Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Title insurance purchasers, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated consumers, claimed that insurers collectively fixed title insurance rates in violation of the Sherman Act. Title insurers in Delaware are required to file their insurance rates with the state Department of Insurance, Del. Code tit. 18, 2504(a). Insurers may comply with the state’s rate filing requirements through a licensed rating organization. Defendants, title insurers, are members of and file their rates through the Delaware Title Insurance Rating Bureau, which is licensed by the DOI; the statutory scheme authorizes cooperative action. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint is barred by the filed-rate doctrine (which precludes antitrust suits based on rates currently filed with federal or state agencies), lack of standing, and federal antitrust liability exemptions. The Third Circuit affirmed.

This action stemmed from an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit wherein plaintiff appealed the dismissal of claims under section 627.701(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and the denial of a motion to enforce execution of the judgment, and defendant appealed the denial of motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff had filed a claim with defendant, its property insurer, pursuant to an insurance policy but was dissatisfied with defendant's investigation and processing of its claim. Based on the facts and analysis, the court answered the first, third, fourth, and fifth questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit in the negative. In doing so, the court did not reach the second certified question. The court concluded that under Florida law: (1) first-party claims were actually statutory bad-faith claims that must be brought under section 624.155; (2) an insured could not bring a claim against an insurer for failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established by section 627.701(4)(a); (3) an insurer's failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established in section 627.701(4)(a) did not render a noncompliant hurricane deductible provision in an insurance policy void and unenforceable as the Legislature had not provided for this penalty; and (4) a contractual provision mandating payment of benefits upon "entry of a final judgment" did not waive the insurer's procedural right to post a bond and stay the execution of a money judgment pending resolution of appeal.

The United States Court of appeals asked the court to answer a question that stemmed from a dispute over the proper interpretation under Georgia law of a contract insuring real property. The primary issue presented was whether the court's ruling in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, a case involving an automobile insurance policy wherein the court held that a provision requiring the insurer to pay for loss to the insured's car required the insurer to also pay for any diminution in value of the repaired vehicle, was applicable. The court held that its ruling in Mabry was not limited by the type of property insured, but rather spoke generally to the measure of damages an insurer was obligated to pay.

IWC appealed the district court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of IDH. Hawaiian, a Florida condominium, contracted with IDH for roof repair. While IDH was conducting the repairs, a large stone veneer wall fell, causing damage to the condominium. Hawaiian's insurer, ICW, sued IDH for negligence. IDH alleged that the wall fell because it was structurally unsound. During trial, at the close of ICW's case, the district court granted IDH's motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could find that IDH was negligent because ICW failed to present any evidence on the standard of care in the roofing industry. Without reaching the issue of whether roofers were "professionals" under Florida law, the court held that ICW was required to put forth some evidence of the standard of care in the roofing industry in order to meet its burden. Because ICW failed to do so, judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. Further, the specificity requirement in Rule 50(a)(2) did not bar the granting of judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This appeal stemmed from litigation between a homeowner, its insurer, and the company hired to restore the home after a series of storms caused damage to the home. A jury found in the restoration company's favor and the trial court rendered judgment against the homeowner and its insurer, jointly and severally. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment with respect to the homeowner's state Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com Code 17.50, claim because the homeowner was not a prevailing party and he was not a entitled to an order restoring all amounts paid under the contracts without deducting the value received under those agreements. The court also affirmed the restoration company's charge error complaint. The court reversed the court of appeals' judgment as to the insurer where the insurer received direct consideration for its promise to pay for the dehumidification and the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for that court to consider the insurer's remaining arguments, which included challenges to the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury findings.

Plaintiffs Marc and Laurie Brown appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to Defendant Concord Group Insurance Company in their insurance coverage action. In 2005, Plaintiffs purchased a house from then-owner Michael Rogers. Two years later, they discovered water leaking into the house near a sliding glass door. They contacted Eugene Spencer, the person who built the house, to repair the problem. In 2009, Plaintiffs again observed water leaking into the house near the same sliding glass door. This time they contacted Daniel Lewis to repair the problem. Lewis later testified that damage was caused by leaks Spencer did not discover during his repair, but probably would have discovered had he removed all of the siding on the wall. The damage required extensive repair work. Concord Group insured Spencer. His policy did not cover "property damage" to his work "arising out of [his work] or any part of [his work]." Plaintiffs argued that the policy provided coverage because Spencer negligently repaired their house in 2007, and the damage in 2009 would not have occurred but for his negligence. Upon review of the policy in question, the Supreme Court concluded it was error for the trial court to grant Concord Group summary judgment because what caused the damage (either the 2003 or the 2007 work) was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policy provided coverage in this case. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Mark Tibert, Melvin Tibert, Sue Tibert, and William Tibert appealed a district court judgment that dismissed their declaratory judgment action against Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. Mark, Melvin, and William Tibert are brothers, and Sue Tibert is Mark's wife. The Tiberts were involved in a lengthy dispute with Minto Grain, LLC, and its owners William and Katherine Slominski. Mark and Sue Tibert and Melvin Tibert owned homes on property adjacent to a grain elevator owned and operated by Minto Grain. Minto Grain intended to expand its facility, and acquired a portion of BNSF Railway's right-of-way on a roadway abutting and providing access to the Tiberts' properties. The Tiberts had various homeowner's policies and umbrella policies, which included personal injury liability endorsements, with Nodak. In 2004, Minto Grain brought an action against the Tiberts, alleging civil conspiracy, wrongful interference with business, tortious interference with contract, nuisance, trespass, and abuse of process. The Tiberts delivered the complaint to Nodak. Nodak denied it had a duty to indemnify or defend the Tiberts under the policies. The Tiberts brought this declaratory judgment action against Nodak, seeking indemnification and recovery of their costs of defending the underlying action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to indemnify the Tiberts for the damages paid to Minto Grain, but did err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to defend the Tiberts in the underlying action. The Court considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the parties and found them to be either unnecessary to its decision or without merit.

Charles and Lisa Hart filed a complaint against TICOR Title Insurance Company for breach of contract after TICOR refused to defend the Harts under their title insurance policy against an escheat claim asserted by the State. The district court entered judgment in favor of TICOR and awarded TICOR attorneys' fees and costs. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of TICOR and vacated the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to TICOR, holding that TICOR owed a duty to defend the Harts under the policy against the State's claim and prayer for affirmative relief. Remanded to the district court with instructions (1) to enter judgment in favor of the Harts, and (2) to determine an award of attorneys fees and costs to the Harts.

In an insurance coverage dispute, the court was required to determine, under Florida law, what constituted "property damage" under a post-1986 standard form commercial general liability (CGL) policy with products-completed operations hazard (PCOH) coverage. Specifically, whether such a policy issued to a general contractor for damage to the part of the completed project performed by a subcontractor, but not to any other project component, caused by a subcontractor's defective work. In light of Florida precedent addressing the scope of similar CGL policies, the court concluded that the policy provided no coverage in this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the damage at issue was not covered under the policy.

Plaintiff challenged defendant's denial of coverage under the terms of an insurance policy provided under the National Flood Insurance Program, a program created by Congress that subsidized flood insurance for individuals and businesses in areas of high flood risk. Plaintiff argued that defendant's denial of coverage excused compliance with the terms of the policy. Because the court must strictly interpret the terms of governmental insurance policies backed by federal funds, and because the policy required compliance with a proof of loss requirement that plaintiff admitted he did not follow, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant.