract with the Estate's decedent. In 2007, June Day was fatally injured in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, Day's vehicle was insured under an automobile liability policy and a personal umbrella policy issued by Hanover, and both policies provided underinsured motorist coverage. Following the accident, Petitioners made a claim against the third party's insurance company's policy. Hanover agreed that Petitioners could accept the settlement offered "while reserving [Hanover's] right to continue the investigation into liability in this matter," and noting that Hanover had "neither accepted nor denied liability." Petitioners accepted payment and executed a release to the third party and her insurance company. Thereafter Petitioners took the position that, by consenting to the settlement, Hanover was precluded from contesting that Petitioners were "legally entitled to recover" damages from the third party. Ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court rejected Petitioners' position and dismissed the action. Petitioners filed an objection arguing that the court had "misunderstood the essence of the petition." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "the record supports the trial court's ruling regarding the litigation strategy the petitioners pursued below. . . . insofar as the petitioners complain that Hanover failed to exercise good faith in that it delayed investigating and processing their claim, we note that the petitioners at all times had it within their power under the terms of the policy to address this problem by demanding arbitration of its underinsured motorist claim against Hanover, or, alternatively, by filing a breach of contract action in court."

Plaintiff Yvette Bouffard appealed a trial court's denial of her request for a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to uninsured motorist (UM) insurance coverage under her umbrella insurance policy issued by Defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. Plaintiff was injured in 2006 from a car accident. She recovered $250,000 from the other party's insurer and her UM coverage under her personal automobile policy. Because her damages exceeded this sum, Plaintiff sought UM coverage under her umbrella policy. State Farm denied the claim because UM coverage was rejected on her original insurance application. The trial court found that Plaintiff authorized her husband to go to the insurance agency to purchase insurance for both of them, and that because the husband did not elect UM coverage, Plaintiff ratified his decision when she failed to object after reviewing the application in the car or after the policy arrived in the mail. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the husband acted as Plaintiff's agent in rejecting UM coverage and affirmed the court's decision to deny Plaintiff declaratory relief.

Petitioner Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford) appealed orders of the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) that denied it recovery from the State Special Fund for Second Injuries for injuries to Claire Hamel and John Rygiel. Ms. Hamel worked as an assembly person for a motor manufacturing company. She was temporarily disabled for psychiatric reasons. She continued to work until her second injury for degenerative disc disease. Mr. Rygiel worked as a truck driver for a mobile MRI unit. Mr. Rygiel had Type II diabetes that required medication. Mr. Rygiel sustained an employment-related injury to his wrist. In both Ms. Hamel and Mr. Rygiel's cases, Hartford applied for and was denied reimbursement from the second injury fund. Hartford appealed both the Hamel and Rygiel decisions by CAB. The issue from both cases centered on whether state law allowed the CAB to consider an employee's past job performance as evidence that his or her preexisting impairment would not be a hindrance to obtaining employment if that employee became unemployed. The Supreme Court concluded that the employee's ability to perform his or her existing job is not determinative of whether the preexisting impairment was a hindrance to obtaining employment. The Court found that the CAB erroneously relied on the employee's ability when it denied Hartford's claims for reimbursement. Accordingly, the Court vacated the CAB's decisions in both the Hamel and Rygiel cases and remanded the cases for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Darlene Gray appealed an order of the Superior Court that dismissed her complaint against Defendant Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company. In 2003, Plaintiff and her sister, in their capacity as trustees of the Ocean Estates Realty Trust, received a quitclaim deed from the Triple P Ranch Realty Trust. Ocean Estates paid $80,000 for the parcel and recorded the deed. Later that year, Ocean Estates conveyed a warranty deed for the land to Plaintiff. At the time she received the deed, Plaintiff obtained a construction loan, granted a mortgage, and purchased title insurance from Commonwealth. The title insurance provided $328,000 in coverage against a title defect. In 2006, Plaintiff learned that Triple P Ranch Realty Trust never acquired title to the property and that the State legally owned it. The land was appraised at $15,000, and the insurer paid the mortgage lender the amount of the appraisal. Plaintiff sued Commonwealth for breach of contract, arguing that Commonwealth's policy should reimburse her for all expenses she incurred prior to learning of the title defect. When the Superior Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, she appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court found that trial court properly determined the measure of damages for Plaintiff's claim. Without finding errors in the trial court's findings of fact, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.