Justia Insurance Law Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in Personal Injury
Omega Protein, Inc. v. Evanston Insurance Company
An explosion at the Omega Protein Plant in Moss Point, Mississippi killed one man and seriously injured several others. Multiple lawsuits were filed against Omega in federal district court. Colony Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action in state circuit court seeking a declaration that it did not cover bodily injuries arising out of the Moss Point facility explosion. Evanston Insurance Company intervened also seeking a declaration of no coverage for the same injuries: Evanston provided a $5 million excess liability policy, which provided coverage after Colony’s $1 million policy was exhausted. Because Colony settled one of the underlying personal injury cases for $1 million (the limits under its policy), Omega sought excess coverage from Evanston for the injuries that occurred at its plant. A special master was appointed, and the trial court granted Evanston’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the pollution exclusion in the insurance contract barred coverage. Omega appealed that grant of summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that a pollution exclusion in the insurance contract was ambiguous, and should have been construed in favor of the insured, allowing coverage. Further, the Court found the question of whether coverage was triggered was governed by the language of the contract, and that Evanston failed to prove there could be no coverage under the excess liability policy. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to all issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Omega Protein, Inc. v. Evanston Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Payne v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action against State Farm seeking payment of $2 million under Florida's uninsured motorist (UM) statute, holding that Florida law did not require State Farm to provide UM coverage.State Farm denied Plaintiffs UM coverage under their personal liability umbrella insurance policy after a motorcycle accident with an uninsured vehicle in South Dakota because the policy did not include UM coverage. Thereafter, Plaintiffs, who resided in Florida at the time of the accident, filed this declaratory action. The circuit court concluded that Florida law applied to the dispute, that State Farm did not violate Florida's UM statute, and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to UM coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Florida law did not require State Farm to provide UM coverage. View "Payne v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law
Johnson v. Johnson
The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants in this personal injury action, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment as to all claims.This case arose from a car accident in Rhode Island involving Horace Johnson, the driver, and Carlton Johnson, a passenger. Carlton and his mother sued to recover damages for Carlton's injuries. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants - Horace, his insurer, and the company from which Horace had leased the vehicle. The First Circuit ultimately certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court a question regarding the definition of "civil action" in Rhode Island's Rejected Settlement Offer Interest Statute, R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.2. After the Rhode Island Supreme Court supplied its answer, this Court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that section 27-7-2.2 was inapplicable; (2) properly concluded that an enforceable settlement agreement existed; and (3) was right to grant summary judgment as to Carlton's insurer bad faith claims. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law
O’Brien’s Response Management, L.L.C. v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
BP retained the Responders (O’Brien’s and NRC) for nearly $2 billion to assist with the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Thousands of the Responders' workers filed personal injury lawsuits against BP, which were consolidated and organized into “pleading bundles.” The B3 bundle included “all claims for personal injury and/or medical monitoring for exposure or other injury occurring after the explosion and fire of April 20, 2010.” In 2012, BP entered the “Medical Settlement” on the B3 claims with a defined settlement class. The opt-out deadline closed in October 2012. The Medical Settlement created a new type of claim for latent injuries, BackEnd Litigation Option (BELO) claims. After the settlement, plaintiffs could bring opt-out B3 claims if they did not participate in the settlement, and BELO claims if they were class members who alleged latent injuries and followed the approved process. Responders were aware of the settlement before the district court approved it but neither Responder had control over the negotiations, nor did either approve the settlement.In 2017, BP sought indemnification for 2,000 BELO claims by employees of the Responders. The Fifth Circuit held that BP was an additional insured up to the minimum amount required by its contract with O’Brien’s; the insurance policies maintained by O’Brien’s cannot be combined to satisfy the minimum amount. O’Brien’s is not required to indemnify BP because BP materially breached its indemnification provision with respect to the BELO claims. View "O'Brien's Response Management, L.L.C. v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc." on Justia Law
Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Pope
Ikia Pope and Brandi Powell were in a motor vehicle collision. Pope left the scene of the collision. Powell alleged Pope drove a vehicle owned by third parties who gave permission for Pope to drive the vehicle. Progressive Direct Insurance Company insured the vehicle driven by Pope. Powell made bodily injury and property damage claims with Progressive Direct Insurance Company (insurer). Powell asserted she was entitled to treble property damages. Progressive sought a declaratory judgment for the purpose of adjudicating whether its insurance policy excluded treble damages pursuant to 47 O.S.2011, section 10-103. Progressive filed a motion for summary judgment, and the court concluded the treble damages provided by 47 O.S. 2011, section 10-103 were punitive in nature, and excluded by a clause excluding punitive damages. Powell appealed the subsequent consent judgment which was based, in part, upon the trial court's adjudication of the treble damages issue. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal sua sponte, concurring with the district court that the statutory treble damages in 47 O.S.2011, section 10-103 were punitive in nature, and punitive damages were expressly excluded by the policy. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Pope" on Justia Law
Moranz v. Harbor Mall, LLC
In this case, the Supreme Court clarified the proper timing of Alvarado calculations, which determines the reimbursement due the insurer from a third-party settlement, and the reimbursement process for an insurer when the amount of workers' compensation (WC) benefits the insurer has already dispensed to the employee is less than the amount it owes the employee for its share of attorney's costs and fees for the third-party action.Petitioner received WC benefits from Respondent. Petitioner brought suit against the owner of the building in which she was injured and reached a settlement. Respondent then sought reimbursement of the WC benefits it had paid to Petitioner under Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-8 and Alvarado v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 993 P.2d 549 (Haw. 2000). At issue was whether certain WC benefits that Respondent owed Petitioner were properly classified as "paid compensation" and whether the process of Respondent's reimbursement of WC benefits exceeded the amount it had previously contributed to Petitioner as "paid compensation." The Supreme Court held (1) Alvarado calculations shall be performed based on the date on which the employee receives the third-party recovery; and (2) an insurer's "share" of the attorney's fees and costs the employee incurs while pursuing third-party recovery is based on the insurer's total WC liability. View "Moranz v. Harbor Mall, LLC" on Justia Law
ACE American Insurance Company v. Rite Aid Corporation
Appellees, Rite Aid Corporation, Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., and Rite Aid of Maryland, Inc. (collectively, “Rite Aid”), held a general liability insurance policy underwritten by defendany Chubb, Limited ("Chubb"). Rite Aid and others were defendants in multi-district litigation before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (the “MDL Opioid Lawsuits”). Plaintiffs in that suit filed over a thousand suits in the MDL Opioid Lawsuits against companies in the pharmaceutical supply chain for their roles in the national opioid crisis. Certain suits were bellwether suits - including the complaints of Summit and Cuyahoga Counties in Ohio (“the Counties”) which were at issue here. The question this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court was whether insurance policies covering lawsuits “for” or “because of” personal injury required insurers to defend their insureds when the plaintiffs in the underlying suits expressly disavowed claims for personal injury and sought only their own economic damages. The Superior Court decided that Rite Aid’s insurance carriers were required to defend it against lawsuits filed by two Ohio counties to recover opioid-epidemic-related economic damages. As the court held, the lawsuits sought damages “for” or “because of” personal injury because there was arguably a causal connection between the counties’ economic damages and the injuries to their citizens from the opioid epidemic. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the plaintiffs, governmental entities, sought to recover only their own economic damages, specifically disclaiming recovery for personal injury or any specific treatment damages. Thus, the carriers did not have a duty to defend Rite Aid under the governing insurance policy. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Rite Aid Corporation" on Justia Law
Fuentes v. Cavco Industries, Inc.
Taleetha Fuentes filed a worker's compensation complaint against her employer Cavco Industries and Cavco’s surety, Sentry Casualty Company (collectively, Defendants). Fuentes filed her complaint in July 2019, and the Defendants denied the claim. During discovery, the Defendants filed a motion to compel in October 2019, which was granted. Following no response from Fuentes, the Defendants filed a motion for sanctions, and Fuentes again did not respond. On December 19, 2019, the full Idaho Industrial Commission issued an Order Dismissing Complaint, citing Industrial Commission Judicial Rule of Procedure (JRP) 12(B). Five months later, in May 2020, Fuentes responded to the initial discovery requests and moved to retain the case on the active calendar, but her filing and motion were returned “unfiled” as explained in an email from the assigned Referee. Fuentes also moved for reconsideration of the dismissal and filed a petition to vacate the order of dismissal under JRP 15. The Commission denied both motions. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the Commission acted in excess of its powers when it misapplied JRP12(B) in the initial dismissal order, and in applying JRP 16 to Fuentes' case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commission’s decision to dismiss Fuentes’ case, and vacated the order. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fuentes v. Cavco Industries, Inc." on Justia Law
Rolan v. New West Health Services
In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court granting the cross-motion for partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and New West Health Services and denying Allied World Assurance Company's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the district court erred in part.Dana Rolan, who serious injuries in an automobile accident, had health insurance through New West. New West denied coverage because the tortfeasor's liability insurance paid $100,000 of Rolan's medical expenses. Rolan filed a class action complaint alleging that New West violated its made-whole obligations. New West tendered the defense to its insurer, Allied. The district court certified the class and held New West liable for monetary losses. Plaintiffs and New West subsequently entered into a settlement. Allied opposed the district court's ensuing motion for final judgment, arguing that the proposed settlement amount was not covered by Allied. The district court approved the settlement between New West and Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred in holding that Allied was estopped from asserting a $1 million "each Claim" limit of liability under the policy; and (2) correctly concluded that Allied's "Loss" provision did not preclude Allied's indemnity obligation of the class's damages. View "Rolan v. New West Health Services" on Justia Law
Ronquillo v. EcoClean
In August 2016, Plaintiff Maribel Ronquillo was in an automobile collision. According to her complaint, Ronquillo was rear-ended by defendant Jesse Williams, who was operating a vehicle owned by an EcoClean employee and towing an EcoClean trailer. Ronquillo suffered serious physical injuries and incurred around $250,000 in medical expenses. At the time of the accident, Ronquillo did not have health insurance, so she entered into a medical finance lien agreement with Injury Finance. Under the terms of that agreement, Injury Finance purchased Ronquillo’s accounts receivable from her healthcare providers at a predetermined, discounted contractual rate, which allowed Ronquillo to receive prompt medical care. Ronquillo remained contractually obligated to repay Injury Finance for “all charges billed by the [medical] [p]roviders” regardless of the result of any litigation. Ronquillo and her husband filed suit alleging negligence and loss of consortium against Williams and asserting a respondeat superior claim against EcoClean. As part of discovery, Defendants subpoenaed Injury Finance, seeking information and documents pertaining to Injury Finance’s accounts receivable purchase rates, provider contracts, and business operations and methodologies. When Injury Finance did not respond to the subpoena, Defendants filed a motion to compel production, which the district court granted. Defendants also filed a “motion for determination of a question of law pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) that Injury Finance . . . is not a collateral source” subject to the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule. This interlocutory appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court raised the narrow question of whether a medical finance company was a collateral source for purposes of the pre-verdict evidentiary component of Colorado’s collateral source rule. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Injury Finance was not a collateral source, "Collateral sources must confer a 'benefit,' as defined in section 10-1-135(2)(a), C.R.S. (2021), onto the injured party. ... Ronquillo has not received a benefit from Injury Finance for purposes of the collateral source rule because her arrangement with Injury Finance does not reduce her financial obligations." The Court expressed no opinion on whether the disputed evidence could be excluded under other evidentiary rules such as CRE 401 and 403. View "Ronquillo v. EcoClean" on Justia Law