Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Grinnell on their claim for equitable garnishment of a personal liability insurance policy issued to the sellers of the home. Plaintiffs claimed that the insureds' misrepresentations regarding the condition of the home qualified as a covered occurrence under the policy. The court concluded, however, that the policy provided coverage only for property damage caused by the occurrence. In this instance, there was no property damage caused by the asserted occurrence, and therefore, there was no applicable coverage. Plaintiffs' alternative argument failed where, even if plaintiffs were correct that the structural damage was caused by a covered occurrence, the damage would be excluded from coverage by the policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Payne, et al. v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim with its insurer, Axis, after electrical wiring was stolen from its lumberyard. Axis refused to pay the full claim, citing a coinsurance provision in the policy. Plaintiff brought this action seeking to recover under the policy. The court concluded that the proper interpretation of the coinsurance provision depended on whether the insured had filed an actual cash value claim or a replacement cost claim. Here, plaintiff filed a claim with Axis for the actual value of its stolen wire. In order to calculate whether plaintiff was subject to a coinsurance policy on that claim, then, the term "value" in the coinsurance provision should be read as the actual cash value of plaintiff's saw and planing mills. Therefore, plaintiff was not subject to a coinsurance penalty on its claim for the actual value of the stolen wire; plaintiff was entitled to receive its claim of $725,000 less the $100,000 interim payment made by Axis and two undisputed $25,000 deductibles; and plaintiff was entitled to a judgment in the amount of $575,000. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Buddy Bean Lumber Co. v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Spirtas was hired to demolish a bridge and it hired a subcontractor for the blasting and demolition. The full demolition took more time and resources to complete. Spirtas incurred additional costs, and the general contractor withheld some payment from Spirtas. Spirtas made a claim under its commercial general liability policy with Nautilus and, after Nautilus denied the claim, Spirtas sued for declaratory judgment and vexatious refusal to pay. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that Exclusions (j)(5), (j)(6), and (m) of the policy precluded coverage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spirtas Co. v. Nautilus Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved the interpretation of two contractual provisions under Minnesota law: an indemnification clause in a contract between PDSI and Miller and an insurance contract between Harleysville and PDSI which extended insurance coverage to PDSI's indemnification of third parties for tort liability caused, in whole or in part, by PDSI or by those acting on its behalf. The court agreed with the district court's finding that a PDSI employee's suit fell squarely within the indemnity provision of the 1989 Agreement between PDSI and Miller. The court also agreed with the district court's interpretation of the insurance agreements as requiring Harleysville to cover Miller's settlement of the employee's claims. Further, the court concluded that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that PDSI or those acting on its behalf at least partly caused the employee's bodily injury within the terms of the Harleysville policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Physical Distrib. Serv., et al" on Justia Law

In 2005, Curtis McGhee and another individual brought claims against the City alleging violations of civil rights sounding in malicious prosecution. The City sought coverage under insurance policies issued by CIC and Columbia. On appeal, the City and McGhee challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to CIC and Columbia, on CIC's and Columbia's declaratory judgment claims concerning coverage under the various insurance policies. The court concluded that the district court correctly refused to consider and correctly denied additional discovery of extrinsic evidence. The court also concluded that the alleged malicious prosecution and resulting personal injuries occurred when the underlying charges were filed against McGhee in 1977. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the following policies did not afford coverage to the City for the malicious prosecution claims: the two excess liability policies issued by CIC; four of the special excess liability policies issued by Columbia; and the commercial umbrella liability policy issued by Columbia. As to the 1977-78 special excess liability policy issued by Columbia, the court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the applicability of the reasonable expectations doctrine. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Chicago Ins. Co., et al v. City of Council Bluffs, et al" on Justia Law

After Lumbermens denied Smith Flooring's claim for loss of one of their buildings, Smith Flooring filed suit alleging breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment as to the terms of the insurance policy. Lumbermens removed the case to the district court and counterclaimed for reformation of the insurance policy. The court held that the district court erred in finding that there were no issues common to the parties' legal and equitable claims; Smith Flooring had a Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury on the common issue of what the terms of the intended contract were; the district court also erred in treating the jury's verdict as merely advisory under Rule 39 insofar as this issue was concerned; however, the district court's error did not necessitate reversal of its granting post-verdict judgment as a matter of law to Lumbermens. The court further held that the evidence in this case was not sufficient to support the jury's verdict in Smith Flooring's favor. Because there was no coverage for the building, it followed that Lumbermens did not breach its contract in denying Smith Flooring's proof of loss. With no breach, Lumbermens owed Smith Flooring no damages. The district court was correct to find that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence demonstrated that the policy did not accurately set forth the agreement between the parties and that the building at issue be excluded from coverage. Consequently, the district court did not err in reforming the policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Smith Flooring v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Beneficiaries of the deceased sued WSLAC after it denied life insurance benefits to the beneficiaries on the basis that the deceased had not disclosed her Hepatitis B on the application. A reasonable jury could conclude that the deceased gave truthful answers about her medical condition and that the agent recorded them incorrectly. It could also conclude that the deceased did not examine the application. The disputed facts were material because there was a genuine issue as to whether the deceased knew of misrepresentation in the application. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yang, et al v. Western-Southern Life Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Clarinet sued Essex alleging that Essex wrongfully refused to pay Clarinet under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Clarinet sought payment for expenses for stabilizing and demolishing a building that it owned, in accordance with Clarinet's interpretation of the policy. Essex denied coverage and refused payment. The insurance policy contained several conditions and exclusions, including the owned property exclusion. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Essex and denied relief to Clarinet because the owned property exclusion barred coverage. View "Clarinet v. Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law

AEGIS, an insurer, appealed from the district court's denial of its motion to compel alternative dispute resolution in its dispute with UEC. The court agreed with the district court that by agreeing in the endorsement of the contract to submit to the jurisdiction of Missouri state courts, AEGIS agreed to have any dispute relating to the insurance or to the claim resolved in those courts. Thus, the endorsement entirely supplanted the condition's mandatory arbitration provision. Even if the policy as a whole were ambiguous as to the mandatory arbitration, the court concluded that UEC would still prevail because it would be entitled to have the ambiguity resolved in its favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Union Electric Co. v. AEGIS Energy Syndicate 1225" on Justia Law

Betty Lu Hughes appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment declaring Owners was not obligated to cover her claim for damages caused by an underinsured motorist. The court concluded that the Owners policy's underinsured motorist coverage did not cover Hughes's claims because the underinsured motorist's liability insurance bodily limit was not "less than" $100,000 as required by the policy's unambiguous definition of "underinsured automobile." The court need not reach the alternative argument that, even if the underinsured motorist's vehicle was "underinsured," the Owners policy set-off provision reduced the amount available under the Owners policy to zero. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Owners Ins. Co. v. Hughes" on Justia Law