Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Nshan Simonyan had a dispute with his insurer, Nationwide Insurance Company of America ("Nationwide") over the company's handling of his defense arising out of a three-car accident in which Simonyan was a driver. Simonyan asked Nationwide to appoint, as "Cumis" counsel, a law firm that he had already hired to advance his affirmative claim against the driver who hit him. Nationwide refused. Simonyan appealed the dismissal of his case after the trial court sustained Nationwide’s demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend. Simonyan argued his allegations were sufficient to state claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to reconsider based on new allegations. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Simonyan v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a locomotive engineer, sued Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCSR”) for negligence after he sustained injuries in a railcar collision. The district court granted summary judgment to KCSR. Plaintiff argued that section 287.280.1, the civil-action provision, authorizes his civil action because KCSR failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance. KCSR responded that it is not liable because Plaintiff “was insured by his immediate . . . employer,” triggering the exemption from liability for statutory employers in section 287.040.3. According to Plaintiff, however, section 287.040.3 exempts KCSR from workers’ compensation liability only, not liability from civil actions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of KCSR. The court held that because Plaintiff was insured by his immediate employer, KCSR is not liable and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court reasoned that Missouri’s workers’ compensation statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 287.120.1, imposes liability on employers for workplace injuries. However, nowhere in section 287.040 does the text differentiate between workers’ compensation liability and civil liability. Accordingly, the court interpreted “liable as in this section provided” to mean “liable as an employer”; that is, liable as a statutory employer. Thus, KCSR’s potential liability, therefore, is liability “as in [section 287.040] provided,” so it enjoys the immunity from suit. View "Nathan Blanton v. KC Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

A patron of RAJJ Entertainment successfully sued RAJJ and its owner, for negligence after being injured in the bar’s parking lot. Defendants’ insurance company, Great Lakes Insurance, sued for a declaration stating that it was not required to indemnify RAJJ and the owner for the damages award because the insurance policy excluded from coverage injuries that arose from physical altercations. The district court granted summary judgment to Great Lakes.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Plaintiff. The court held that the clear language of the policy controls. The court reasoned that insurance companies are not required to indemnify the insured for injuries that are excluded by a policy. Generally, where a plaintiff’s negligence claim arises out of an assault or battery, the assault or battery exclusion bars coverage of the insured’s negligence claim.   Defendants claim that the exclusion does not apply because the underlying lawsuit “arose out of” their negligence—not any assault, battery, or physical altercation. The court reasoned that the policy language concerns how the bodily injury arose, not how the lawsuit arose. The concurrent-proximate-cause rule does not apply because RAJJ and the owner’s negligence is not a “covered cause.” Furthermore, even if RAJJ and the owner’s negligence were covered, that would not require Great Lakes to indemnify them because their negligence was not “truly independent and distinct” from the assault, battery, or physical altercation. View "Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Ray A. Perrin" on Justia Law

Glick, without a written agreement, provided home daycare for Clayton’s infant daughter, Kenzi, for $25 per day, paid in cash at the end of the week. On January 29, 2018, Kenzi died while in Glick’s care. The coroner’s office indicated that her death resulted from bedding asphyxia after being placed prone on a couch cushion covered with a blanket to nap. The Glicks’ Liberty Mutual insurance policy, covered personal liability for “bodily injury” except for liability “[a]rising out of or in connection with a ‘business’ engaged in by an insured.” A separate endorsement stated: If an “insured” regularly provides home daycare services to a person or persons other than “insureds” and receives monetary or other compensation for such services, that enterprise is a “business.” Mutual exchange of home daycare services, however, is not considered compensation. The rendering of home daycare services by an “insured” to a relative of an “insured” is not considered a “business.”Liberty Mutual denied coverage. In Clayton’s wrongful death lawsuit, the district court granted Liberty Mutual summary judgment and expressly declared Liberty Mutual has no duty to defend or indemnify Glick in the underlying lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Clayton’s claim “did not even potentially fall within the scope of coverage.” View "Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Clayton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant John Coates brought an action for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against defendant-appellee Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Plaintiff was injured after a motorcycle collision; he was insured by Progressive under a motorcycle policy, an auto policy, and a policy providing UM coverage. Coates moved for partial summary judgment regarding his entitlement to uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits. Progressive moved for summary judgment regarding Coates' bad faith claim. Coates sought more time to conduct discovery to address Progressive's counterclaim on bad faith. The trial court granted Coates' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, allowing his UM claim against Progressive. The trial court also granted Progressive's Motion for Summary Judgment, denying Coates' claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court denied Coates' Motion for Additional Time to Respond. After review of the parties’ arguments on appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment on Coates' UM claim. The Court reversed, however, the decisions granting Progressive's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Coates additional time to respond to that motion. View "Coates v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition for damages in the 19th Judicial District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish. Plaintiff totaled his car in an accident and alleged that GoAuto, his car insurance carrier, paid less in policy benefits than his policy and Louisiana law required. GoAuto filed its notice of removal, Plaintiff received permission from the Louisiana court to amend his complaint again and, as accepted on appeal, filed the amended complaint. This amendment changed the definition of the class from class “residents of Louisiana” to class “citizens of Louisiana.” After removal, the parties filed several competing motions disputing which complaint controlled and the sufficiency of GoAuto’s notice of removal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order remanding the case to state court, finding that Defendant is a citizen of Louisiana and thus the suit lacks the minimal diversity necessary to vest a federal court with jurisdiction. The court declined Defendant’s request to disregard the Louisiana state court’s pre-removal procedural rulings applying Louisiana law and substituted its own Erie guesses at how a Louisiana court ought to rule on a motion to amend a pleading.   Further, in regards to Defendant’s argument that it is plausible that some class members are not citizens of Louisiana, the court held that none of these individuals, assuming they had relocated to Colorado, Texas, or Florida before the filing of the complaint, qualify as citizens of Louisiana. Finally, the court held that Defendant points to nothing in the text of the statute that would bar Plaintiff’s class definition. View "Turner v. GoAuto Insurance" on Justia Law

Defendant Russell Blodgett appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Insurance Company (CSU). Blodgett argued the trial court erred by concluding that the terms of a commercial general liability policy issued by CSU clearly and unambiguously excluded coverage for Blodgett’s damages in a separate personal injury action against CSU’s insured resulting from Blodgett’s fall from an alleged negligently constructed staircase. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, pursuant to the policy’s clear and unambiguous language, CSU had no duty or obligation to defend or indemnify its insured in the underlying litigation. View "Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Insurance Company v. Best Way Homes, Inc. & a." on Justia Law

Appellant Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) required patients or their family members sign Conditions of Admissions (COAs) when Dameron provides the patients’ medical care. The COAs at issue here contained language assigning to Dameron direct payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) benefits and medical payment (MP) benefits that would otherwise be payable to those patients under their automobile insurance policies. Dameron treated five of AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Insurance Exchange’s (CSAA) insureds for injuries following automobile accidents. Those patients had UM and/or MP coverage as part of their CSAA coverage, and Dameron sought to collect payment for those services from the patients’ UM and/or MP benefits at Dameron’s full rates. Instead of paying to Dameron the lesser of either all benefits due to the patients under their UM and MP coverage, or Dameron’s full charges, CSAA paid portions of those benefits directly to the patients which left balances owing on some of Dameron’s bills. Dameron sued CSAA to collect UM and MP benefits it contended CSAA owed Dameron under the assignments contained in the COAs. The trial court concluded that Dameron could not enforce any of the assignments contained in the COAs and entered summary judgment in CSAA’s favor. After its review, the Court of Appeal held Dameron could not collect payment for emergency services from the UM or MP benefits due to patients that were covered under health insurance policies. Additionally, the Court found: (1) the COA forms were contracts of adhesion; (2) it was not within the reasonable possible expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their UM benefits; and (3) a trier of fact might find it is within the reasonable expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their MP benefits. Accordingly, the Court concluded Dameron could not maintain causes of action to collect MP or UM benefits due to four of the five patients directly from CSAA. However, consistent with its opinion, the trial court could consider whether an enforceable assignment of MP benefits was made by one adult patient. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern Cal., Nevada etc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court entering summary judgment in favor of Alexis Still in this dispute over whether there was a settlement agreement between the parties, holding that there was no settlement agreement between the parties.Clifton Jameson and Still were involved in an automobile accident. Jameson sent MetLife, Still's insurer, an offer to settle. MetLife made a counteroffer. Jameson took the counteroffer as a rejection of his offer to settle and sued Still for damages arising from the accident. MetLife then attempted to accept Jameson's original settlement offer. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Still, concluding that MetLife's counteroffer did not terminate the settlement offer and that its subsequent letter of acceptance created a settlement agreement between the two parties. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of settlement because no settlement agreement was reached. View "Jameson v. Still" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death and survival action brought against an automobile insurer, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment in favor of the insurer as to Plaintiff's negligence and gross negligence claims, holding that the court of appeals erred.An insured motorist was involved in a single car accident. The motorist's husband later arrived and began taking photos, but while he was engaged in that activity on the side of the road, he was struck by another vehicle and killed. Plaintiff, the motorist, brought this action alleging that the insurer had instructed her to take the photos and that her husband was complying with that instruction when the other driver hit him. Thus, Plaintiff argued, the insurer proximately caused her husband's death. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer on the negligence and gross negligence claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not have a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing post-accident guidance so as not to increase the risk of harm to its insured. View "Elephant Insurance Co., LLC v. Kenyon" on Justia Law