Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Employee was injured while in the course of scope of his employment through the actions of a third-party tortfeasor (Tortfeasor). Employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits and a lawsuit against Tortfeasor. Employer intervened in the lawsuit to protect its subrogation lien against any recovery from Tortfeasor. Employee settled the lawsuit with Tortfeasor and dismissed the case. Employer filed a motion to set the case for trial, asserting that it was entitled to a lien against the settlement proceeds for the cost of future medical benefits that may be paid on behalf of Employee. After initially setting the case for trial, the trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that future medical expenses are not too speculative as a matter of law to be included in an employer's lien against the proceeds of a suit against a third-party tortfeasor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employer failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, as Employer's subrogation lien against the proceeds of the settlement did not extend to the cost of future medical benefits to which Employee may be entitled. View "Cooper v. Logistics Insight Corp." on Justia Law

Jerry and Martha Garrison witnessed their son's injuries after he was struck by a car. The son died afterwards. The Garrisons filed a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the owner and driver of the car. The Garrisons also served a copy of the complaint upon their insurance company, State Farm, pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of their policy. The policy covered damages for "bodily injury," and "bodily injury" was defined in the policy as "bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease, or death that results from it." The trial court determined that the "bodily injury" provision of the uninsured motorist statute covered mental injuries, and therefore, the policy provided, by operation of law, coverage for the Garrisons' emotional distress claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as applied to this case, "bodily injury" did not include damages for emotional harm alone; and (2) the definition of "bodily injury" in the policy did not conflict with the uninsured motorist statute. View "Garrison v. Bickford " on Justia Law

In the workers' compensation case underlying this interlocutory appeal, Employee and Employer were unable to reach a resolution. A benefit review report submitted at 10:25 a.m. on October 20, 2011 memorialized the impasse. On the same day, Employee filed a complaint seeking workers' compensation benefits in the chancery court. The time stamp affixed by the court clerk indicated the complaint was filed at 10:22 a.m. In response to Employee's complaint, Employer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Employee's complaint had been filed prematurely. After Employee filed affidavits averring he did not file the complaint until after he received the benefit review repor, the chancery court determined it had subject matter jurisdiction and denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a complaint may not be filed until the time noted on the benefit review report; and (2) when a complaint bears an unambiguous time stamp, it shall be deemed filed t the time indicated, and the time stamp may not be impeached by extrinsic evidence. View "Word v. Metro Air Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue was whether there was liability insurance coverage for Plaintiffs' injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of Insured's bar and restaurant. Insurer denied coverage and declined to defend Insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. The trial court entered an order finding that the altercation was covered under both the commercial general liability and liquor liability provisions of the policy. The court of appeals ruled that the liquor liability coverage agreement provided coverage for the judgments but that the commercial general liability agreement provided no coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there was no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there was no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage; and (2) estoppel by judgment did not apply to collaterally estop Insurer from arguing the lack of coverage.

After an automobile accident between Insured's van and a motorcycle, Insurer filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the van was covered under a commercial policy or a personal policy with lower liability limits. Insurer alleged that before the accident Insured had instructed his insurance agent to transfer the van from the commercial policy to the personal policy. Insured denied this and alleged that he had instructed the agent to retain the van on the commercial policy. The trial court ruled that because Insurer had sent Insured a letter and premium bills showing the change in coverage and Insured had paid the bills without objection, Insured had ratified the transfer and the van was covered under the personal policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals but on different grounds, holding (1) the action of the insurance agent in transferring the van to the personal policy was not subject to ratification by Insured because the insurance agent was not acting in Insured's stead or for his benefit when it made the transfer; and (2) Insurer was estopped from denying coverage under the commercial policy.

Defendant contractor entered into a contract to replace a roof. When the newly installed roof developed leaks, Defendant hired an independent contractor to make repairs. While performing the work, the independent contractor caused a fire, resulting in a large insurance claim by the homeowners. As subrogor to the homeowners' rights and claims arising out of the fire, Plaintiff insurance company sued Defendant in tort and contract. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that because Defendant had subcontracted the work, he could not be liable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant had an implied non-delegable duty to install the roof in a careful, skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. Remanded.

In this workers' compensation case, Employee was operating a torque gun, which jerked and twisted her right hand while at work. Employee contended that her injury extended into her arm. Employer agreed the injury was compensable but argued that the injury was limited to Employee's index finger. The trial court found that Employee's injury was properly apportioned to her right arm, rather than to her hand or finger, and awarded seventy percent permanent partial disability (PPD) to the right arm. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by apportioning the injury to the arm and that the award of PPD benefits was excessive. The Supreme Court Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed, holding (1) the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's decision to apportion Employee's injury to the arm; and (2) the evidence supported the trial court's award of disability benefits.

A father and his sixteen-year-old son were sued after the son was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle owned, insured, and provided to him by his father. The basis for the suit against the father was the family purpose doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a family member. The trial court granted summary judgment to the father, finding that the family purpose doctrine did not apply. The court of appeals reversed and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied as a matter of law. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, holding that while two of the essential elements of the family purpose doctrine were met in this case, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the last element. Remanded for trial.

Plaintiff was injured while driving his employer's tow truck. Plaintiff filed suit against the driver of the other car involved in the accident, and later sought to invoke his employer's uninsured motorist policy in an amount equal to the liability coverage for bodily injury. The employer's insurer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit uninsured motorist coverage to the amount listed in the policy rather than the amount fixed by statute. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, directing that the insurer's motion for partial summary judgment be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the insured signs an application indicating the selection of uninsured motorist coverage lower than the liability limits but neglects to initial a provision designed to confirm the selection of coverage less than the standard provided by statute, the requirement under Tenn. Code Ann. 56-7-1201(a)(2) that the selection be in writing has been satisfied.