Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed a quiet title action against owners of adjacent lots, seeking a declaration that express easements granted in favor of the adjacent lots were invalid. The defendants filed counterclaims asserting that the express easements were valid. Plaintiffs submitted to Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") a claim for defense pursuant to a policy of title insurance issued by Commonwealth insuring Plaintiffs’ property, but Commonwealth denied the claim. In the quiet title action, the district court extinguished the express easements and denied the counterclaims but concluded that the defendants possessed implied easements. While the quiet title action was pending, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Commonwealth, seeking a determination that Commonwealth breached its duty under the policy by refusing to provide a defense to the counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in sustaining Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment because Commonwealth did not violate its contract with Plaintiffs by denying coverage or indemnification. View "Woodle v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case had its origins in a property damage action brought by Jason and Gina Corrick against B&B Transit, Inc. B&B Transit filed a notice and coverage claim with its insurer, Montpelier US Insurance Company. Montpelier eventually settled the case against B&B Transit. While the Corricks’ complaint was still pending, Respondents, including B&B Transit, filed a first-party bad faith claim against Petitioners, including Montpelier and its national coverage counsel, Charlston, Revich & Wollitz (“CRW”). Respondents subsequently served discovery requests on Petitioners. After CRW opposed disclosure of certain requested documents, Respondents filed a motion to compel disclosure of the documents. The circuit court entered an order requiring CRW to disclose certain documents. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s discovery order. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition as moulded, concluding that part of the circuit court’s order permitting discovery of documents sought by Respondents was prohibited from enforcement because the documents were protected under the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. Montpelier US Ins. Co. v. Hon. Bloom" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cheryl Hersh worked for defendant County of Morris. The County rented approximately sixty-five parking spaces for its employees in the Cattano Garage, a private parking garage containing several hundred parking spaces located approximately two blocks from Hersh’s office. Although she did not have sufficient seniority to park in a county-owned lot located adjacent to her building, the County granted Hersh permission to park in one of the rented spots, gave her a scan card so she could enter the garage, and instructed her to park on the third level. Shortly after Hersh parked her car and exited the structure, she was struck by a motor vehicle while crossing a public street between the garage and her office. Hersh suffered significant injuries. Hersh filed for workers' compensation benefits. The judge concluded Hersh's injuries were compensable, finding that under New Jersey case law, parking lots provided or designated for employee use are part of the employer's premises for purposes of workers' compensation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The County appealed. The Supreme Court reversed: because the County did not control the garage where Hersh parked, the route of ingress and egress from the parking garage to her office, or the public street where she was injured, and did not expose her to any special or additional hazards, Hersh's injury occurred outside of the employer's premises and therefore was not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. View "Hersh v. County of Morris" on Justia Law

Amzak appealed the district court's summary judgment on its loan loss claims against its title insurance policy provider and related entities. The court concluded that Amzak failed to show that it suffered actual loss because of a failure of title and STL could not be held responsible for any harm suffered by Amzak. The court formalized the holding in First State Bank v. American Title and likewise rejected the guarantee rationale of Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., and agreed with the district court's rejection of Amzak's argument that STL breached the title policy at the time of the loan because its mortgage was voidable at that time. The court also disposed of Amzak's negligence claim where STL's delay in making a complete filing of Amzak's mortgage was not a legal cause of Amzak's loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Amzak Capital Mgmt. v. Stewart Title" on Justia Law

In 2007, Steven and Valerie Hruza sought to obtain a loan from Clearwater Mortgage (Clearwater). Clearwater requested Defendant-Respondent Wade Massey to perform an appraisal of their real property located in Caldwell. Massey owned co-defendant Capitol West Appraisals and is a professional appraiser licensed to practice in Idaho. Massey performed the appraisal and sent a Summary Appraisal Report to Clearwater indicating that market value of the property was $1,150,000. Clearwater decided to deny the Hruzas' loan application before considering the appraisal. Massey admitted that both he and Clearwater were aware that the appraisal contained errors. Clearwater's president and Massey agreed that Massey would not fix the errors and Clearwater would not pay Massey for the appraisal. The Hruzas submitted a subsequent loan application to Idahy Federal Credit Union (now known as Icon). Icon approved the loan, secured by a deed of trust on the Hruzas' property. Icon sent a check to Capitol, and Capitol accepted payment. Plaintiff-Appellant CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. was the fidelity bond insurer for Icon. It paid Icon as a result of the Hruzas' default on their loan. As Icon's subrogee, CUMIS filed suit against Massey and Capitol, alleging professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract based on Massey's conduct in preparing the appraisal. A central point of dispute between the parties was how Icon obtained the appraisal. CUMIS alleged that the Hruzas included the appraisal with their loan application, thus prompting Icon to pay Capitol for the appraisal. Massey suggested that Icon improperly obtained the appraisal, pointing to Icon's admission that it did not know how it obtained it and that Icon did not request a letter of assignment from Clearwater to use or rely on the appraisal. The district court concluded that CUMIS could not establish that Massey owed a legal duty to Icon, that Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against appraisers, and that CUMIS had no breach of contract claim. Therefore, the district court granted Massey’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims asserted by CUMIS, with prejudice. Finding that there remained issues of material fact, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing CUMIS's complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey" on Justia Law

A bank purchased insurance on a commercial property mortgaged to it by a borrower. The policy prohibited an assignment "of this Policy" without the insurer's consent. After the property was damaged, the bank assigned its loss claim to the borrower. The insurer refused to pay the borrower's claim because of the nonassignment provision, and the borrower sued. The district court held that the suit was barred and awarded judgment for the insurer. The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the nonassignment provision was enforceable. The Court concluded, after review of the provision in question, that the provision did not apply to the assignment of a postloss claim, so the Court did not determine the enforceability of a provision prohibiting such assignments. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "City Center West v. American Modern Home Insurance" on Justia Law

Defendant-sellers obtained a policy from American Family Mutual Insurance Company insuring an apartment building. When preparing for the sale of the building, Defendants signed a real estate condition report stating that they were not aware of the presence of asbestos on the premises. After Plaintiff-buyers purchased the building, their contractor discovered asbestos in the building. Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendants for breach of contract/warranty and negligence in failing to adequately disclose defective conditions. The circuit court held that American Family had no duty to defend or indemnify Defendants because an asbestos exclusion in the American Family policy precluded coverage. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the policy precluded coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the asbestos exclusion in the American Family policy precluded coverage for the losses alleged by Plaintiffs. View "Phillips v. Parmelee" on Justia Law

Anne Sullivan-Thorne (Defendant) executed a mortgage on her house in favor of IndyMac Bank, FSB. Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company filed an action against Defendant relating to damage done to the home. As part of the litigation, Defendant filed an action against IndyMac seeking to have all insurance proceeds payable to her alone. IndyMac counterclaimed against Defendant, alleging that Defendant had breached the note and mortgage and that Defendant had caused IndyMac not to receive payment of insurance proceeds in an amount sufficient to repair the property. The superior court dismissed IndyMac's counterclaim and entered a final judgment in which the court ordered that Cambridge re-issue the insurance proceeds and make them payable to Defendant alone. IndyMac later assigned the mortgage to Wilmington Trust Company (Plaintiff), who filed this action seeking a judgment of foreclosure against Defendant. The district court entered summary judgment for Defendant, finding that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that because Wilmington's foreclosure claim did not present matters that "were, or might have been, litigated" in the earlier action, the court erred in entering summary judgment for Defendant on claim preclusion grounds. View "Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sullivan-Thorne" on Justia Law

In a proposed class action, Schilke alleged that Wachovia, her lender and holder of a mortgage on her home, fraudulently placed insurance on her property when her homeowner’s policy lapsed. Wachovia secured the replacement coverage from ASI and charged her for it, as specifically permitted by her loan agreement. The premium was more than twice what she had paid for her own policy and included a commission to Wachovia’s insurance-agency affiliate, also as permitted under the loan agreement. Schilke calls the commission a “kickback” and asserted statutory and common-law claims, most sounding in fraud or contract. The district court dismissed based on federal preemption and the filed-rate doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The loan agreement and related disclosures and notices conclusively show that there was no deception at work. Wachovia fully disclosed that lender-placed insurance could be significantly more expensive than her own policy and could include a fee or other compensation to the bank and its insurance-agency affiliate. Maintaining property insurance was Schilke’s contractual obligation and she failed to fulfill it. . View "Schilke v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Gulfport Mississippi apartment complex was damaged in Hurricane Katrina. Its insurer, RSUI paid actual-cash-value proceeds. The parties began negotiating for additional replacement-cost proceeds. During negotiations, the named-insured contracted to sell the property in its unrepaired state to Edgewood and notified RSUI of its intention to assign the claim for replacement-cost proceeds. RSUI responded that if the property was sold before repair, there could be no recovery of replacement-cost proceeds. The sale closed. The seller and Edgewood sought a declaration that the insurer was obligated to pay the claim with a related breach-of-contract action. Edgewood repaired the property. The litigation continued for years until it became clear that there had been no assignment. The district court dismissed the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Absent an assignment, Edgewood lacks standing; the seller still owns the claim and remains a proper plaintiff. The seller had an insurable interest when the policy issued and at the time of the loss; the sale of the property in its unrepaired state did not extinguish its right to recover. Although the policy specifies that replacement-cost proceeds will not be paid until the property is repaired, it does not require that the insured complete the repairs itself. View "Southland Mgmt. Corp. v. RSUI Indem. Co." on Justia Law