Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Robert Loppi purchased a life insurance policy from United Investors Life Insurance Co. in which he initially named Marilyn Loppi, his wife, as the beneficiary. In 2008, after Marilyn filed for divorce from Robert, Robert applied to United Investors to change the beneficiary on his life insurance policy to his uncle, David Loppi. In 2009, during the course of the divorce proceeding, the family court entered an interlocutory order ordering that Robert’s life insurance policies be cashed in and that the cash surrender value be divided equally between Robert and Marilyn. Before Robert complied with the interlocutory order, Robert died. Thereafter, United Investors declined to pay the life insurance death benefit to either David or Marilyn. David filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that he alone was entitled to the life insurance policy death benefit. The hearing justice granted David’s petition for declaratory judgment stating that David was entitled to 100 percent of the policy proceeds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Marilyn was not entitled to any portion of the life insurance proceeds at issue. View "Loppi v. United Investors Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a home that a pre-closing inspection revealed had corrosion on the oil heating system in the basement. Although the boiler and oil tank were replaced prior to the sale of the home, the oil feed line buried beneath the concrete floor in the basement was not replaced. After Plaintiffs discovered an oil leak at the feed line, they initiated claims under their homeowners’ insurance policy issued by Defendant. Defendant denied Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant for breach of contract. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claim was caused by gradual corrosion of an oil fuel feed line, not by a sudden or accidental loss, and the claim was therefore barred by the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the undisputed evidence indicated that the damage to Plaintiffs’ property was caused by corrosion, which was not covered by their insurance policy, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Nunez v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and other defendants, alleging multiple counts. A jury found Defendants liable for abuse of process and awarded compensatory and punitive damages against each defendant. On May 31, 2012, judgments were entered against Defendants. On August 31, 2012, Metropolitan filed an appeal from the May 31, 2012 judgment, and on September 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal from the May 31, 2012 judgment. Metropolitan moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s cross-appeal, arguing that it was untimely because it was not filed within the initial twenty-day appeal period that began to run after entry of the August 20, 2012 orders. The trial justice denied Metropolitan’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff’s cross-appeal was timely because it was filed within twenty days of Metropolitan’s August 31, 2012 notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s September 18, 2012 notice of cross-appeal was timely because it was filed within the twenty-day period triggered by Metropolitan’s August 31, 2012 notice of appeal. View "Miller v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce from Dean Miller, Plaintiff and Dean executed a property settlement agreement providing that Dean would maintain life insurance for the benefit of the parties' four minor children until they reached the age of majority. Dean subsequently executed a service request form listing his children as the beneficiaries of his life insurance policy and instructing that beneficial interests be paid to and managed by Kristin Saunders as custodial trustee for the benefit of his minor children. After Dean died, funds from his life insurance policy were distributed to Saunders. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief asking the superior court to declare that Dean's four children were the sole beneficiaries of his life insurance policy. The court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that Dean created a valid custodial trust pursuant to the Rhode Island Uniform Custodial Trust Act (RIUCTA) and that the trust was not inconsistent with Dean's obligations under the property settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Dean created a custodial trust pursuant to RIUCTA; and (2) Dean did not violate the property settlement agreement by designating Saunders as custodial trustee on the service request form. View "Miller v. Saunders" on Justia Law

Defendant's employer had insurance through American States Insurance Policy (ASIC). After Defendant was involved in a car accident, Defendant sent ASIC written notice of a potential claim under ASIC's uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) coverage. ASIC did not formally deny the claim but, rather, responded with a declaratory-judgment action, asserting that because Defendant had failed to undertake legal action or to make a written demand for arbitration against ASIC within three years from the date of the accident, her UIM claim against ASIC was time-barred. The U.S. district court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of ASIC, determining that the three-year limitations period set forth in the policy did not violate public policy. On appeal, the court of appeals certified a question of law to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which answered by holding that Rhode Island would not enforce the contractual limitations clause in this case because it began to run on the date of the accident rather than the date the insurance contract was breached and was shorter than the statutory limitations period. View "Am. States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam" on Justia Law

The Providence School Board (Board) provided health insurance to active employees and retirees. In 2006, the Providence Teachers Union (Union) filed a grievance protesting a difference in the increase of premium costs for retirees compared with a more modest increase in premium costs for active employees. The Union argued that the Board's action violated three provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the board and the union. An arbitrator ruled in the Union's favor, concluding that the Board violated the CBA by failing to include retirees and active employees in a single group when it calculated the healthcare premium rates. The trial justice vacated the arbitration award, concluding (1) the Union did not have standing to pursue a grievance on behalf of retirees, and (2) the issue of the calculation of the group premium rate was not arbitrable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to Arena v. City of Providence and City of Newport v. Local 1080, the Union could not pursue this grievance on behalf of the retirees; and (2) because the Union had no standing to pursue this particular grievance, the grievance was not arbitrable. View "Providence Sch. Bd. v. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in a motor-vehicle collision with an underinsured driver (Tortfeasor). Tortfeasor was insured by Progressive Insurance Company (Progressive). Progressive paid Plaintiff its policy limits of $25,000. Plaintiff then sought recovery for personal injuries pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions (UM/UIM coverage) of her policy with Encompass Insurance Company (Encompass). Arbitrators issued a total award of $172,750. Plaintiff sought confirmation of the arbitration award. Encompass objected, arguing that Plaintiff's UM/UIM policy provided $100,000 maximum coverage, that Encompass had paid the policy limits in accordance with the insurance contract, and that, under Rhode Island law, Plaintiff was not entitled to recover from Encompass in excess of her policy limits. The trial justice vacated the portion of the award in excess of the $100,000 policy limit and confirmed the remainder of the arbitration award. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court and directed that the arbitration award be reinstated in its entirety, holding that the superior court was incorrect in its interpretation of the law, and no grounds for modification or vacation of the award existed. View "Wheeler v. Encompass Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner was severely injured when he was assaulted by a stranger in the West End of the City of Providence. Petitioner had been sent to that location by his employer, Verizon New England. Petitioner subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial judge denied Petitioner's request, concluding that Petitioner's injuries were noncompensable under Rhode Island's actual-risk test, which requires that there be some causal connection between the injury suffered by the employee and the employment or the conditions of employment. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decree of the appellate division and remanded, holding that Petitioner's injuries were compensable under the street-peril doctrine. View "Ellis v. Verizon New England, Inc." on Justia Law

Pearl Archambault died while in the care of Haven Health Center of Greenville (Haven Health) after a nurse mistakenly administered a lethal overdose of morphine. The administratrix of her estate, Plaintiff, filed a medical malpractice action against Haven Health. Health Haven subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Thereafter, Plaintiff amended her complaint to add Columbia Casualty Company, the professional liability insurer of Health Haven, as a defendant and asserted two counts against Columbia directly based on R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.4, which permits an injured party to proceed against an insurer when the insured has filed for bankruptcy. The superior court entered default judgment against Haven Health. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment against Columbia, holding that the superior court erred in interpreting Rhode Island law and that the insurance contract between Columbia and Health Haven should be construed in Plaintiff's favor. View "Peloquin v. Haven Health Ctr. of Greenville, LLC" on Justia Law

Dean Pepper, the owner and sole shareholder of D.F. Pepper Construction (DFP) was driving one of his trucks home in the early winter morning. An icy road caused the truck to slide into Pepper's house and crash through the foundation and west wall. The house was later condemned and demolished as a result of the damage. The house was insured by Nationwide Casualty Insurance Company. Nationwide paid the loss. As subrogee of Pepper, Nationwide then sued DFP, the registered owner of the truck, alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Pepper. The superior court issued judgment in favor of Nationwide, finding that Pepper had been negligent and that the antisubrogation rule did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Pepper Constr., Inc." on Justia Law