Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned the struggle for control of a family business, the Pittman Nursery Corporation (PNC). The district court ruled that Hortica, insurer for PNC, had a duty to defend three of the five lawsuits at issue. Pursuant to Ark. Code. Ann. 23-79-209(a), the court reversed the district court's denial of fees and remanded for a hearing to determine the proper amount of fees Hortica must pay to PNC for its defense in the declaratory judgment suit. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Hortica's post-verdict judgment as a matter of law (JAML) motion, grant of pre-verdict JAML on PNC's breach of fiduciary duty and punitive claims, and exclusion of certain evidence. View "Hortica-Florists' Mutual Ins. v. Pittman Nursery Corp., et al." on Justia Law

The EPA filed suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq. against Land O'Lakes, alleging that Land O'Lakes was responsible for cleanup costs at a contaminated refinery site. Land O'Lakes subsequently filed suit against its insurers, Wausau and Travelers, seeking payment of defense costs and indemnification under commercial general liability (CGL) policies that the insurers issued in connection with the CERCLA suit. The court concluded that Land O'Lakes's 2009 duty-to-defend claims were barred by the Minnesota statute of limitations where the 2001 Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) letter was a "suit" for arguably-covered damages as contemplated under the pertinent CGL policies. The court also concluded that Land O'Lakes's costs to remediate the refinery site fell within the owned-property exclusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Employers Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

PETCO sought a declaration that ICNA had to defend and indemnify PETCO in an underlying litigation with Medtronic. Medtronic sued PETCO after an aquarium heater it had purchased from PETCO malfunctioned and started a fire at a Medtronic plant. The district court granted ICNA's motion for summary judgment and PETCO appealed. At issue was whether the aquarium heater satisfied a condition precedent to coverage under the policy. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the ground that PETCO failed to identify any mandatory or voluntary safety standard with which the heater complied. View "PETCO Animal Supplies Stores, et al. v. Ins. Co. of North America" on Justia Law

Lexington sought a declaration that it owed Integrity neither coverage nor defenses under an errors and omissions (E&O) insurance policy. Fidelity intervened and subsequently moved for a stay. The court concluded that the district court enjoyed discretion when applying Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., Inc. and it did not abuse its discretion in denying Fidelity's motion for a stay. The court also concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Fidelity's indemnification claims where the two exclusions in the E&O policy, the prior-knowledge exclusion and the lien-waiver exclusion, independently and alternately precluded coverage for the claims as articulated by Fidelity on appeal. The court did not consider the propriety of the district court's election to address third-party beneficiary status nor its substantive determination as to that issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lexington Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Nat'l Fin." on Justia Law

In an insurance coverage dispute with a policyholder, Cincinnati appealed the district court's adverse summary judgment rulings. The policyholder sought a claim of total loss for a vertical lathe that it purchased from a manufacturer in Taiwan and that was destroyed in Los Angeles. Cincinnati denied coverage, claiming that the coverage extension for newly acquired property did not apply. The court concluded that the extension of coverage to "any location you acquire" was ambiguous and, under Iowa law, the court construed that ambiguity in the policyholder's favor. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest under Iowa law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Amera-Seiki Corp. v. The Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Auto-Owners, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. On appeal, Auto-Owners challenged the district court's certification of a class for those policy owners whose policies were issued in North Dakota. The court reversed, concluding that the certified class did not meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23 where the reasonableness of any claim payment may have to be individually analyzed and, therefore, the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class. View "Halvorson, et al. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Indigo and one of its employees filed suit against Advanced and Lile, alleging breach of contract, negligence, conspiracy, and violations of federal law on the theory that Advanced and Lile had intentionally delayed payments on valid insurance claims. Indigo argued on appeal that, despite receiving full reimbursement from the receiver, it suffered an injury because a monthly retention amount it had paid to Advanced was neither credited towards the employee's medical costs nor repaid by Indigo. The court agreed with the district court that Indigo failed to establish standing because Indigo failed to show how any injury had arisen, or might arise in the future, from the alleged conduct. View "Indigo LR LLC, et al. v. Advanced Ins. Brokerage, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking interest on benefits she received under an Accidental Death and Dismemberment (ADD) insurance policy issued by Hartford. The parties disagreed on whether Tennessee law or Missouri law applied. Plaintiff did not dispute Hartford's argument that under Missouri law and the policy language, Hartford paid the benefit to her when it was payable. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to interest under Missouri law. Assuming Tennessee law applied, the court relied on Performance Sys., Inc. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, to conclude that the Tennessee Supreme Court would likely construe "due" in Tenn. Code Ann. 7-14-109(b) to mean the time of payment designated in the policy, not the date of loss. In this instance, Hartford paid the benefit to plaintiff within the time of payment designated in the policy and, therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to interest under subsection (b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Williamson v. Hartford Life & Accident, etc." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in two underlying lawsuits (the Briley Lawsuit and the McSpadden Lawsuit). These underlying lawsuits sought damages arising out of Doe Run's operation of a five-hundred-acre waste pile (Leadwood Pile). The court concluded that the pollution exclusions in the CGL policies precluded a duty to defend Doe Run in the Briley Lawsuit. The court concluded, however, that the McSpadden Lawsuit included allegations and claims that were not unambiguously barred from coverage by the pollution exclusions in the policies. The McSpadden Lawsuit alleged that the distribution of toxic materials harmed plaintiffs, without specifying how that harm occurred. The McSpadden complaint also alleged that Doe Run caused bodily injury or property damage when it left the Leadwood Pile open and available for use by the public without posting warning signs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in an underlying lawsuit. The underlying lawsuit alleged environmental property damage resulting from Doe Run's mine and mill operations. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Lexington had no duty to defend because the policies' absolute pollution exclusions unambiguously barred coverage of all claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law