Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting a summary judgment motion filed by Petitioners and two insurers, Farmers Insurance Exchange and Truck Insurance Exchange (collectively, Insurers), and denying Respondent's cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that the district court did not err by finding that Insurers had no duty to defend Respondent under the terms of the relevant insurance policies.After a complaint in the underlying lawsuit alleging slander, malicious prosecution, and bodily injury was amended to add Respondent as a defendant Respondent tendered the complaint to Farmers seeking defense and indemnity under a series of homeowners insurance policies and commercial general liability policies. Later, the Insurers filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination that they were not obligated to defend and indemnity Respondent. The district court found that Insurers had no duty to defend Respondent under any of the policies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondent failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the claims fell within the scope of coverage of any of the policies at issue. View "Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Minemyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this insurance dispute over damages allegedly caused by the poor construction of an in-ground pool, holding that this Court overrules the portions of Wisconsin Pharmacy Co. v. Nebraska Cultures of California, Inc., 876 N.W.2d 72 (Wis. 2016), stating that "property damages" must be to "other property" for purposes of determining an initial grant of coverage in a commercial general liability (CGL) policy.Due to the damages caused by the cracking of Homeowner's pool, Homeowner was forced to demolish the entire pool structure and construct a new one. Two insurers on appeal had issued CGL policies to the pool's general contractor, and a third insurer issued a CGL policy to the supplier of the pump mix used for the pool's construction. All three insurers sought a declaration that their policies did not provide coverage to Homeowner. The Supreme Court held, under the circumstances of this case, that none of the insurers were entitled to summary judgment and accordingly remanded the cause back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "5 Walworth, LLC v. Engerman Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs' insurer and its agent in this negligence action brought by Plaintiffs seeking to recover damages after their home was destroyed in a fire, holding that the district court did not err.Insureds purchased a homeowners insurance policy from Insurer through a licensed insurance producer (Agent). Insureds later filed a complaint alleging that Agent negligently advised them on the estimated replacement value of their home and negligently misrepresented the adequacy of their policy limits in the event of a total loss. Insureds also alleged that Insurer was liable under a theory of respondent superior. The district court granted summary judgment for Insurer and Agent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Insureds' claims failed as a matter of law and that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Callahan v. Brant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court granting summary judgment and final judgment in favor of third-party defendants, Western Surety Company and the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (collectively, the Sureties) in this case concerning the scope of the sureties' liability under a performance and payment bond issued in conjunction with a public works project, holding that there was no error.The Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) was sued by Apex Development Company in this action alleging that RIDOT and its contractors trespassed and damaged Apex's private property. RIDOT filed a third-party complaint against the Sureties and others, seeking full indemnity and contribution. A hearing justice granted summary judgment for the Sureties, and a final judgment was entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that RIDOT was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error on appeal. View "Apex Development Co., LLC v. State of R.I. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the meaning and application of a standard title insurance policy exclusion (Exclusion 3(a)) designed to cover any defects, encumbrances, or adverse claims created or suffered by the insured in the context of construction lending, holding that this Court's opinion in First American Title Insurance Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC, 218 Ariz. 394 (2008), sets forth the proper interpretation and application Exclusion 3(a).In its underlying rulings, the trial court invoked Action Acquisitions to interpret Exclusion 3(a) in the construction lending context. The court of appeals reversed, instead applying the bright-line rule articulated in BB Syndication Services, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance Co., 780 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) this Court adopts Action Acquisitions' causation test for Exclusion 3(a)'s applicability; and (2) the court of appeals erred in applying the BB Syndication approach. View "Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. v. Osborn III Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in the proceedings below, holding that an appraiser cannot be "disinterested" if he or she, or a firm in which he or she has an interest, is to be compensated for services as a public adjuster with a contingency fee.At issue was whether George Keys, the president of Keys Claims Consultants, Inc. (KCC), a homeowner's public adjusting firm, which was to be compensated on a contingency basis for its adjusting services, could subsequently serve as a "disinterested" appraiser for Jon Parrish under the language of the relevant insurance policy with State Farm. The trial court concluded that Keys could serve as Parrish's disinterested appraiser because the two had disclosed their arrangement to State Farm. The Second District reversed, concluding that Keys could not serve as Parrish's disinterested appraiser. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Keys’s company, KCC, was to be compensated via contingency fee, Keys had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the claim and could not qualify as a “disinterested” appraiser. View "Parrish v. State Farm Fla. Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court affirming the Polk County assessor's original tax valuation of two large corporate office buildings in downtown Des Moines at $87,050,000 and $44,910,000, holding that the district court did not err by relying on the Board's expert appraisers when it affirmed the assessor's valuation.Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the owner of the buildings at issue, protested the valuation, and the Polk County Board of Review upheld the valuation. The district court affirmed the assessment after hearing appraisers appointed by both the Board and Nationwide as expert witnesses and finding the Board's experts more reliable. The court of appeals reversed and reduced the assessments. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's decision and affirmed the judgment of the district court holding (1) there was no basis to reject the district court's determination about the relative reliability of the expert witness testimony; and (2) the Board met its burden to prove that the valuation was not excessive. View "Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Polk County Board of Review" on Justia Law

Sheckler rented residential property from McIntosh. The lease provided McIntosh “shall maintain fire and other hazard insurance on the premises only” and that Sheckler was responsible for insurance on possessions contained in the premises. The lease's indemnification clause exculpated McIntosh from any damages or injury occurring on the premises. McIntosh obtained insurance from Auto-Owners; first-party dwelling coverage provided coverage for fire damage and third-party landlord liability coverage provided coverage for claims brought by third parties that the insured “becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of or arising out of bodily injury or property damage.” The third-party coverage provided a duty to defend any claim covered by the policy, excluding “property damage to property occupied or used by an insured or rented to or in the care of, any insured.” The policy listed McIntosh as the only named insured. McIntosh claims no money received from Sheckler was used to pay the annual premium.Sheckler notified McIntosh that the gas stove was not working. McIntosh placed a service call. The technician’s efforts resulted in a fire that caused substantial property damage. Auto-Owners paid McIntosh for damages incurred due to the fire and lost rental income and filed a subrogation action against the technician (Workman), who filed a third-party contribution complaint against Sheckler. Sheckler tendered the defense to Auto-Owners, which rejected the claim. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the rejection of Sheckler’s claim. An insurer’s duty to defend or indemnify does not extend to the tenant of an insured property against a third-party negligence contribution claim when the tenant is not identified as a person insured under the policy. View "Sheckler v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company's decision to rescind an insurance policy purchased for a derelict house Homeowner intended to remodel, holding that questions of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.After a fire occurred, damaging the house and some of its contents, Allstate announced that it was rescinding the homeowners' insurance policy issued to Homeowner, asserting that Homeowner digitally signed an application in which he falsely answered a request as to whether he would occupy the house within thirty days. Plaintiffs, including Homeowner, sued Allstate for breach of contract and unfair trade practices. The circuit court granted Allstate's motion to rescind the policy, concluding that there was no factual dispute that Homeowner had made false statements on his insurance application. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that questions of material fact existed regarding whether Plaintiff's answer to Allstate's thirty-day-occupancy question was false and whether the question was material to Allstate's issuance of the policy. View "McDowell v. Allstate Vehicle & Property Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a civil suit against an insurer based on allegations that the insurer negligently advised them that they did not need to purchase a builder's risk policy for a hotel project. The district court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding that the insurer had no duty to give advice about different coverages or to ensure that adequate coverage existed and that plaintiffs failed to show the existence of a special relationship between the agent and the insureds that would give rise to additional duties on the agent's part to ensure the insured had adequate coverage.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in its resolution of the motion for summary judgment. View "I Square Management, LLC v. McGriff Insurance Services, Inc." on Justia Law