Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that a settlement agreement between Plaintiff and her underinsured motorist carrier did not entitle the underinsured defendant (Defendant) to a statutory reduction of the jury verdict rendered against her pursuant to the offset provision of Va. Code 8.01-35.1, holding that the tortfeasor remains primarily responsible for fully compensating the plaintiff for the injury the tortfeasor has caused.Plaintiff sustained injuries when her vehicle was struck by Defendant's vehicle. Plaintiff sued Defendant, asking for compensatory and punitive damages. Prior to trial, Plaintiff settled her underinsured motorist (UIM) claims against her insurance provider. The jury returned a verdict awarding Plaintiff damages against Defendant. Defendant moved to reduce the verdict against her because of the amount paid to Plaintiff by Plaintiff's insurer. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to reduce the judgment Plaintiff obtained against Defendant by the amount of the proceeds Plaintiff received from her UIM policy. View "Llewellyn v. White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company's motion for a new trial after a jury returned a general verdict in favor of Giyo Miranda and denying State Farm's request for subrogation recovery against Miranda, holding that State Farm was not prejudiced by the court's instructions to the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine.Giyo Miranda was involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle driven by Loyd Nielson after Miranda lost control of his vehicle. State Farm, Nielson's insurer, pursued subrogation recovery against Miranda, but the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Miranda. State Farm filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that State Farm failed to establish any prejudice from the circuit court's instructions and that the court was unable to exercise meaningful appellate review on the merits of State Farm's claims. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Wadette Cothran incurred approximately $40,000 in medical expenses from injuries she received in an automobile accident. Her employer's workers' compensation carrier paid all of her medical expenses. She was also covered by her automobile insurance policy issued to her and her husband Chris by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The State Farm policy provided PIP coverage with a limit of $5,000. However, State Farm refused to pay her any PIP benefits for medical expenses based on a "Workers' Compensation Coordination" provision in the policy. This appeal requires presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's consideration whether Section 38-77-144 of the South Carolina Code (2015) prohibited an automobile insurance carrier from reducing its obligation to pay PIP benefits to its insured by the amount of workers' compensation benefits the insured received for medical expenses. The Court held that it did: "[w]hen an insurer seeks to reduce its obligation to pay benefits based on a third party's previous payment for the same claim, it is a setoff. Because that is the precise effect of State Farm's "Coordination" provision, section 38-77-144 prohibits the provision from reducing State Farm's obligation to pay PIP benefits to the Cothrans." the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the summary judgment in the Cothrans' favor. View "Cothran v. State Farm" on Justia Law

After a child fell 50 ft. from a zipline at Bible camp, the parties dispute who potentially bears financial responsibility for her injuries. The Eighth Circuit held that, under the plain language of the insurance policy, the camp's insurer was not responsible for the conference center's alleged negligence. In this case, the insurer's potential liability for the child's injuries could not possibly have arisen out of the use of the premises leased to the insured. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the entry of summary judgment for the insurer. View "Great American Alliance Insurance Co. v. Windermere Baptist Conference, Inc." on Justia Law

The federal district court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was asked to construe section 38-77-350(C) of the South Carolina Code (2015) and determine whether, under the facts presented, an insurance company was required to make a new offer of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage when an additional named insured is added to an existing policy. In 2012, Wayne Reeves acquired an insurance policy from Progressive Direct Insurance Company (Progressive) covering his motorcycle. When the policy was issued, Wayne declined optional UIM coverage. In 2015, Wayne's wife (Jennifer) and son (Bryan) were added to the policy as "drivers and household residents," because they also drove motorcycles. In 2017, Bryan sold his motorcycle and purchased another motorcycle, a 2016 Harley Davidson, which was added to the policy. At the time, Wayne had Bryan added as named insured to the policy. Progressive did not offer Bryan any optional coverages. Later in 2017, Bryan was involved in an accident while driving his 2016 Harley Davidson. Bryan ultimately made a claim against Progressive to reform the policy to include UIM coverage based on Progressive's failure to offer him the optional coverage. Progressive contended that adding Bryan as a named insured was a change to an existing policy, and as a result, Progressive was not required to offer Bryan UIM coverage. Based on the undisputed facts, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded under South Carolina law, Progressive was not required to make an additional offer of UIM coverage to Bryan. View "Progressive Direct v. Reeves" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against AUIC, alleging that the release it procured from the insured was fraudulent conveyance under statutory and common law. In this case, the insured was involved in a car accident that injured plaintiff. AUIC paid the insured to release any bad faith claim he had against the company for AUIC's failure to accept an earlier settlement offer.The Court of Appeal held that California's Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA) filing deadlines did not pose a bar to plaintiff's UVTA cause of action; the operative complaint stated a valid UVTA claim against the insured; and plaintiff waived any challenge to the demurrer ruling on the common law cause of action. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Potter v. Alliance United Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Claimant Mark Pilling filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits which insurer Travelers Insurance denied. An administrative law judge (ALJ) reversed insurer’s denial, but the Workers’ Compensation Board reversed the ALJ’s order and reinstated insurer’s denial on the ground that claimant was a nonsubject worker because he was a partner in the business for which he worked and he had not applied for coverage as a nonsubject worker. The Court of Appeals affirmed the board’s order. On claimant’s petition, the Oregon Supreme Court granted certiorari review and concluded that, even assuming claimant was a nonsubject worker, he was entitled to coverage because the business for which he worked made a specific written application for workers’ compensation coverage for him, which insurer accepted. Therefore, the Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board and remanded to the board for further proceedings. View "Pilling v. Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this equitable contribution action brought by Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (collectively, Nationwide) against Erie Insurance Exchange the Supreme Court vacated the final judgment of the circuit court granting Erie's demurrer and dismissing Nationwide's claim for equitable contribution, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law.In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 293 Va. 331 (Nationwide I), the Supreme Court resolved an insurance coverage dispute between Nationwide and Erie. Thereafter, Nationwide brought this action seeking reimbursement for Erie's share of a monetary settlement that Nationwide had paid to a tort claimant while the case was on appeal. The circuit court sustained Erie's demurrer to the claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have denied Erie's demurrer to the claim of equitable contribution based upon the coverage allocation that the Court had determined in Nationwide I. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court to enter an order awarding contribution to Nationwide consistent with the Court's allocation of coverage liability in Nationwide I and with the views expressed in this opinion. View "Nationwide Mut. Fire Insurance Co. v. Erie Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the circuit court's distribution of proceeds from Nicklaus Macke's wrongful death settlement the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court overruling Appellant's motion for a second continuance and in apportioning only a small percent of the wrongful death settlement to Appellant, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.Nicklaus, the son of Pamela Eden and Loren Macke (Macke), suffered fatal injuries in a motor vehicle collision with Austin Patton. Macke negotiated a settlement with Patton's insurance company, which offered to pay its policy limit in satisfaction of Macke's wrongful death claim against Patton. The circuit court apportioned ninety-eight percent of the settlement to Nicklaus' father and two percent to Eden, who played little to no role in Nicklaus' childhood and upbringing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in overruling Appellant's motion for continuance; and (2) the circuit court did not erroneously apply the law in making its apportionment judgment, and the apportionment was not against the weight of the evidence. View "Macke v. Patton" on Justia Law

Matthew Dye brought an action against Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company and GEICO Indemnity Company, seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., for injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle he had recently purchased. At plaintiff’s request, plaintiff’s father had registered the vehicle in plaintiff’s name and obtained a no-fault insurance policy from Esurance. The declarations page of the policy identified only plaintiff’s father as the named insured. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was living with his wife, who owned a vehicle that was insured by GEICO. After Esurance and GEICO refused to cover plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff filed a breach-of-contract claim against both insurers along with a declaratory action, alleging that either Esurance or GEICO was obligated to pay his no-fault PIP benefits and requesting that the trial court determine the parties’ respective rights and duties. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review centered on whether an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident was excluded from receiving statutory no-fault insurance benefits under the no-fault act when someone other than an owner or registrant purchased no-fault insurance for that vehicle. The Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]t least one owner or registrant must have the insurance required by MCL 500.3101(1), and ‘when none of the owners maintains the requisite coverage, no owner may recover [personal injury protection (PIP)] benefits.’ ” The Supreme Court concluded an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle was not required to personally purchase no-fault insurance for his or her vehicle in order to avoid the statutory bar to PIP benefits. Rather, MCL 500.3101(1) only requires that the owner or registrant “maintain” no-fault insurance. The Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Dye v. Esurance Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law