Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

BP retained the Responders (O’Brien’s and NRC) for nearly $2 billion to assist with the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Thousands of the Responders' workers filed personal injury lawsuits against BP, which were consolidated and organized into “pleading bundles.” The B3 bundle included “all claims for personal injury and/or medical monitoring for exposure or other injury occurring after the explosion and fire of April 20, 2010.” In 2012, BP entered the “Medical Settlement” on the B3 claims with a defined settlement class. The opt-out deadline closed in October 2012. The Medical Settlement created a new type of claim for latent injuries, BackEnd Litigation Option (BELO) claims. After the settlement, plaintiffs could bring opt-out B3 claims if they did not participate in the settlement, and BELO claims if they were class members who alleged latent injuries and followed the approved process. Responders were aware of the settlement before the district court approved it but neither Responder had control over the negotiations, nor did either approve the settlement.In 2017, BP sought indemnification for 2,000 BELO claims by employees of the Responders. The Fifth Circuit held that BP was an additional insured up to the minimum amount required by its contract with O’Brien’s; the insurance policies maintained by O’Brien’s cannot be combined to satisfy the minimum amount. O’Brien’s is not required to indemnify BP because BP materially breached its indemnification provision with respect to the BELO claims. View "O'Brien's Response Management, L.L.C. v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc." on Justia Law

Ikia Pope and Brandi Powell were in a motor vehicle collision. Pope left the scene of the collision. Powell alleged Pope drove a vehicle owned by third parties who gave permission for Pope to drive the vehicle. Progressive Direct Insurance Company insured the vehicle driven by Pope. Powell made bodily injury and property damage claims with Progressive Direct Insurance Company (insurer). Powell asserted she was entitled to treble property damages. Progressive sought a declaratory judgment for the purpose of adjudicating whether its insurance policy excluded treble damages pursuant to 47 O.S.2011, section 10-103. Progressive filed a motion for summary judgment, and the court concluded the treble damages provided by 47 O.S. 2011, section 10-103 were punitive in nature, and excluded by a clause excluding punitive damages. Powell appealed the subsequent consent judgment which was based, in part, upon the trial court's adjudication of the treble damages issue. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal sua sponte, concurring with the district court that the statutory treble damages in 47 O.S.2011, section 10-103 were punitive in nature, and punitive damages were expressly excluded by the policy. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Pope" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court clarified the proper timing of Alvarado calculations, which determines the reimbursement due the insurer from a third-party settlement, and the reimbursement process for an insurer when the amount of workers' compensation (WC) benefits the insurer has already dispensed to the employee is less than the amount it owes the employee for its share of attorney's costs and fees for the third-party action.Petitioner received WC benefits from Respondent. Petitioner brought suit against the owner of the building in which she was injured and reached a settlement. Respondent then sought reimbursement of the WC benefits it had paid to Petitioner under Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-8 and Alvarado v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 993 P.2d 549 (Haw. 2000). At issue was whether certain WC benefits that Respondent owed Petitioner were properly classified as "paid compensation" and whether the process of Respondent's reimbursement of WC benefits exceeded the amount it had previously contributed to Petitioner as "paid compensation." The Supreme Court held (1) Alvarado calculations shall be performed based on the date on which the employee receives the third-party recovery; and (2) an insurer's "share" of the attorney's fees and costs the employee incurs while pursuing third-party recovery is based on the insurer's total WC liability. View "Moranz v. Harbor Mall, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellees, Rite Aid Corporation, Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., and Rite Aid of Maryland, Inc. (collectively, “Rite Aid”), held a general liability insurance policy underwritten by defendany Chubb, Limited ("Chubb"). Rite Aid and others were defendants in multi-district litigation before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (the “MDL Opioid Lawsuits”). Plaintiffs in that suit filed over a thousand suits in the MDL Opioid Lawsuits against companies in the pharmaceutical supply chain for their roles in the national opioid crisis. Certain suits were bellwether suits - including the complaints of Summit and Cuyahoga Counties in Ohio (“the Counties”) which were at issue here. The question this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court was whether insurance policies covering lawsuits “for” or “because of” personal injury required insurers to defend their insureds when the plaintiffs in the underlying suits expressly disavowed claims for personal injury and sought only their own economic damages. The Superior Court decided that Rite Aid’s insurance carriers were required to defend it against lawsuits filed by two Ohio counties to recover opioid-epidemic-related economic damages. As the court held, the lawsuits sought damages “for” or “because of” personal injury because there was arguably a causal connection between the counties’ economic damages and the injuries to their citizens from the opioid epidemic. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the plaintiffs, governmental entities, sought to recover only their own economic damages, specifically disclaiming recovery for personal injury or any specific treatment damages. Thus, the carriers did not have a duty to defend Rite Aid under the governing insurance policy. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Rite Aid Corporation" on Justia Law

Taleetha Fuentes filed a worker's compensation complaint against her employer Cavco Industries and Cavco’s surety, Sentry Casualty Company (collectively, Defendants). Fuentes filed her complaint in July 2019, and the Defendants denied the claim. During discovery, the Defendants filed a motion to compel in October 2019, which was granted. Following no response from Fuentes, the Defendants filed a motion for sanctions, and Fuentes again did not respond. On December 19, 2019, the full Idaho Industrial Commission issued an Order Dismissing Complaint, citing Industrial Commission Judicial Rule of Procedure (JRP) 12(B). Five months later, in May 2020, Fuentes responded to the initial discovery requests and moved to retain the case on the active calendar, but her filing and motion were returned “unfiled” as explained in an email from the assigned Referee. Fuentes also moved for reconsideration of the dismissal and filed a petition to vacate the order of dismissal under JRP 15. The Commission denied both motions. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the Commission acted in excess of its powers when it misapplied JRP12(B) in the initial dismissal order, and in applying JRP 16 to Fuentes' case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commission’s decision to dismiss Fuentes’ case, and vacated the order. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fuentes v. Cavco Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court granting the cross-motion for partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and New West Health Services and denying Allied World Assurance Company's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the district court erred in part.Dana Rolan, who serious injuries in an automobile accident, had health insurance through New West. New West denied coverage because the tortfeasor's liability insurance paid $100,000 of Rolan's medical expenses. Rolan filed a class action complaint alleging that New West violated its made-whole obligations. New West tendered the defense to its insurer, Allied. The district court certified the class and held New West liable for monetary losses. Plaintiffs and New West subsequently entered into a settlement. Allied opposed the district court's ensuing motion for final judgment, arguing that the proposed settlement amount was not covered by Allied. The district court approved the settlement between New West and Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred in holding that Allied was estopped from asserting a $1 million "each Claim" limit of liability under the policy; and (2) correctly concluded that Allied's "Loss" provision did not preclude Allied's indemnity obligation of the class's damages. View "Rolan v. New West Health Services" on Justia Law

In August 2016, Plaintiff Maribel Ronquillo was in an automobile collision. According to her complaint, Ronquillo was rear-ended by defendant Jesse Williams, who was operating a vehicle owned by an EcoClean employee and towing an EcoClean trailer. Ronquillo suffered serious physical injuries and incurred around $250,000 in medical expenses. At the time of the accident, Ronquillo did not have health insurance, so she entered into a medical finance lien agreement with Injury Finance. Under the terms of that agreement, Injury Finance purchased Ronquillo’s accounts receivable from her healthcare providers at a predetermined, discounted contractual rate, which allowed Ronquillo to receive prompt medical care. Ronquillo remained contractually obligated to repay Injury Finance for “all charges billed by the [medical] [p]roviders” regardless of the result of any litigation. Ronquillo and her husband filed suit alleging negligence and loss of consortium against Williams and asserting a respondeat superior claim against EcoClean. As part of discovery, Defendants subpoenaed Injury Finance, seeking information and documents pertaining to Injury Finance’s accounts receivable purchase rates, provider contracts, and business operations and methodologies. When Injury Finance did not respond to the subpoena, Defendants filed a motion to compel production, which the district court granted. Defendants also filed a “motion for determination of a question of law pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) that Injury Finance . . . is not a collateral source[]” subject to the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule. This interlocutory appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court raised the narrow question of whether a medical finance company was a collateral source for purposes of the pre-verdict evidentiary component of Colorado’s collateral source rule. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Injury Finance was not a collateral source, "Collateral sources must confer a 'benefit,' as defined in section 10-1-135(2)(a), C.R.S. (2021), onto the injured party. ... Ronquillo has not received a benefit from Injury Finance for purposes of the collateral source rule because her arrangement with Injury Finance does not reduce her financial obligations." The Court expressed no opinion on whether the disputed evidence could be excluded under other evidentiary rules such as CRE 401 and 403. View "Ronquillo v. EcoClean" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the term "civil action" in Mass. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.2 refers to a judicial proceeding that is commenced by the filing in court of a complaint and all other required documents together with fees.This case involved an accident in which Horace Johnson and Carlton Johnson were seriously injured when Horace was driving. Before any party filed suit, Carlton's counsel sent a letter to Arbella Mutual Insurance Company, which had issued an automobile insurance policy to Horace, demanding a settlement in the amount of the $100,000 policy limit. After Arbella indicated its acceptance of the settlement offer Carlton and his mother (together, Plaintiffs) filed suit. The case was removed to federal district court, which granted summary judgment to Defendants, rejecting Carlton's argument that section 27-7-2.2 applied to the case and rendered Arbella's acceptance of the settlement offer ineffective. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals certified the instant question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that "civil action" in section 27-7-2.2 refers to a judicial proceeding which is commenced by the filing of a complaint and all other required documents together with the fees prescribed by law. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Insureds and against Insurer in reliance upon its prior decision in N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gurley, 139 N.C. App. 178 (2000), holding that the lower courts erred.Matthew Bronson, who was intoxicated, collided with a vehicle owned by Pamela Dana, resulting in serious injuries to Pamela and William Dana, who was riding in the passenger seat. Pamela died from her injuries. At the time of the accident, Pamela was insured under a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by Insurer. William, individually and as administrator of Pamela's estate, claimed to be entitled to an additional $74,750 in underinsured motorist coverage over the amount that Insurer had already tendered to them. Insurer filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of underinsured motorist coverage it was required to provide to the Danas. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Danas, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the application of Gurley in this case was error. View "N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the district court that the State was covered by an insurance policy it had with National Indemnity Company (National) for claims made against the State for injury and death resulting from asbestos exposure but reversed the district court's rulings regarding qualifying "occurrences" under the policy, holding that remand was required for further consideration of these issues.This insurance dispute followed litigation between the State and claimants who alleged that they were harmed by the State's failure to warn them of the hazards of asbestos exposure over years of mining and milling operations in Libby, Montana. National insured the State against general liability from 1973-1975. National filed this action seeking determinations that it had no obligation to defend the State or to cover the claims. The State concluded that National breached its duty to defend the State but disagreed with the district court's determination of the number of "occurrences" eligible for coverage under the policy, holding that remand was required for further factual findings. View "National Indemnity Co. v. State" on Justia Law