Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

First American Title Insurance Company issued title insurance policies to the predecessors of North Fork Land & Cattle, LLLP. When North Fork learned that Bunker Road, which crosses three of North Fork’s properties, was established as a county road, North Fork submitted notices of claims under the title insurance policies, asserting that First American failed to disclose to one of North Fork’s predecessors that Bunker Road burdened the properties and that it was damaged by the Bunker Road encumbrance. First American did not respond to North Fork’s claims, and North Fork filed suit against First American. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of First American, concluding that North Fork did not meet the definition of “insured” under the title insurance policies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that North Fork is a covered insured under the terms of the title insurance policy. Remanded. View "N. Fork Land & Cattle, LLLP v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A condominium homeowners association sued a contractor for negligence. The contractor’s insurer refused to defend the contractor against the action, and the contractor and the homeowners association thereafter entered into a settlement that included a stipulated judgment against the contractor, a covenant by the homeowners association not to execute that judgment, and an assignment to the homeowners association of the contractor’s claims against its insurer. When the homeowners association then initiated a garnishment action against the insurer, however, the trial court dismissed the action on the ground that, under “Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire & Marine,” (517 P2d 262 (1973)), the covenant not to execute had released the contractor from any obligation to pay the homeowners association and, in the process, necessarily released the insurer too. The homeowners association appealed, arguing that “Stubblefield” either was distinguishable on its facts or had been superseded by statute. In the alternative, it argued that Stubblefield should have been overruled. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that, although Stubblefield was not distinguishable and had not been superseded by statute, it was wrongly decided. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brownstone Homes Condo. Assn. v. Brownstone Forest Hts." on Justia Law

Equinox on the Battenkill Management Association, Inc., appealed a superior court's grant of summary-judgment denying insurance coverage. The appeal arose from a declaratory judgment action against management association’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, Inc., to determine coverage under a commercial general liability policy for damage to cantilevered balconies on condominium units it managed in Manchester. The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether "Gage v. Union Mutual Fire Insurance Co,." (169 A.2d 29 (1961)) was still good law with regards to the meaning of "collapse" and whether "Gage" controlled the result here. After review, the Court concluded that the policy language in this dispute was broader than the language in Gage and that therefore Gage did not control. The Court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for that court to resolve disputed questions of fact and interpret the applicable policy language. View "Equinox on the Battenkill Management Assn., Inc. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, a fire destroyed three buildings and related equipment that were owned by Jackson Hop, LLC, and were used to dry hops, to process and bale hops, and to store hop bales. The buildings were insured by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho for the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment, not to exceed the policy limit. Farm Bureau’s appraisers determined that the actual cash value of the buildings was $295,000 and the value of the equipment was $85,909. Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $380,909. Jackson Hop disagreed with that figure, and it hired its own appraiser, who concluded that the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment totaled $1,410,000. Farm Bureau retained another appraiser to review the report of Jackson Hop’s appraiser, and that appraiser concluded that the value of $1,410,000 was unrealistically high. Jackson Hop filed this action to recover the balance of what it contended was owing under the insurance policy, plus prejudgment interest. The parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration as provided in the policy. During that process, Jackson Hop presented additional opinions regarding the actual cash values, ranging from $800,000 to $1,167,000 for the buildings and $379,108 to $399,000 for the equipment. Farm Bureau’s experts revised their opinions upward, although only from $295,000 to $333,239 for the buildings and from $85,909 to $133,000 for the equipment. Before completion of the arbitration, Farm Bureau paid an additional sum of $85,330. Arbitrators determined that the actual cash value of the buildings and the equipment was $740,000 and $315,000, respectively, for a total of $1,055,000. Within seven days of the arbitrators’ decision, Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $588,761, which was the amount of the arbitrators’ award less the prior payments. Jackson Hop filed a motion asking the district court to confirm the arbitrators’ award and to award Jackson Hop prejudgment interest, court costs, and attorney fees. Farm Bureau filed an objection to the request for court costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. The court awarded Jackson Hop attorney fees, but denied the request for court costs because the parties’ arbitration agreement stated that both parties would pay their own costs, and the court denied the request for prejudgment interest because the amount of damages was unliquidated and unascertainable by a mathematical process until the arbitrators’ award. Jackson Hop then appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jackson Hop v. Farm Bureau Insurance" on Justia Law

Reyna Bernard purchased property and executed a promissory note in the principal amount secured by a mortgage on the property. The mortgage was assigned to HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. A fire later destroyed the property. Manuel Rosario entered into an insurance adjusting agreement with an LLC providing that the LLC would assist with the adjustment of the loss in return for a percentage of the total recoverable loss. Thereafter, Bernard defaulted on the note, and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale to HSBC, leaving an unpaid deficiency on the note in the amount of $246,072. Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association (RIJRA) subsequently initiated an interpleader action to determine the respective rights of the LLC, Bernard, and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC as agent for HSBC with regard to the insurance proceeds. The superior court found that Ocwen was entitled to the entirety of the insurance proceeds pursuant to the language contained in the mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bernard and Rosario failed to demonstrate their entitlement to the insurance proceeds; and (2) the mortgage executed by Bernard was duly acknowledged as statutorily required and was therefore valid. View "R.I. Joint Reinsurance Ass’n v. Rosario" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Doug and Gayle Mellin brought a declaratory judgment action asserting, in relevant part, that their homeowner’s insurance policy with defendant Northern Security Insurance Company, Inc. required Northern to reimburse them for losses to their condominium caused by cat urine odor. Plaintiffs' downstairs neighbor kept two cats in her condominium. They surmised that the smell entered their unit from the downstairs condominium through an open plumbing chase servicing the kitchen. In December 2010, plaintiffs filed a claim under their homeowner’s insurance policy, which was denied. Epping's building/health inspector examined the unit and sent a letter to plaintiffs stating that they "have a health problem existing" and the odor "is such that [they] need to move out of[] the apartment temporarily and have a company terminate the odor." Remediation proved unsuccessful. Plaintiffs continued to reside in the unit until February 1, 2011. They claimed that, after that time, they "could [not] have tenants," although they occasionally occupied the unit. Ultimately, they sold their condominium. They claimed that the sale price for the unit was significantly less than that for a comparable condominium in the area which was unaffected by cat urine odor. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Northern. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment: plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate a "tangible physical alteration" to the unit to prove that the unit was rendered permanently uninhabitable. "Rather, to demonstrate a physical loss under Coverage A, they must establish a distinct and demonstrable alteration to the unit." The Court also reversed with regard to a "pollution exclusion clause" found in plaintiffs' policy: "pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous when applied to the facts of this case and, as such, does not preclude coverage for the plaintiffs’ claims." And with regard to "Coverage D," the Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting Northern judgment as a matter of law. This was vacated, and the entire case remanded for further proceedings. View "Mellin v. Northern Security Insurance Company, Inc." on Justia Law

A large commercial development in Kansas City, Missouri was aborted in the middle of construction due to cost overruns. When the developer would not cover the shortfall, the construction lender stopped releasing committed loan funds, and contractors filed liens against the property for their unpaid work on the unfinished project. Bankruptcy followed, and the contractors’ liens were given priority over the lender’s security interest in the failed development, leaving little recovery for the lender. The lender looked to its title insurer for indemnification. The title policy generally covers lien defects, but it also contains a standard exclusion for liens “created, suffered, assumed or agreed to” by the insured lender. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the title company. The exclusion applies to the liens at issue, which resulted from the lender’s cutoff of loan funds, so the title insurer owed no duty to indemnify. The liens arose from insufficient project funds, a risk of loss that the lender, not the title company, had authority and responsibility to discover, monitor, and prevent. View "BB Syndication Servs, Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review centered on an insurance-coverage dispute that began in 2011 between Severin and Stephanie Hegel and The First Liberty Insurance Corporation. The Hegels claimed that First Liberty improperly denied their claim for a "sinkhole loss," defined under their homeowner's insurance policy as "structural damage to the building, including the foundation, caused by sinkhole activity." First Liberty argued that the damage to the Hegels' residence did not qualify as "structural damage," a term that was not defined in either the policy or the version of the Florida sinkhole-insurance statute applicable to their claim. The the district court granted summary judgment for the Hegels, finding that "structural damage" meant any "damage to the structure" and awarded them $166,518.17 in damages. First Liberty appealed. After review, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded: the district court erred in equating the contractual term "structural damage" with any "damage to the structure." The case was remanded for further proceedings on whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding how much, if any, structural damage to the Hegels' house (as properly defined) was due to sinkhole activity. The district court's determination on this issue will in turn lead to either a new grant of summary judgment for the appropriate party or to a trial on the merits. View "Hegel v. First Liberty Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

After a subsurface water main abutting Plaintiffs’ property ruptured, causing water to flood into and damage their home’s basement, Plaintiffs made a claim under their homeowners’ insurance policy issued by Defendant, Allstate Indemnity Company. Allstate disclaimed coverage based on a provision in the policy excluding coverage for loss caused by water on or below the surface of the ground, including water that seeps through any part of the residence premises. Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that Allstate had improperly disclaimed coverage because their claim fell within the exception to the water loss exclusion. Supreme Court declared that Plaintiffs’ loss was covered under the policy and that Allstate was required to pay the claim. The Appellate Division modified the order by vacating the declaration and otherwise affirmed, concluding that the policy was ambiguous and should be construed in favor of Plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the policy’s unambiguous language excluded from coverage the water damage to Plaintiffs’ home, and the exception did not nullify the water loss exclusion or render it ambiguous. View "Platek v. Town of Hamberg" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cogswell Farm Condominium Association filed a declaratory judgment action with respect to two exclusions in insurance policies issued by respondents Tower Group, Inc. and Acadia Insurance Company. The trial court held that the two exclusions at issue precluded coverage for petitioner's underlying lawsuit against Lemery Building Company, Inc. In 2009, Cogswell sued Lemery and others, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and negligent supervision in the construction of 24 residential condominium units. Cogswell asserted that the "weather barrier" components of the units – including the water/ice shield, flashing, siding, and vapor barrier – were defectively constructed and resulted in damage to the units due to water leaks. Because the units were sold at different times and the policies were in effect during two different time periods, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in holding that one policy exclusion served as a bar for coverage for each unit after it was sold. Furthermore, the Court found that the other exclusion was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting respondents summary judgment with respect to that exclusion. The trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cogswell Farm Condominium Ass'n v. Tower Group, Inc." on Justia Law